The liquidity effects associated with addition of a stock to the S&P 500 index: evidence from bid/ask spreads

This study examines changes in stock liquidity, as measured by the bid/ask spread, when a stock is added to the S&P 500 Index. The paper presents evidence of a significant decrease in the bid/ask spread upon S&P 500 addition, however, this effect is limited to only those stocks that were not trading listed options. Further, the decrease in the bid/ask spread for nonoptioned stocks is accompanied by a significant and permanent increase in share price and trading volume. While optioned stocks experience a permanent increase in trading volume, they experience only a temporary increase in share price. The findings for optioned stocks support the hypothesis that the price and volume effects associated with S&P 500 addition derive from temporary price pressure. Findings pertaining to the nonoptioned stocks indicate that the price and volume effects associated with S&P addition reflect enhanced stock liquidity. The decrease in the bid/ask spread for nonoptioned stocks is attributed to informational efficiencies achieved via index arbitrage trading, and it is argued that this effect is mitigated for optioned stocks due to the pre-existence of arbitrage trading between the option and the underlying stock.     

Short-term market reaction after extreme price changes of liquid stocks

In our empirical study we examine the dynamics of the price evolution of liquid stocks after experiencing a large intra-day price change, using data from the NYSE and the NASDAQ. We find a significant reversal for both intra-day price decreases and increases. Volatility, volume and, in the case of the NYSE, the bid–ask spread, which increase sharply at the event, stay significantly high days afterwards. The decay of the volatility follows a power law in accordance with the `Omori law'. While on the NYSE the large widening of the bid–ask spread eliminates most of the profits that can be achieved by an outside investor, on the NASDAQ the bid–ask spread stays almost constant, yielding significant short-term profits. The results thus give an insight into the size and speed of the realization of an excess return for providing liquidity in a turbulent market.     

High frequency lead/lag relationships — Empirical facts

Lead/lag relationships are an important stylized fact at high frequency. Some assets follow the path of others with a small time lag. We provide indicators to measure this phenomenon using tick-by-tick data. Strongly asymmetric cross-correlation functions are empirically observed, especially in the future/stock case. We confirm the intuition that the most liquid assets (short intertrade duration, narrow bid/ask spread, small volatility, high turnover) tend to lead smaller stocks. However, the most correlated stocks are those with similar levels of liquidity. These lead/lag relationships become more and more pronounced as we zoom on significant events. We reach 60% of accuracy when forecasting the next midquote variation of the lagger using only the past information of the leader, which is significantly better than using the information of the lagger only. However, a naive strategy based on market orders cannot make any profit of this effect because of the bid/ask spread.     

Related securities and price discovery: Evidence from NYSE-listed Non-U.S. stocks

In this paper we analyze whether handling related securities improves a market maker's information environment and helps to incorporate new information in stock prices. Our empirical tests are focused on New York Stock Exchange specialists and the U.S. share in price discovery of 64 British and French companies cross-listed on the NYSE. We define related securities as stocks from the same country, the same region, or other foreign stocks. We find strong evidence that a higher prominence of related stocks in the specialist portfolio is associated with a higher U.S. share in price discovery of our sample firms. We interpret our findings as evidence that concentrating market makers in similar stocks reduces information asymmetries and improves the information environment as market makers can extract information relevant to a stock from order flow to related securities. To support our argument, we show that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is negatively related to the prominence of other foreign stocks in the specialist portfolio.     

American futures options arbitrage: evidence from the Nikkei 225 options market

Previous studies have examined the profitability of European index options arbitrage. This paper adds to the literature by investigating the arbitrage profitability of American index options—the Nikkei 225 index futures options traded on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). Using the real-time bid–ask prices, we find evidence of profitable arbitrage opportunities, while the frequency of observations violating no-arbitrage bounds and the magnitude of arbitrage profits decrease with the level of transaction costs. Our results have implications for the analysis of American options market efficiency. Failure to use bid–ask prices may lead to biased conclusions.     

Effects of large shareholding on information asymmetry and stock liquidity

Prior studies, such as Claessens et al.’s [Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholding. Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2771], suggest that deviation between ultimate control and ownership decreases firm value (due to the entrenchment effects of large shareholding). Using a sample of Canadian firms, we study the relation of ultimate control and ownership with an important dimension of stock liquidity – bid–ask spread. We find that stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component of their bid–ask spread and wider bid–ask spread. Our results are consistent with the notion that the ultimate owners of these stocks may have selfish agendas. To increase the probability of the agendas being implemented, the firms may have poor information disclosure, resulting in poor stock liquidity.     

Momentum and contrarian strategies in international stock markets: Further evidence

Previous studies have shown that market participants underestimate earnings growth for past winner stocks, and that growth stocks are more sensitive to earnings surprises. These findings suggest implementing momentum strategies with growth stocks. This study investigates linkages between value versus growth investment styles and momentum strategies in international markets. In addition, we extend Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)-type tests, which attempt to distinguish between competing explanations of the momentum phenomenon, to international market indices. Our full sample results show that momentum profits are concentrated in the growth indices, and that there is evidence of short-term overreaction in these and other indices that is subsequently corrected. Our subsample results are mixed; there is some evidence that the profitability of momentum (but not contrarian) strategies persists in the post-December 1987 period. However, unlike the earlier period, there is no evidence that markets overreact and that these overreactions are subsequently corrected.     

