Performance, seniority, and wages: formal salary systems and individual earnings profiles

This paper replicates studies by Medoff and Abraham [Quart. J. Eco. 95 1980 703; J. Hum. Res. 16 1981 186] and Flabbi and Ichino [Lab. Eco. 8 2001 359] using personnel data from the Dutch national aircraft manufacturer Fokker. It shows how a formal salary system, as is widely used by large firms, brings about that seniority-wage profiles are largely independent of controls for reported performance in cross-sectional wage regressions even though supervisors' evaluations shape life-cycle earnings profiles. Performance ratings determine how fast a worker climbs the firm's career and wage ladder. The paper also reveals that real wage growth depends on the employer's prosperity, and it demonstrates that formal salary systems cause serial correlation in wage growth and “Green Card” effects.     

The ambiguous effect of minimum wages on hours

In a competitive model we ease the assumption that efficiency units of labour are the product of hours and workers. We show that a minimum wage may either increase or decrease hours per worker and the change will have the opposite sign to the slope of the equilibrium hours hourly wage locus. Similarly, total hours worked may rise or fall. We illustrate the results throughout with a Cobb-Douglas example.     

Union wages,hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements

Small monopoly trade unions decide upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work subject to firm's demand for union members. Since the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by excess unemployment, we study the employment and welfare effects when trade unions try to coordinate their policies. Firstly, we consider a joint agreement about marginal wage moderation, where trade unions remain free to choose the hours of work non-cooperatively. Secondly, we analyze in which way a joint change in the hours of work affects employment and welfare if trade unions are free to choose the wage rate.     

Intra-regional wage variation and regional disparity in the relative earnings of blacks

Studies of the relative earnings of Blacks in the U.S. have found that the ratio of Black to White male earnings is lower in the South than in the rest of the U.S. In this paper, it is argued that the usual methods of estimating earnings ratios are distorted by the omission of variables that generate equalizing wage differences which are place-specific. The results support this contention. It is concluded that the Black-White earnings ratio is only about 2.5 percent lower in the South than outside the South. It is not significantly different for those with less than 16 years of work experience.     

Conditional distributions and the bivariate normal distribution

Summary An alaysis of the extent to which conditional distributions of a bivariate vector characterize bivariate normality is given.     

Conditional distributions of generalized order statistics and some characterizations

Generalized order statistics have been introduced in Kamps (1995a). They enable a unified approach to several models of ordered random variables, e.g. (ordinary) order statistics, record values, sequential order statistics, record values from non-identical distributions. The purpose of this paper is to develop conditional distributions of one generalized order statistic given another and to characterize the underlying continuous distribution by different conditional expectations. Well-known results for ordinary order statistics and record values are extended to generalized order statistics. Received: July 1997     

The impact of working-time reductions on actual hours and wages: evidence from Swedish register-data

The paper studies the impact on actual hours worked and hourly wages of a 5% reduction in working-time for one class of shift workers in Sweden using individual level panel data from employers' payroll records during the second quarter of each year. The main results are that actual hours only declined by approximately 35% of the reduction in standard hours, while hourly wages rose sharply—almost enough to leave monthly wages unaffected. Much larger effects on hours are found when studying the effects of the employees' locally determined scheduled hours. This indicates that a low rate of actual implementation may account for the limited impact on actual hours and suggests that using variation in self-reported, rather than contractual, standard hours may have biased the results of previous studies.     

Predictions of annual earnings using quarterly earnings,annual earnings and dividend payout ratios

This study empirically examines two issues related to forecasting annual accounting earnings. The first issue studied is the improvement in forecasts of annual earnings that can be obtained by including information about dividend payout along with the past earnings series in forecasting models. The second issue deals with the comparative ability of quarterly earnings time series models and annual earnings time series models to predict annual earnings. The results of this study indicate that considerable improvement in predictive ability can be obtained by expanding the information set to include the dividend payout ratio series. The empirical analysis also indicates that time series models developed using annual earnings generate more accurate predictions of annual earnings than do models developed using quarterly earnings.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

Training,productivity and wages in Italy

This paper presents for the first time panel evidence on the productivity and wage effects of training in Italy. It is based on an original dataset which has been created aggregating individual-level data on training with firm-level data on productivity and wages into an industry panel covering all sectors of the Italian economy for the years 1996–1999. I use several modelling specifications and a variety of panel data techniques to argue that training significantly boosts productivity. However, no such effect is uncovered for wages. This seems to suggest that firms do actually reap more of the returns.     

Workplace surveillance,privacy protection,and efficiency wages

Consider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the efficiency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable effort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by costly workplace surveillance. It is argued that a privacy protection law preventing surveillance may increase the total surplus. While such a law reduces the employer's profit, this loss can be overcompensated by the employee's gain, because the employer invests in surveillance not only to implement higher effort, but also to reduce the employee's rent.     

