Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Do Credit Ratings Really Affect Capital Structure?

This paper revisits recent investigations into the role credit ratings play in the marginal financing behavior of firms. Although it has long been documented that credit ratings may be an important determinant of firm capital structure policy, academics have only recently subjected this motivation to empirical scrutiny. We add to the brief existing literature by investigating the sensitivity of marginal financing behavior of firms to a number of attributes deemed to capture firms’ affinity to emphasize credit ratings in their financing behavior. Our results suggest that credit ratings are not a first‐order concern in capital structure decisions.     

Measuring Sovereign Risk: Are CDS Spreads Better than Sovereign Credit Ratings?

Using data for 54 countries over a 12‐year period, we find that the variation in average sovereign ratings in a given year can be explained by average credit default swap (CDS) spreads over the previous three years. In a horse race between CDS spreads and sovereign ratings, we find that CDS spread changes can predict sovereign events, while rating changes cannot. The predictability of CDS spreads is greater when there is disagreement between Moody's and the S&P for a country's rating.     

Emerging Market Instability: Do Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns?

Changes in sovereign debt ratings and outlooks affect financialmarkets in emerging economies. They affect not only the instrumentbeing rated (bonds) but also stocks. They directly impact themarkets of the countries rated and generate cross-country contagion.The effects of rating and outlook changes are stronger duringcrises, in nontransparent economies, and in neighboring countries.Upgrades tend to take place during market rallies, whereas downgradesoccur during downturns, providing support to the idea that creditrating agencies contribute to the instability in emerging financialmarkets.     

Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Improve Credit Ratings? Evidence from Geographic Identification

We show that a firm's CSR policy is significantly influenced by the CSR policies of firms in the same three‐digit zip code, an effect possibly due to investor clienteles, local competition, and/or social interactions. We then exploit the variation in CSR across the zip codes to estimate the effect of CSR on credit ratings under the assumption that zip code assignments are exogenous. We find that more socially responsible firms enjoy more favorable credit ratings. In particular, an increase in CSR by one standard deviation improves the firm's credit rating by as much as 4.5%.     

Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings? Results from a Study of 72 Countries

Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998–2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature.