Formulating wald tests of the restrictions implied by the rational expectations hypothesis

In this paper, we examine the small sample properties of alternative formulations of Wald tests of non-linear restrictions implied by the rational expectations hypothesis. A Monte Carlo analysis is presented as well as an example using Canadian aggregate time series data. The evidence indicates that Wald test results are extremely sensitive in small samples to the way in which the non-linear restrictions in such models are parameterized, with a multiplicative form yielding tests of most accurate size. Least squares degrees of freedom adjustments also improve the sample performance of the tests.     

Testing rational expectations by the use of overidentifying restrictions

A simple econometric test for rational expectations in the case in which unobservable, rationally expected variables appear in a structural equation is presented. Using McCallum's instrumental variable estimator as a base, a test for rational expectations per se and a joint test of rational expectations and hypotheses about the structural equation are presented. The new test is shown to be a new interpretation of Basmann's test of overidentifying restrictions. As an illustration, the hypothesis that the forward exchange rate is the rationally expected future spot exchange rate is tested and rejected.     

Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models

This paper examines different theoretical stability tests of infinite-horizon rational expectations equilibria. These ‘tests’ have different status: two of them express that the considered equilibrium is ‘isolated’ [neither (non-sunspot) equilibria (test 1) nor (well-behaved) sunspot equilibria exist in a neighbourhood (test 2)] and two of them are learning criteria [either standard ‘evolutive learning’ (test 3) or game-theoretical ‘eductive’ learning (test 4)]. Surprisingly, these four tests select the same steady state equilibria in the class of one-dimensional one-step-forward looking economic models. The extension of this equivalence theorem to n-dimensional and then more complex systems is discussed.     

Expectation formation of older married couples and the rational expectations hypothesis

This paper tests the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis regarding retirement expectations of older married American couples, controlling for sample selection and reporting biases. In prior research we found that individual retirement expectation formation was consistent with the Rational Expectation hypothesis, but in that work spousal considerations were not analyzed. In this research we take advantage of panel data on expectations to test the RE hypothesis among married individuals as well as joint expectations among couples. We find that regardless of whether we assume that married individuals form their own expectations taking spouse's information as exogenous, or the reports of the couple are the result of a joint expectation formation process, their expectations are consistent with the RE hypothesis. Our results support a wide variety of models in economics that assume rational behavior of married couples.     

Weakly rational expectations

Aumann and Drèze (2008) characterised the set of interim expected payoffs that players may have in rational belief systems, in which there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. We show here that common knowledge of rationality is not needed: when rationality is satisfied in the support of an action-consistent distribution (a concept introduced by Barelli (2009)), one obtains exactly the same set of rational expectations, despite the fact that in such ‘weakly rational belief systems’ there may not be mutual knowledge of rationality, let alone common knowledge of rationality. In the special case of two-player zero-sum games, the only expected payoff is the minmax value, even under these weak assumptions.     

Limited-dependent rational expectations models with future expectations

This paper examines limited-dependent rational expectations (LD-RE) models containing future expectations of the dependent variable. Limited dependence is of a two-limit tobit variety which may, for example, arise as a result of a policy of imposing limits on the movement of the dependent variable by means of marginal as well as intramarginal interventions. We show that when the forcing variables are serially independent the model has an analytical solution which can be computed by backward recursion. With serially correlated forcing variables, we discuss an approximate solution method, as well as a numerically exact method that, in principle, can be implemented by stochastic simulation, although in practice it is limited by available computational capacity. The paper discusses some properties of the approximate solutions and reports the results of a limited number of Monte Carlo experiments in order to illustrate the computational feasibility of using the exact solution when the fundamentals are serially independent and the approximate solution when they are serially correlated.     

Identification of rational expectations models

This paper deals with the problem of the identification of simultaneous Rational Expectations (RE) models. In the case of RE models with current expectations of the endogenous variables, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the global identification are derived explicitly in terms of the structural parameters and the linear homogenous identifying restrictions. It is shown that in the absence of a priori restrictions on the processes generating the exogenous variables and the disturbances, RE models and general distributed lag models are ‘observationally equivalent’. In the case of RE models with future expectations of the endogenous variables, a general solution that highlights the ‘non-uniqueness’ problem and from which other solutions such as forward or backward solutions can be obtained, is derived. It is shown that untestable and often quite arbitrary restrictions are needed if RE models with future expectations are to be identifiable. Certain order conditions similar to those obtained for the identification of RE models with current expectations are also derived for this case.     

On the solutions in rational expectations models

This paper deals with the solutions to macroeconomic models with rational expectations. A first purpose is to demonstrate that two forms of the efficient-market equation commonly used in the literature may be treated as approximations of the same general equation, of different orders with respect to perturbative forces of the market. Second aim is to show how the perturbative terms can be given explicit forms. Finally, the paper addresses the question of finding contributions which can concur to explain the phenomenon usually referred to asstock price volatility.

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Riassunto Si è interessati alla soluzione di modelli macroeconomici con aspettativa razionale. In primo luogo si vuole dimostrate come due forme differenti dell'equazione del mercato efficiente utilizzate nella letteratura possano essere considerate approssimazioni della stessa equazione generale, di ordini diversi rispetto alle forze perturbative del mercato. Si vuole quindi individuare una tecnica per dare forma esplicita ai termini perturbativi. Infine, si va alla ricerca di contributi che possano concorrere a spiegare il fenomeno noto comevolatilità dei prezzi del mercato azionario.

     

Dangers of commitment under rational expectations

Within a New Keynesian framework, interest rate rules that respond to public expectations lead to determinate and expectationally stable solutions for any level of commitment, as shown by Waters (Macroecon Dyn 13(4):421–449, 2009). That paper also demonstrates gains to commitment, under least square learning, though over-commitment can lead to some very poor outcomes for some parameter values. This paper shows an identical outcome under rational expectations. The optimal level of commitment is unchanged if there are observation errors in the policymaker’s knowledge of public expectations, which is not the case under learning. However, if there is sufficient policymaker uncertainty about the parameter values, partial commitment is best.     

Predictions of short-term rates and the expectations hypothesis

This paper emphasizes that traditional tests of the EH are based on two assumptions: the expectations hypothesis (EH) per se and an assumption about the expectations generating process (EGP) for the short-term rate. Arguing that conventional tests of the EH need to assume EGPs that may be significantly at odds with the true EGP, we investigate this possibility by analyzing the out-of-sample predictive performances of several models for predicting interest rates, including a few models which assume that the EH holds in its functional form that relates long- to short-term yields. Using US riskless yield data for a 1970–2016 monthly sample and testing methods that take into account the parameter uncertainty, the null hypothesis of an equal predictive accuracy of each model relative to the random walk alternative is hardly ever rejected at intermediate and long horizons. This confirms that, at least at a practical level, the main difficulty with the EH is represented by the effective prediction of short-term rates. We discuss the relevance of these findings for central banks’ use of forward guidance.     

Estimation of conditional moment restrictions without assuming parameter identifiability in the implied unconditional moments

A well-known difficulty in estimating conditional moment restrictions is that the parameters of interest need not be globally identified by the implied unconditional moments. In this paper, we propose an approach to constructing a continuum of unconditional moments that can ensure parameter identifiability. These unconditional moments depend on the “instruments” generated from a “generically comprehensively revealing” function, and they are further projected along the exponential Fourier series. The objective function is based on the resulting Fourier coefficients, from which an estimator can be easily computed. A novel feature of our method is that the full continuum of unconditional moments is incorporated into each Fourier coefficient. We show that, when the number of Fourier coefficients in the objective function grows at a proper rate, the proposed estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. An efficient estimator is also readily obtained via the conventional two-step GMM method. Our simulations confirm that the proposed estimator compares favorably with that of Domínguez and Lobato (2004, Econometrica) in terms of bias, standard error, and mean squared error.     

Pooling forecasts in linear rational expectations models

Estimating linear rational expectations models in a limited-information setting requires replacing the expectations of future, endogenous variables either with instrumented, actual values or with forecast survey data. Applying the method of Gottfries and Persson [Empirical examinations of the information sets of economic agents. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 251–259], I show how to augment these methods with actual, future values of the endogenous variables to improve statistical efficiency. The method is illustrated with an application to the US hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve, where traditional, lagged instruments and the median forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters both appear to miss significant information used by price-setters, so that forecast pooling with actual values improves the statistical fit to inflation.     

Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations

In this paper the probability distribution of equilibrium outcomes is assumed to be a continuous but unknown function of agents' forecasts (which are probability measures). Agents start with a prior distribution on the set of mappings from forecasts into probabilities on outcomes. This induces an initial forecast. After observing the equilibrium outcome a posterior distribution is computed which induces a new forecast. The main result is that with probability one the forecasts converge to the set of fixed points of the unknown mapping. This can be interpreted as convergence to rational expectations.     

