An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

Greenhouse gas emissions build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. We identify weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria with full participation in a game of international emission reduction. Treaties are easier to reach for long-lived than for short-lived gases.     

SUSTAINABLE CONSTANT CONSUMPTION IN A SEMI‐OPEN ECONOMY WITH EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES*

To sustain constant consumption, Hartwick's rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwick's rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi‐open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

The importance of the design of market-based instruments for CO2 mitigation: An AGE analysis for Spain

In the past few decades, economists have defended the use of market-based instruments (MBI) in environmental and climate policy. There have been many papers which have compared the costs of attaining environmental objectives with MBIs and with command and control instruments. However very few have compared different MBIs in examining these costs. This paper seeks to analyse various MBIs for CO₂ mitigation from the viewpoint of cost-effectiveness, using an AGE (applied general equilibrium) model for the case of Spain. A distinction is drawn between (1) quantity instruments, which represent different extents of a market for emission permits; and (2) price instruments, which represent different types of tax. Each instrument can affect different segments of the emission sources and therefore can have very different effects on the economy as a whole. We show how MBI can help to minimise mitigation costs, but also how taxes and tradable emission permits that are limited or constrained by many exemptions and distortions can raise costs considerably.     

Price and quantity regulation in general equilibrium

We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity shock by increasing input use. Thus price regulation generates higher average, but more variable, production. Therefore, we show that in general equilibrium the relative advantage of quantity versus price regulation depends not only on the slopes of marginal benefits and costs, but on general equilibrium effects such as risk aversion. The general equilibrium effects are often more important than the slopes of the marginal benefits and cost curves. In the simplest model, a reasonable risk aversion coefficient implies quantity regulation generates higher welfare regardless of the benefit function.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

Environmental regulation and investment: Evidence from European industry data

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of environmental regulation on investment. In particular, we ask whether and how strongly an industry's investment responds to stringency in environmental regulation. Environmental regulation is measured as (i) an industry's total current expenditure on environmental protection, and (ii) a country-industry's revenue from environmental taxes. Focusing on European data of manufacturing industries between 1998 and 2007, we estimate the differential impact of environmental stringency on four types of investment: gross investment in tangible goods, in new buildings, in machinery, and in ‘productive’ investment (investment in tangible goods minus investment in abatement technologies). Both environmental variables enter positively, and their quadratic terms exhibit significantly negative parameter estimates. This, in turn, indicates a positive but diminishing impact of environmental regulation on investment.     

Reliability of individual valuations of public and private goods: Choice consistency, response time, and preference refinement

We examined the reliability of a large set of paired comparison value judgments involving public goods, private goods, and sums of money. As respondents progressed through a random sequence of paired choices they were each given, their response time decreased and they became more consistent, apparently fine-tuning their responses, suggesting that respondents tend to begin a hypothetical value exercise with relatively imprecise preferences and that experience in expressing preference helps reduce that imprecision. Reliability was greater for private than for public good choices, and greater for choices between a good and a monetary amount than for choices between two goods. However, the reliability for public good choices was only slightly lower than for the private goods.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION: POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE RELATED GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND IN JAPAN

This paper investigates the effect of political factors on the interregional allocation of the budget to assist farmers in coping with agricultural trade liberalization in Japan. We present a simple model to show the relationship between political factors and interregional budget allocation and empirically examine whether political factors played a key role in the interregional allocation of Japanese government spending for the Uruguay Round agricultural trade liberalization. Our findings show that this allocation was distorted due to political reasons, which was problematic from the standpoints of fairness and social efficiency.     

Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers

Abstract. We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.     

Optimal environmental taxes and standards: Implications of the materials balance

This paper investigates the implications of the materials balance for optimal environmental policy. We find that neglecting the materials-emissions relationship - as is common in models of optimal environmental regulation - implies biases, whose sign depends on the regulatory instrument chosen. When emissions are regulated through an emission tax, the seemingly optimal tax is too high. When regulation proceeds through the use of an emission standard, the seemingly optimal standard is too lax.     