Seniority,experience, and wages in the UK

This paper uses BHPS data to investigate the relative importance of seniority and experience in determining male wages in the UK labor market. Using both the Altonji and Shakotko instrumental variable and the Topel two-step estimation approaches, I find that for all male workers, tenure plays a modest role, increasing wages by about 1% each year over the first 10 years on the job. General labor market experience has a larger role, so that after 30 years wages have increased by about 60%. Individual and job match heterogeneity are important, and should be carefully modeled when estimating wage equations for the British labor market. These results are remarkably similar to the most recent evidence about these relationships in the US labor market. After extending the standard model to include industry and occupation experience, the estimated impact of job seniority becomes negligible for nonunion workers. Instead, the wages of nonunion workers rise because of the accumulation of general and sector-specific experience. The wages of union workers are still found to increase with job seniority over the first ten years with their employer, suggesting that if seniority matters for wages it is only for union workers.     

Noncognitive skills, occupational attainment, and relative wages

This paper examines whether men's and women's noncognitive skills influence their occupational attainment and, if so, whether this contributes to the disparity in their relative wages. We find that noncognitive skills have a substantial effect on the probability of employment in many, though not all, occupations in ways that differ by gender. Consequently, men and women with similar noncognitive skills enter occupations at very different rates. Women, however, have lower wages on average not because they work in different occupations than men do, but rather because they earn less than their male colleagues employed in the same occupation. On balance, women's noncognitive skills give them a slight wage advantage. Finally, we find that accounting for the endogeneity of occupational attainment more than halves the proportion of the overall gender wage gap that is unexplained.     

Job congruence, academic achievement, and earnings

This study combines a widely held view of how earnings are related to education and job tenure (The Mincer model¹) with the notion that earnings are associated with the quality of an employer–employee job match. The quality of an individual's occupational choice is measured using job congruence, a commonly-used construct in the psychometric literature. Better-matched individuals should be more productive and, as a result, have higher earnings. Previous studies were unable to address the importance of job preferences to earnings because available data do not include both job congruence and individual earnings. The Alumni Outcomes Survey, recently produced by ACT Inc., is among the first data sets to include both variables. We use these data to estimate the importance of job congruence on earnings after controlling both for job tenure and for academic achievement, measured by an individual's ACT score. Results indicate that job congruence is positively correlated with earnings, and has effects on earnings that are of almost equal magnitude with years of education.     

Overeducation, wages and promotions within the firm

We analyse data from personnel records of a large firm producing energy and telecommunication and test for the effect of deviations between required and attained education of workers. Required education is measured as hiring standards set by the firm. We find the usual effects of over- and undereducation in a wage regression, thus rejecting the argument that such effects are exclusively due to firm fixed effects. Distinguishing, within the firm, between a sheltered internal labour market and an exposed external labour market, we find that at the internal labour market over- and undereducation significantly affect career development, in particular at younger ages, but that such effects are mostly absent at the firm's external labour market.     

Efficiency wages,wage comparison,and public sector budgeting

We develop a government decision model where efficiency wage mechanisms affect the allocation of resources between different public services. We show how the introduction of interdepartment wage relativities modifies the standard Solow wage setting conditions. We compare the outcome under centralised and decentralised wage setting, and show that a decentralised wage setting system creates a distortion. Finally, we discuss the possibility of elimination this distortion using alternative financing systems.Final version: 08 April 2003JEL Classification: H23, J45We are grateful to Jan E. Askildsen, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Agnar Sandmo, participants at conferences and seminars in Trondheim, Uppsala and Åsgårdstrand, and several anonymous referees for helpful comments. The second author is grateful to The Norwegian Research Council for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Immigrant earnings,relative to what? The importance of earnings function specification and comparison points

Immigrant relative earnings estimates are sensitive to the choice of comparison point and the specification of earnings. Non-sample mean comparisons (Borjas, 1985) understate relative earnings. Simple earnings specifications (linear education, quadratic experience) overstate relative earnings for both poorly and well-educated immigrants. Specifications which ignore omitted variables understate the relative earnings of poorly educated immigrants and overstate those of well-educated ones. Although measures of assimilation and changes in immigrant quality are insensitive to earnings specification, they indicate strong earnings growth for post-1964 immigrants, an overall decrease in immigrant quality, and an increase in Mexican immigrant quality.     

Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality

The motivation of individuals lies at the core of corporate governance. For CEOs much research has been directed at the linkage between pay and enterprise performance. The results, however, provide only weak support for the efficacy of profit-related pay. Herein we adopt a different perspective and test for the existence of efficiency wages in a mutual sector wherein the use of traditional control mechanisms is particularly problematic. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that efficiency wages do yield superior performance. We therefore conclude that efficiency wages are a much-needed tool of corporate governance in the mutual sector. Furthermore, as an incentive mechanism, efficiency wages do not require the observability of individual effort, thus they potentially provide an equitable incentive mechanism for all organizations.