Insider trading,growth opportunities and the market reaction to new financing announcements*

Abstract

This paper explores the profitability of momentum strategies, by investigating if a momentum strategy is superior to a benchmark model once the effects of data-snooping have been accounted for. Two data sets are considered. The first set of data consists of US stocks and the second one consists of Swedish stocks. For the US data strong evidence is found of a momentum effect and hence the hypothesis of weak market efficiency is rejected. Splitting the sample in two parts, it is found that the overall significance is driven by events in the earlier part of the sample. The results for the Swedish data indicate that momentum strategies based on individual stocks generate significant profits. A very weak or no momentum effect can be found when stocks are sorted into portfolios. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, results show that data-snooping bias can be very substantial. Neglecting the problem would lead to very different conclusions.     

Price,volume and spread effects associated with the expiry of lock-in agreements: Evidence from the Hong Kong IPO market

We examine the price, volume and bid–ask spread reactions to lock-in expiries in Hong Kong IPOs. We show that the lock-in expiry causes an increase in both trading volume and bid–ask spread, but no significant change in the share price. We attribute the absence of a price reaction to the fact that most of the Hong Kong IPO firms are controlled by one or two non-institutional shareholders who choose not to sell their shares after the lock-in expiry. Another plausible reason for the absence of a price reaction may be the period studied by this paper which follows the publication of a number of studies on lock-in expiry. The publication of the anomaly may have arbitraged away any gains internationally. The absence of significant abnormal returns around the lock-in expiry confirms the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Our results are consistent with the European evidence, but contradict the findings of most US studies. We show that the volume and spread increases are not caused by the sales by locked-in insiders around the lock-in expiry. The volume increase may be caused by the presence of undisclosed insider transactions around the lock-in expiry. This may well be the case, since the insider trading disclosure requirement does not apply to transactions that result in a change of less than one percentage point to an insider holding. Finally, we show that the wider spread is likely to be caused by market makers charging high information rent to protect themselves against potential trading with informed insiders.     

Relative performance of bid–ask spread estimators: Futures market evidence

The issue of transaction costs is the mainstay of the equity market microstructure. Research in the microstructure of futures markets has lagged behind. A primary reason is that futures exchanges in the U.S. do not record bid–ask quotes, requiring these costs to be imputed from transaction price data. A reliable estimator of bid–ask spreads would significantly enhance microstructure research in futures markets. Unique intraday data from the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) that include both transaction prices and bid–ask spreads allow us to compare bid–ask spread estimation techniques proposed in the literature against the benchmark of actual spreads in a futures market, and thus identify the best-performing estimator. To maximize relevance, we impose all the constraints that apply in U.S. futures data to perform our estimations. We find that the four bid–ask spread estimators considered significantly underestimate the actual spreads. However, simple moments-based estimators perform better in predicting spreads.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection

Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, was designed to prohibit disclosure of material private information to selected market participants. The informational advantage such select participants gain is unclear. If multiple “insiders” receive identical information, private information is immediately incorporated in price and each insider has zero expected profit. If, on the other hand, Regulation FD has curtailed the flow of information from firms, private information becomes longer‐lived and more valuable. Hence, market makers will demand increased compensation by widening the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread. We identify the cost components of the bid‐ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. Controlling for other factors affecting the spread, we find that adverse selection costs increase approximately 36% after Regulation FD. We interpret our finding as Regulation FD failing to achieve one of its desired objectives.     

Information asymmetry of fair value accounting during the financial crisis

We examine whether US banks’ fair value net assets, measured according to the three-level hierarchy introduced in SFAS 157, are associated with information asymmetry during the 2008 financial crisis. Our results show that bid–ask spread, a proxy for information asymmetry, is positively associated with fair value net assets, and the degree of association is contingent upon the three-level hierarchy, with bid–ask spreads being lowest for Level 1 (the most transparent valuation inputs) and highest for Level 3 (the least observable). Also, there is some evidence that SFAS 157 led to a reduction in bid–ask spread, and we find that quarterly changes in Level 1 and Level 2 fair value net assets are significantly associated with changes in bid–ask spread in 2008 when the spread was rapidly rising, but not in 2009 when it was falling. Our findings suggest that the three-level hierarchy under SFAS 157 provides investors with useful information, and fair value is associated with uncertainty, as measured by bid–ask spread, before and during the financial crisis.     

The 52-week high strategy and information uncertainty

This paper examines the driver of the 52-week high strategy, which is long in stocks close to their 52-week high price and short in stocks with a price far below their one-year high, and tests the hypothesis that this strategy’s profitability can be explained by anchoring—a behavioral bias. To test the null, we examine whether the 52-week high criterion has more predictive power in cases of larger information uncertainty. This hypothesis is based on the psychological insight that behavioral biases increase in uncertainty. For six proxies of ambiguity, we document a positive relationship to returns of 52-week high winner stocks and a negative relationship to returns of 52-week high loser stocks. The opposite effect of information uncertainty on winner and loser stocks implies that the 52-week high profits are increasing in uncertainty measures. Moreover, the study documents that the six variables have a similar impact on momentum profits. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that anchoring explains the profits of the 52-week high strategy and that it is the driver of the momentum anomaly.     

Option trading after the opening bell and intraday stock return predictability

Prior literature finds that information is reflected in option markets before stock markets, but no study has explored whether option volume soon after market open has predictive power for intraday stock returns. Using novel intraday signed option-to-stock volume data, we find that a composite option trading score (OTS) in the first 30 min of market open predicts stock returns during the rest of the trading day. Such return predictability is greater for smaller stocks, stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, and stocks with higher bid–ask spreads relative to their options’ bid–ask spreads. Moreover, OTS is a significantly stronger predictor of intraday stock returns after overnight earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that option trading in the 30 min after the opening bell has predictive power for intraday stock returns.     

Slow diffusion of information and price momentum in stocks: Evidence from options markets

This paper investigates the source of price momentum in the stock market using information from options markets. We provide direct evidence of the gradual information diffusion model in Hong and Stein (1999): momentum profits are larger for stocks whose information diffuses slowly into the stock market. We exploit the options markets to identify stocks with slow information diffusion speed. As informed traders trade options to realize the information that has not been fully incorporated in the stock price, we are able to enhance the momentum strategy by selecting winner/loser stocks with high growth/large drop in call option implied volatility. Our empirical strategy generates a risk-adjusted alpha of 1.8% per month over the 1996–2011 period, during which the simple momentum strategy fails to perform. The results are robust to the impact of earnings announcement, transaction costs, industry concentration, and choice of options’ moneyness and time-to-maturity. Finally, our finding is not driven by existing stock- or option-related characteristics that are known to improve momentum.     

The impact of tick size on intraday stock price behavior: evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange

This research examines the impact of tick size on intraday stock price behavior for stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the 2-year period of 1998–1999. The sample involves the same 80 firms that trade under the tick size of (New Taiwan Dollars) NT$0.1 and NT$0.5, respectively. The sample firms display a U-shaped intraday pattern of bid–ask spread, volatility, autocorrelation, and trading volume. The empirical results indicate that a larger tick size is associated with a wider bid–ask spread, larger volatility, and more negative autocorrelation. Moreover, a larger tick size is associated with a higher percentage increase of bid–ask spread and volatility in the middle of the trading period. Finally, the effect of tick size on trading volume is insignificant.     

Effect of the Actual Size Rule Under Market Stress

We examine the introduction of the Actual Size Rule (ASR) on Nasdaq during a control period and a period of market stress. We find that market makers in both ASR and Non-ASR stocks reduce quotation sizes and widen spreads when under stress but the reduction of quotation size and increase in spread width are significantly larger for ASR stocks. We also examine October 27, when the market was under the most severe stress. We find ASR and Non-ASR stocks have similar reductions in time-weighted quotation ask size when compared with the control sample but ASR bid sizes are about 10% smaller than Non-ASR bid sizes. Our findings imply that the ASR rule may significantly reduce market quality under times of market stress. JEL Classification: 14, G15, G18     

Shorting costs and profitability of long–short strategies

We examine how the profitability of long–short arbitrage strategies based on anomalies is affected after adjustment for two shorting costs: implicit cost due to unavailability of stocks in the short-leg to sell short and loan fees actually paid to stock lenders. The combined shorting cost amounts to almost 40 percent of long–short gross returns over the sample period from January 2006 to December 2017. After adjustment for these shorting costs, long–short arbitrage profits are thus reduced by almost 40 percent. Even after adjustment for risk, the proportion of shorting costs is also substantial. If other trade-related transaction costs are considered, long–short arbitrage profits would be reduced further. Our results provide explicit evidence that casts doubt on the profitability of long-short arbitrage strategies based on anomalies.     

Tick Size,Spreads, and Liquidity: An Analysis of Nasdaq Securities Trading near Ten Dollars

Quoted and effective bid–ask spreads on Nasdaq are two to four cents per share narrower, ceteris paribus, when stocks trade with a smaller tick size below $10 per share. There is no evidence of a reduction in liquidity with the smaller tick size. The largest spread reductions occur for stocks whose market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes. This finding provides support for models implying that changes in the tick size can affect equilibrium spreads on a dealer market and indicates that the relation between tick size and market quality is more complex than the imposition of a constraint on minimum spread widths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G29, D34, N20.     

Effect of the ban on short selling on market prices and volatility

We examine the effects of the short‐selling ban, imposed by Australian regulators in the wake of the global financial crisis, on the trading of financial stocks. Our findings argue against commonly stated reasons for imposing short‐sale bans. We find no evidence that short‐sale restrictions provide support for stock prices or that they reduce volatility. Moreover, stocks subject to the short‐selling ban suffered a severe degradation in market quality. Controlling for the adverse effects of the financial crisis on markets, we show that short‐selling restrictions increase intraday volatility, reduce trading activity and increase bid–ask spreads.