地理标志多哈回合谈判进程及对我国农业的影响

由于世界贸易组织(WTO)的《与贸易相关的知识产权协定》(TRIPS协定)以及世界知识产权组织(WIPO)的众多国际条约的广泛而深入的影响,包括地理标志在内的知识产权法律制度已经进入了全球化的时代。对发展中国家而言,如何在国际知识产权相关问题谈判中为自身的发展赢得空间,已经不单单是一个技术问题,这将对其经济利益产生越来越重要的影响。本文认为在传统知识产权领域核心技术大部分被发达国家占据,国际知识产权保护标准主要由发达国家制定的情况下,发挥我国的传统优势,加大地理标志的保护将有利于我国参与贸易全球化,提升产品国际竞争力。因为地理标志的保护往往最能够发挥我国的资源优势,对增强我国产品的核心竞争力起到"四两拨千斤"的放大作用。文章介绍了多哈回合地理标志的最新谈判情况,以及我国目前有关地理标志的立法及保护现状。文章呼吁我国对地理标志的保护应该采取"内外兼修"的方法。即对"内",将保护地理标志作为支持农村经济发展的重要组成部分,在国内建立起一套管理统一、权利义务分明的地理标志法律体系;对"外",合理运用多边谈判和双边谈判的国际场合,在给予别国进一步市场准入的同时,大力地推动有利于我国农业发展的地理标志国际保护制度。     

自然人流动谈判的进程及影响因素分析

2000年WTO新一轮服务贸易谈判开启,自然人流动谈判是该轮谈判的焦点之一。自然人流动谈判历经提交提案、双边要价-出价、复边谈判、服务信号会议,尚未最终完结。WTO自然人流动谈判受到诸多因素的影响。自然人流动的更快速发展、发展中国家的更积极推动、利益相关者的更多关注对谈判起着有力的促进作用。而多哈回合一揽子承诺的谈判原则、自然人流动壁垒繁多复杂、发达国家与发展中国家间的利益冲突与观点分歧较大地阻碍了自然人流动谈判的进程。这些因素决定了自然人流动谈判成为WTO谈判的焦点,但其过程必定是曲折而缓慢的。     

Design and Implementation of Business Objects for Automated Business Negotiations

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the specification, generation and exchange of business objects in the context of electronic commerce. Common business objects have been defined for product catalogs, purchase orders and other business entities. However, no business objects have been defined and implemented for supporting automated business negotiations even though business negotiation is very much an integral part of business activities. In this work, we have designed and implemented a set of business negotiation objects for supporting the bargaining type of business negotiations. These objects define the operations and information contents needed for negotiation parties to express their requirements and constraints during a bargaining process. They correspond to a set of negotiation primitives, which is a superset of the negotiation-related primitives defined in two popular languages: ACL and COOL. The implementation of these objects is patterned after the business object documents in the XML format proposed by the Open Applications Group, thus conforming to the established standard. The incorporation of several types of constraint specifications in these business negotiation objects provides the negotiation parties and the negotiation servers that represent them much expressive power in specifying callforproposals and proposals. Two synchronization problems and their solutions associated with the withdrawal and modification of negotiation proposals are addressed and presented in this paper. The use of these business negotiation objects in a bilateral bargaining protocol is also presented. We have validated the utility of these objects in an integrated network environment, which consists of two replicated negotiation servers, two commercial products, and some other university research systems that form a supply chain.     

Getting the Floor: Motive-Consistent Strategy and Individual Outcomes in Multi-Party Negotiations

Social motives influence negotiators actions and reactions. In this study we proposed that social motives moderate the relationship between persistence in the use of integrative or distributive negotiation strategy and individual outcomes in 33 four-person mixed-motive negotiations. Cooperative negotiators who persisted in using integrative strategy achieved higher outcomes than those who did not persist. Persistence in the use of integrative strategy did not pay off for individualistic negotiators in this multi-party setting. We theorized that this pattern of results was due to cooperative and individualistic negotiators using strategy differently. We found that cooperative negotiators used more motive-consistent integrative strategy and less motive-inconsistent distributive strategy than individualistic negotiators, whose pattern of strategy use was consistent with their self-interested motives, providing evidence for our motive consistency theory.     

Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation

We investigate how a key structural aspect of negotiation—power—combines with aspiration level to affect the interaction pattern of negotiators. Conflicting research findings have revealed that in most cases negotiators with anequal balance of power reach agreements of higher joint gain than negotiators with an unequal power balance, but in some instances the opposite result has been found. We suggest that it is important to consider the interaction between the negotiators to explain these varying findings. We propose that when unequal power negotiators are able to reach agreements of high joint gain it is due to the efforts of the low power party. In addition, we argue that the low power player will be most likely to drive the search for a solution of high joint gain when he or she also has high aspirations. We tested these proposals in a market negotiation with integrative potential. To examine the pattern of negotiation, all offers and counter-offers were written. The results indicated that overall, equal power dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than unequal power dyads. Under unequal power, the hypothesis that higher joint outcomes would be obtained when the low power player had high aspirations received partial support. In addition, support was found for the hypothesis that in unequal power dyads low power players would be responsible for driving solutions of higher joint gain.     

Anchor Points, Reference Points, and Counteroffers in Negotiations

Based on the theoretical assumptions that counteroffers are generated through an anchoring-and-adjustment process and that offers are perceived as gains or losses relative to a reference point, predictions were made of how, in a price negotiation, the size of counteroffers vary with proposed selling prices and reservation prices. The predictions were confirmed in two experiments. In Experiment 1, 64 undergraduate students of business administration playing the role of buyers of condominiums were presented proposed selling prices and asked to give a counteroffer which a hypothetical seller would accept or reject. A reference point was induced by telling subjects their reservation price. Before giving a counteroffer subjects were asked to indicate whether it was higher or lower than an arbitrary anchor point. In four different groups of subjects, high vs. low reference point was crossed with high vs. low anchor point. The results showed as expected that the counteroffers were higher for a high than for a low anchor point, and higher for a high reference point when the anchor point was perceived as a gain than for a low reference point when the anchor point was perceived as a loss. In Experiment 2 in which another 48 undergraduate students of business administration participated, the anchor points were the proposed selling prices and the reference point (reservation price) was manipulated by providing estimates of the market price. The results were as predicted, thus suggesting that the proposed selling prices operated as anchor points and that the estimated market prices affected the reservation prices (reference points) so that the selling prices and estimated market prices jointly affected the counteroffers.     

Power perceptions and modes of complaining in higher education

This study examines the relationship between student perceptions of different types of educator power and different modes of student complaining behaviour in the case of university education. A large sample of marketing students in the business school responded to the study from a state university in Northeastern United States. Factor analysis and canonical correlation analysis are used to explore the relationships between five bases of power perceptions (referent, expert, reward, legitimate, and punishment) and four modes of complaining behaviour (voice, negative word of mouth, third party, and exit). The results indicate that students engage in different modes of complaining as they perceive different types of educator power. The predominant complaining mode is found to be voice under referent or expert power, third party under legitimate power, and exit under reward or punishment power. Our findings offer important implications for student satisfaction, retention, and completion rates in higher education.     

Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations

Negotiation analysis and game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenous preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on and independent of the history of offers made. On the contrary, this paper argues that preferences might be based on attribute-wise reference points changing during the negotiation process. Aversion against losses relative to the reference point determines negotiators’ decisions in the negotiation and after its termination. The emergence and implications of reference points in a negotiation context are motivated, exemplified, and modeled formally. Furthermore, data from an internet experiment on endogenous preferences in bilateral multi-attribute negotiations is presented. The data supports the behavioral model.     

Mutually Dependent: Power,Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation.     

The Influence of Relative Power and Locus of Control on Channel Cooperation

This study examines the effects of power imbalances in a dyadic channel relationship and an individual's locus of control orientation on a transaction-specific decision. Both manifest and latent relative power are independently manipulated in favor of either the manufacturer or distributor in an experimental setting. The primary dependent measure is the likelihood of cooperation by the distributor. Results indicate a strong effect along the manifest dimension, perceived direct influence over the transaction. A moderate effect is observed along the latent dimension, a vast imbalance in company size. The direction of these effects on cooperation is dependent upon which party possesses the relative power advanatage. An exploratory path analysis reveals an indirect causal relationship between locus of control and cooperation.     

我国在铁矿石贸易谈判丧失“话语权”原因和对策

我国是国际铁矿石的需求和进口大国,可以说是市场需方的一个大寡头,但是在每次的国际铁矿石贸易价格谈判中处于几乎"失语"的尴尬处境。本文分析了其原因并为改善这种不利处境为我国钢铁企业提供参考对策。     

MBA Student Opinion about the Teaching of Business Ethics: Preference for Inclusion and Perceived Benefit

Data about whether business ethics should be taught generally,whether it was included in the current class the students were taking, and how beneficialthat inclusion was are analyzed in relation to two general questions about the qualityof the course. The database is from a large U.S. MBA program in an institution thatis committed to integrating business ethics throughout the curriculum. Thegraduate students felt strongly that ethics should be taught in business classes. All five itemsunder study were significantly correlated with one another and a factor analysisidentified two major factors. Significant effects were found in student opiniondepending on whether the course was elective or core as well as the discipline of theclass. Areas for future research were suggested.     