Optimal policy in Markov-switching rational expectations models

In this paper we consider the optimal quadratic control problem of Markov-switching linear rational expectation models. These models are general and flexible tools for modelling not only regime but also model or parameter uncertainty. We show, first, how to find the solution of a Markov-switching linear rational expectation model. Based on this solution we then show how to apply dynamic programming to find the optimal time-consistent policy and the resulting Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium. Suitable modifications of the algorithm allow to deal with the (non-RE) case in which the policymaker and the private sector hold different beliefs or probabilities over regime change. We also show how the optimisation procedure can be employed to obtain the optimal policy under commitment. As an illustration we compute the optimal policy in a small open economy subject to stochastic structural breaks in some of its key parameters.     

Solving generalized multivariate linear rational expectations models

We generalize the linear rational expectations solution method of Whiteman (1983) to the multivariate case. This facilitates the use of a generic exogenous driving process that must only satisfy covariance stationarity. Multivariate cross-equation restrictions linking the Wold representation of the exogenous process to the endogenous variables of the rational expectations model are obtained. We argue that this approach offers important insights into rational expectations models. We give two examples in the paper—an asset pricing model with incomplete information and a monetary model with observationally equivalent monetary-fiscal policy interactions. We relate our solution methodology to other popular approaches to solving multivariate linear rational expectations models, and provide user-friendly code that executes our approach.     

Conducting inference in semiparametric duration models under inequality restrictions on the shape of the hazard implied by job search theory

Using a four-month panel of revised Current Population Survey data from September–December 1993, we extend the class of semiparametric hazard models of the type first studied by Prentice and Gloeckler ( 1978 ), and brought to the attention of economists by Meyer ( 1988 , 1990 ), to incorporate inequality restrictions on the shape of the hazard. This extension enables us to test hypotheses regarding the shape of the hazard implied by search theory using duration data alone. These tests provide another link between the empirical and theoretical literatures on unemployment duration and job search. The GHK probability simulator makes it straightforward to generate approximate hypothesis test results, as simulation estimates of the probability under the null hypothesis are generated using the asymptotic normal approximation to the distribution of the hazard parameters obtained from maximum likelihood estimation. Importance sampling is used to conduct inference under the null and obtain exact finite sample estimates of the probability the null is satisfied. A new algorithm for maintaining stability of the importance weights is also developed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are employment decisions based on rational expectations?

Conventional employment functions with partial adjustment to output fitted to quarterly data tend to have positively autocorrelated residuals, to imply implausibly high returns to scale and almost always fail tests for parameter stability. The hypothesis of this paper is that mis-specified expectations are the main cause of these findings and rational and adaptive expectations models are compared. Further, employment is conditioned not on output but on variables which firms can more reasonably take as exogenous. ‘Disequilibrium’ features of labour markets are introduced by making adjustment costs depend upon current and expected labour market tightness.One of the implications of rational expectations is that the revision between points in time t and $\text{t ? 1}$ in the expected value of any variable should be independent of any information available before t and serially uncorrelated. Given a model of a forward looking firm whose hiring decisions are subject to quadratic adjustment costs, an appropriately transformed employment equation can be derived which has a very similar structure to the Koyck transformed employment equation which corresponds to adaptive expectations. Maximum likelihood estimation of the adaptive expectations form gives parameter estimates for quarterly British data for the manufacturing sector which are so unreasonable that this hypothesis can be rejected. Maximum likelihood estimation of the rational expectations form would involve modelling the stochastic processes of all the driving variables. However, conditional upon one parameter, consistent estimates of the remaining parameters can be obtained by OLS and these accord well with economic theory. This is the direct evidence in favour of the rational expectations hypothesis. However, it can also explain why the adaptive expectations form gives such poor results and why conventional employment functions give the unsatisfactory results referred to above. Further, rational expectations provides an explanation for the common finding, particularly in the context of employment and the demand for durable goods, of implausibly low or wrong signed levels effects in more general quarterly time series models with lagged dependent variables.     

On the impossibility of insider trade in rational expectations equilibria

Existing no trade results are based on the common prior assumption (CPA). This paper identifies a strictly weaker condition than the CPA under which speculative trade is impossible in a rational expectations equilibrium (REE). As our main finding, we demonstrate the impossibility of speculative asset trade in an REE whenever an insider is involved who knows the asset's true value. To model insider trade as an equilibrium phenomenon an alternative equilibrium concept than the REE is thus required.