基准管理:获取企业竞争优势的新途径

<正> 基准管理产生在美国,施乐公司是实施和研究基准管理的先行者。之后,迅速引起美国企业界和研究机构对基准管理的浓厚兴趣,包括杜邦公司、通用汽车公司、IBM和柯达等在内的公司纷纷仿效,推动了基准管理的研究和实践,使其成为企业赢得竞争优势的一种全新的管理理念。     

竞争导向的时代

商场就是战场!这是说经营者必须知己知彼,扬长避短,以求在竞争中处于有利地位。商场不是战场!这是说竞争各方在争夺顾客时,不能使用阴损毒辣的招数,必须按市场规则进行。另外,竞争的目的不是消灭对手,因此竞争各方有可能在拼杀中共生共荣,而战争则是你死我活,我胜你降。因此,说到竞争导向时,千万别忽略了顾客导向。     

质量管理:提高企业竞争优势的基本途径

当今,质量是全球追求的目标.如何进行质量的全面有效管理已经成为全世界的共同语言.特别是在全球化趋势越来越明显,全球经济越来越紧密联系的21世纪之初,一个企业要想在某个行业中拥有一席之地,就必须实行全面质量管理.     

质量管理在半导体产业竞争中的主导地位

随着科学技术的不断进步与发展,半导体产业正在成长与壮大,各类的半导体制造企业如雨后春笋般涌现出来。半导体产业的竞争也越来越激烈,在生产过程中,对于生产效率、产品质量和制造成本等三要素的控制起着至关重要的作用,而在这其中产品的质量控制始终处于主导地位,已成为企业创造高额经济效益的重要手段。     

标杆管理——企业获取竞争优势的新方法

<正> 一、标杆管理的起源及发展 标杆管理(Benchmarking),又叫基准化管理、对标管理。起源于20世纪70年代末美国企业学习日本企业的运动中。标杆管理先驱是施乐公司,后经美国生产力与质量中心系统化和     

浅说电力设备企业质量管理

质量管理有利于打造企业品牌,增强市场竞争力。本文概述了电力设备企业质量管理的极端性,就质量管理的问题成因进行了剖析,同时给出了相应的对策,以资助同行企业更好地强化质量管理,最终得以赢得市场。     

An introduction to mechanized reasoning

Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but–to date–this work has not yet been properly presented in economics journals. We introduce mechanized reasoning to economists in three ways. First, we introduce mechanized reasoning in general, describing both the techniques and their successful applications. Second, we explain how mechanized reasoning has been applied to economic problems, concentrating on the two domains that have attracted the most attention: social choice theory and auction theory. Finally, we present a detailed example of mechanized reasoning in practice by means of a proof of Vickrey’s familiar theorem on second-price auctions.     

ODM模式下质量管理现状及对策分析

随着全球经济一体化,产业分工日趋细化,电子产业大量发展,因此在电子制造行业,设计生产外包的委托加工生产方式在世界范围内逐步生成的一种普遍现象.而质量管理又是项目管理的重要要素之一.阐述了ODM模式下质量管理的现状与问题,并就如何使用六西格玛(DMAICR)方法进行产品导入过程中质量管理流程的改善进行了深入的介绍和分析.     

Price and quality competition with quality positions

In this study, we investigate price and quality decisions in a duopoly in the presence of firms’ quality positions , which are determined by the quality levels of their existing core products. Into a standard model of vertical differentiation, we incorporate a “repositioning cost” that is proportional to the quality differences between firms’ current and new products. By varying the levels of quality positions, we analyze the impact of this cost on the equilibrium outcomes. Our results show that the presence of repositioning costs restricts firms’ abilities to improve profitability and differentiate themselves vertically. As a result, a high‐positioned firm does not necessarily have a competitive advantage over a low‐positioned firm, even if the former offers a superior new product in equilibrium. In addition, if a low‐positioned firm is significantly cost‐efficient compared with its rival with regard to repositioning, then that firm can earn higher profits than those of a high‐positioned firm by strategically offering its low‐end product. These results contrast sharply with those based on the standard vertical differentiation model.     

ISO 9000: a guide to world-class quality standards

World standards for determining companies' commitment to continuous quality improvement (CQI) have been established. These standards are collectively known as ISO-9000. Prudent buyers of goods and services for health care organizations that are also committed to CQI should understand these standards and use them to facilitate supplier certification.     

Potential competition and quality disclosure

This study presents a model of quality disclosure in which an incumbent, through its quality and disclosure choices, influences the potential that a new entrant enters the market. In this regard, we consider a sequential framework in which the incumbent chooses its quality and decides whether to disclose it to the market; subsequently, the entrant makes the same decisions, if it enters the market. We show that the potential competition can create strategic incentives for the incumbent to choose nondisclosure, because the availability of information about the incumbent's quality promotes entry by enhancing the entrant's expected profit from the market. In addition, an analysis of the effects of mandatory disclosure laws suggests that they can be effective in encouraging new market entrants and in improving the product quality of established firms.