Culture's Influence on Business Negotiations in Four Countries

The usefulness of a theoretical model of the determinants of business negotiation outcomes is tested in a simulation with business people from four countries (the United States, Japan, Brazil and Spain). The article is an extension of Graham, Mintu, and Rodgers (1994), and also directly tests Hofstede's and Hall's theories of culture. A problem-solving approach results in higher negotiation outcomes for Americans when their partners reciprocate. Role (buyer or seller) is the key determinant of profits for Japanese negotiations; that is, buyers do better than sellers. For the Spanish negotiators, a problem-solving approach actually yielded lower profits. For the Brazilians, interpersonal attractiveness lead to higher partner satisfaction.     

制造商权力策略对经销商绩效的影响研究

本文从经销商视角界定了渠道绩效的概念,并依据认知评价理论提出了权力运用与经销商绩效间的关系,通过问卷调查并利用因子分析及多元线性回归分析验证了研究假设.实证分析结果表明,制造商威胁策略的使用,对经销商绩效有消极影响;而建议策略与许诺策略的使用,则对经销商绩效产生积极影响.     

The Discouraging Effect of Risks in WTO Negotiations: Determinants and Perceived Changes

The observation has frequently been made that uncertainty about the legal meaning and the economic and political effects of WTO agreements exert a discouraging effect on the progress of multilateral trade negotiations. This article identifies the determinants of uncertainty and risk in the WTO. It also examines changes in these determinants over time, pointing to increasing levels of uncertainty and risk. The argument is based on a series of interviews conducted with members of national delegations to the WTO and with WTO employees.     

Dimensions of International Negotiations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes

Cases of international negotiation are compared in terms of their similarities and dissimilarities. Using both primary and secondary source materials, each case is coded in terms of aspects of the issues, structure, situation, processes, and outcomes of negotiation. One analysis consisted of 23 cases in which Austrian delegations participated. Multidimensional scaling results indicated that a key dimension was the distinction between small bilateral talks and larger multilateral negotiations. Bilateral talks were more likely to be characterized by treaties, low turnover, stage-like processes, and no deadlines. Correlational findings also showed that outside influences had stronger impacts on outcomes than such internal factors as bureaucratic support. A second scaling analysis, based on cases published by the Johns Hopkins' Foreign Policy Institute, produced two dimensions, number and complexity of the issues. The groupings of the cases also corresponded to Ikle's distinctions among types of negotiation. Correlational findings indicated relationships among aspects of the negotiating situation and outcomes. The article concludes with a comparison of the two analyses.     

Not All Threats are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations

The effectiveness of threats in negotiations was examined by exploring two factors likely to affect it: implicitness, or the extent to which the threat mentions what action the perpetrator would take if the target does not comply; and timing, or the time when the threat is stated. Participants were given a negotiation scenario that differed only by the nature of the threat made by their counterpart. The design was a 2 (implicit vs. explicit threat) × 2 (early vs. late threat) factorial design with a control condition (no threat). The study showed that early-implicit and late-explicit threats were both more likely to elicit concessions than early-explicit and late-implicit threats. The two more effective threats were also the ones that made the perpetrator seem less aggressive. Further, perceived credibility mediated the positive effect that late-explicit threats had over late-implicit threats in eliciting concessions. These results support the claim that whether making the threats sanction implicit is effective depends on its timing, as the nature of bargaining moves and perceptions varies over time (Pruitt 1981). They suggest that the way in which a threat is stated may dramatically influence its effect on the target.     

Illusions of Corporate Power:Revisiting the Relative Powers of Corporations and Governments

A common opinion is that power has shifted from states to companies. This article discusses quantitative and qualitative aspects of power possessed by companies and by states. A more adequate comparison than that between company sales and gross national product is the one between company value added and GNP. Also more adequate is the comparison between the public sector and company net profit. These rival measures take down company power to about a tenth of the sales measure. Also in qualitative terms the "exit power" of the company gives a low impact compared to governmental action and the article concludes that company power by common measures is overestimated. However, the aggregated long-term effect of the market economy on the development of society is most significant. But it is a mistake to use that judgment as an argument for the opinion that business executives are the major power holders in modern societies. Perceptions of power also have an impact on which expectations and commitments that can be judged as realistic and therefore the issue of power is central for the normative discussion about corporate social responsibility.