有限责任公司股东出资义务的规制

有限责任公司股东出资义务．是指有限责任公司在设立或增加资本时．股东为取得股权．根据协议的约定以及法律和章程的规     

关于夫妻忠实义务的法律思考

夫妻忠实义务,在法律上一般仅作狭义上的理解,其内容涵盖了身份权益和夫妻间的人格权益,其基本法律性质按人格化的身份权说解释是比较恰当的。在违背夫妻忠实义务的法律救济上,存在法定规制范围过窄、救济途径缺乏实际可操作性、没有规定第三者的责任和夫妻忠实协议的立法空白等问题,应当明确道德自律与法律救济的界限,建立婚内停止侵害、损害赔偿制度,明确规定第三者责任,承认体现双方真实意思表达的夫妻忠实协议的法律效力。     

论公司董事的忠实义务

董事的忠实义务,就是指董事依其职位所决定,在经营管理公司事务时,忠实于其职守及公司利益,尽最大忠诚为公司工作,当个人利益与公司利益发生冲突时,以公司利益为优先,不得利用其董事职位获取与公司利益相冲突的个人非法利益.本文阐述了董事忠实义务的性质,分析了董事忠实义务的内容以及董事违反忠实义务的民事责任.     

忠实义务立法的不足与完善

保持对配偶的忠实是夫妻间的一项重要义务,这项义务的有效履行不仅有利于家庭关系的和睦,更有利于社会和谐、稳定地发展。本文从忠实义务立法规定中总结出存在的问题,并提出完善该项义务立法的对策建议     

论公司董事忠实义务的涤除机制

现代各国的公司法,都为这样的涤除机制设置了一系列的要求,如董事的披露义务,利害关系董事的回避义务等,甚至英美法上,还规定了实质性的标准——公正,这也是司法审查的标准。本文试图通过对公司董事忠实义务的涤除机制的存在前提、其批准和认可机关以及对公平的要求的阐述,试图实现对公司董事忠实义务涤除机制的深入研究和探讨,其中运用到比较的方法,以期能够在不同国家相关法律的比较中获得有益的借鉴。     

从博弈论到控制股东的法定义务

在公司治理中,控制股东因为"按资表决"这种天然的制度安排,拥有很大的权力,公司的董事、高管均代表他们的利益。公司的其他各利益相关者,主要包括小股东、债权     

有限责任公司股东履行清算义务的现实障碍

公司法的目标并非是为了单纯地实现公司股东的利益最大化,而是为了实现公司法上的各种利益关系主体之间的利益平衡。在考虑公司法的问题上,应该更为全面更综合地考虑公司在清算时所涉及的利益关系,尤其是控股股东和小股东之间的利益冲突关系,以及其形成的对于股东履行清算义务的障碍,这深深地影响着公司的整个生命历程,从设立到治理,从解散到清算。文章研究股东的清算义务在实践履行中所遇到的问题时,总结出意思不能、行为阻碍、意愿差异和指引缺失四个有限责任公司股东履行清算义务时的现实障碍。     

有限责任公司股东履行清算义务的现实障碍

公司法的目标并非是为了单纯地实现公司股东的利益最大化,而是为了实现公司法上的各种利益关系主体之间的利益平衡。在考虑公司法的问题上,应该更为全面更综合地考虑公司在清算时所涉及的利益关系,尤其是控股股东和小股东之间的利益冲突关系,以及其形成的对于股东履行清算义务的障碍,这深深地影响着公司的整个生命历程,从设立到治理,从解散到清算。文章研究股东的清算义务在实践履行中所遇到的问题时,总结出意思不能、行为阻碍、意愿差异和指引缺失四个有限责任公司股东履行清算义务时的现实障碍。     

论违反出资义务股东所应承担的民事责任

股东的出资义务是指股东基于出资协议、公司章程应当向公司缴纳各自认缴的出资额的给付义务。股东出资是形成公司资本的基础,也是股东最基本的义务,但是,在实践中却存在各种各样违反出资义务的行为, 使公司、守约股东、债权人的利益受到损害．而违反出资义务的出资人却仍然取得、保留了股东资格。如何追究违反出资义务股东的民事责任是一个非常复杂的问题．[第一段]     

论控制股东滥用控制权的法律责任

控股股东不断借助于新的机制和形式强化或滥用大股东权力。在此情况下,完善保护小股东以及从属公司的其他利害关系人权益的有关法律机制,成为世界各国公司法修改和变革的焦点。信义义务(注意义务和忠实义务)是控制股东应履行的基本义务。在学理上确定此义务并完善控制股东违反义务之后的责任体系,是我国完善公司立法需研究的一个重要领域。     

How do large minority shareholders wield control?

While high ownership concentrations in even the largest American corporations provide prima facie evidence that large minority shareholders wield control, the economics and finance literatures have mostly overlooked the question of how they do so. Using a simple framework adapted from work by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), this paper shows how minority shareholders can use takeover threats to discipline management. It then shows how they can bolster their threats, and hence their influence, simply by threatening to increase these minority stakes. When inside information is not too problematic, a relatively small stake can endow minority shareholders with considerable ongoing control.     

库存控制系统中的流分析

文章主要从库存控制系统的分析、设计与实现多个过程分析其中相关流的关系及技术,主要包括物料流、价值流、业务流、服务流、信息流、资金流等。对基于UML的对象流与用于控制的流标签、实现中的基于数据库的数据流等也作了论述。通过分析各个流的关系,设计并实现了高效的具有清晰流的基于物流的库存控制系统。     

Large shareholders and corporate governance

The paper looks at the voluntary provision of governance to outside shareholders by an entrepreneur who takes his firm public but remains a large shareholder after the IPO. We find that the entrepreneur always puts in place an independent board which acts in the interests of the outside shareholders, but may put in place a friendly remuneration committee that ensures that CEO pay is structured to suit the entrepreneur in the cases where the retained equity stake is sufficiently large. When comparing this provision of governance to the provision preferred by a welfare maximizing regulator, we find that both voluntary overprovision and underprovision of governance can happen. Overprovision of governance happens in the cases where the entrepreneur commits to independence at the level of the remuneration committee when the regulator prefer a friendly remuneration committee. Underprovision of governance takes the form of establishing a friendly remuneration committee (with an independent board), when the regulator would prefer an independent remuneration committee (with a friendly board). We discuss the empirical predictions of the model.     

Affiliated block shareholders and analyst optimism

We investigate several previously under-documented conflicts of interest that may result in analyst optimism by utilizing two unique features of brokerage firms in China, namely, the dominant ownership of large shareholders within the brokerage firms and the mandatory disclosure of brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client. We show that controlling shareholders of an analyst’s brokerage-firm put pressure on the analyst to report more optimistically biased earnings forecasts and recommendations to the stocks they hold larger positions in. We also find that the magnitude of analyst optimism increases with the shareholdings of the mutual funds that contribute commission fees to the analyst’s brokerage firm. These findings remain robust after incorporating a regulation change that reduces conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry and higher dimensional fixed effects, and thus are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality or omitted variable bias.     

Local institutional shareholders and corporate hedging policies

This paper examines the effectiveness of monitoring function from institutional investors on corporate hedging strategy in Taiwan over the period from 2005 to 2012. The empirical results show that institutional investors are effective monitors of corporate risk management to enhance the probability and extent of hedging. In addition, the monitoring function from institutional investors is effective for mitigating the risk-shifting problem of high leveraged firms. Moreover, local institutional investors play more important role in monitoring distressed firm's magnitude of hedging than foreign institutional investors. These results are robust to the consideration of endogeneity, selection bias, and industrial difference. This is the first empirical evidence in the literature regarding the monitoring effect of institutional investors on risk management strategy from the angle of monitoring costs.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Independent directors and earnings management: The moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights

The research results on the suppressing effect of independent directors on earnings management are not consistent in existing literature. In addition, it has been argued that using financial statements provided by top management to investigate top management's earnings management is not appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, we used external auditors (including the auditors of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the auditors of two Big Four accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche and KPMG in Taiwan) as respondents in order to obtain less biased data. Second, we investigate the moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. The results show that both the existence of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights have significant suppressing effects on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed.     

Information transmission between large shareholders and stock volatility

Does information transmission between large shareholders exacerbate stock volatility or reduce stock volatility? In this study, based on the common shareholding data in the Chinese stock market from 2007 to 2017, we establish the shareholder’s coshareholding network, and use the weighted network clustering coefficient to measure the information transmission speed. Moreover, we investigate the impact of information transmission speed on stock volatility. The empirical results show that a nonlinear U-shaped relationship exists between information transmission speed and stock volatility. The findings are robust to the inclusion of other determinants of stock volatility identified in the literature. Finally, we verify the existence of private information interaction in the coshareholding network.     

打造诚信北京为和谐奥运助力——北京市职业道德专项考核试点工作有了新尺度

为贯彻落实中共中央<公民道德建设实施纲要>,北京市作为首批开展职业道德专项考核试点工作的城市,高度重视,加强领导.于2003年成立了由市委宣传部、首都精神文明办公室、市劳动和社会保障局、市总工会、市思想政治工作研究会等五家单位组成的领导小组.     

Short-selling restrictions,takeovers and the wealth of long-run shareholders

In this paper we consider a situation in which a firm may be able to influence the investors’ ability to short-sell its stock. We analyze the effect short-selling restrictions have on the market price and the subsequent effect generated on the market for corporate control. More precisely, we argue that short-selling restrictions may lead to exclusion of pessimistic beliefs and may therefore inflate prices. Thus, if a company is poorly managed and has a stock with strong short-selling restrictions, a profitable takeover will not emerge because of the high stock price. The raider may not have the incentives to acquire the company as its price will be above its fundamental value, conditional on takeover, even accounting for the potential benefits of takeover. We then argue that such effects are detrimental to long-run shareholders and that a value-maximizing strategy is to have a stock with no short-selling restrictions.