Environmental regulation and technology transfers

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology imply that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.     

The effect of ambiguous risk, and coordination on farmers' adaptation to climate change — A framed field experiment

The risk of losses of income and productive means due to adverse weather can differ significantly among farmers sharing a productive landscape, and is of course hard to estimate, or even “guesstimate” empirically. Moreover, the costs associated with investments in reduced vulnerability to climatic events are likely to exhibit economies of scope. We explore the implications of these characteristics on farmer's decisions to adapt to climate change using a framed field experiment applied to coffee farmers in Costa Rica. As expected, we find high levels of risk aversion, but even using that as a baseline, we further find that farmers behave even more cautiously when the setting is characterized by unknown or ambiguous risk (i.e. poor or non-reliable risk information). Secondly, we find that farmers, to a large extent, coordinated their decisions to secure a lower adaptation cost, and that communication among farmers strongly facilitated coordination.     

The impact of climate on life satisfaction

We analyse the influence of climate on average life satisfaction in 79 countries using data from the World Values Survey. Climate is described in terms of ‘degree-months’ calculated as the cumulated monthly deviations from a base temperature of 65 °F (18.3 °C). Our results suggest that countries with climates characterised by a large number of degree-months enjoy significantly lower levels of life satisfaction. This finding is robust to a wide variety of model specifications. Using our results to analyse a particular climate change scenario associated with the IPCC A2 emissions scenario points to major losses for African countries, but modest gains for Northern Europe.     

Implications of happiness research for environmental economics

Using happiness data to study economic issues is a burgeoning field in recent economic literature. This paper shows that happiness research has considerable potential for environmental economic analysis. The paper discusses some implications of happiness research for environmental policy analysis, specifically with respect to the level of socially optimal environmental quality. It discusses evidence that consumer choice may be not utility maximizing and systematically distorted away from intrinsically motivated options, especially environment-friendly consumption. Finally, the paper describes how happiness data can be used in a novel approach to the monetary valuation of environmental quality and discusses the associated benefits and problems in relation to conventional methods.     

FISCAL STRUCTURAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: PUBLIC SPENDING AND PRIVATE EFFORT*

This paper explores governments' and private agents' incentives to implement or postpone fiscal structural reform attempts. Both fiscal consolidation and fiscal reorganization often create spillover effects and thereby induce free‐riding problems. It is thus important to cope with the free‐riding behaviour of interest groups. It is often argued that in order to attain successful outcomes, a good macroeconomic situation is needed, since we expect positive income effects. In this paper, we first explain the dynamic aspects of insufficient fiscal consolidation due to free‐riding problems in the framework of private provision of public goods. Then, using a static model between central and local governments, we examine the sign of income effects for reform attempts to pursue fiscal reorganization. It is shown that good economic circumstances do not necessarily enhance reform of reorganizing fiscal expenditures, although it could enhance fiscal reconstruction.     

The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec

In the absence of oppression, citizens of a sub-unit who contemplate secession carefully weigh the benefits and costs of different outcomes. Here these costs are shown to be highly variable: they depend on the strategic behavior of each state and on whether cooperative relations would be re-established after secession. Using Quebec as a case, it is shown that threats of non-cooperation by the predecessor state may be discounted as not credible. Elementary game theory, however, shows that, with repeat play, retaliatory non-cooperation could be a rational strategy. Moreover, it is shown that reaching a compromise solution requires a credible threat on the part of the potential secessor to accept a sovereignty where there would be no economic cooperation. In modern welfare states, these risks are severe enough to make secession rare, and incremental constitutional change the norm. For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to Gordon Tullock, Isidoro Massa, other participants at meetings of the Public Choice Society and the European Public Choice Society, Ignatius Horstmann, Douglas Brown, the editors, and two anonymous referees. Errors are mine.     

Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations

This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup.