Beyond the Sovereign Debt Crisis: Alternative Forms of Market-Based Debt Restructuring Schemes

The resolution of the international debt crises has stimulated extensive research onhow to design solutions for countries facing external debt overhang problems. Thispaper analyses the benefits for creditors and debtors of the following `market-based'debt restructuring schemes: (i) issue of collateralised new assets inexchange for the old debt; (ii) automatic roll-over of the debt repayment with astate-contingent penalty rate. The first proposal combines the basic debt conversionscheme proposed by Krugman (1989) with Cline's proposal (1995) of self-enhancementson the new claims as a form of risk-compensation for creditors (seealso Williamson, 1988). Under this scheme the debtor country modifies the streamof the debt service payments by voluntarily exchanging the outstanding debt fornew assets with different debt service characteristics where the principal and/or theinterest rate payment can be fully or partially collateralised. The roll-over schemeentitles illiquid countries to extend the outstanding debt for a specified period at apenalty rate which is contingent on a measure of the country's creditworthiness.This solution has the desirable effect of reducing the future contractual obligationsby lowering the penalty rate on the excess of debt rolled over, thus helping thedebtor country to use additional resources to invest in the economy.     

关于解决主权债重组问题的讨论:基于博弈均衡的分析框架

集中于国际主权债重组的理论诠释,并通过对主权债重组中的两个问题--集体行动困境和道德风险的博弈模型建立和分析,讨论如何建立一个解决主权债务重组问题的机制,使遇到债务困难的国家和债权人循此机制解决问题从而减少债权债务双方的损失,总结出处理主权债务问题应特别考虑的几个关系,提出一些启发性的政策建议.     

欧洲主权债务危机形成机理及对中国的启示

本文以希腊债务危机为切入点,着重分析此次欧洲主权债务危机的形成机理,同时从中得出对我国的启示。     

Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the creditor in a dynamic, noncooperative game. Its length is shown to depend on the planning horizon of the parties, the discount factor and the growth prospect of the debtor country.     

Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.     

Profitable Buybacks in Sovereign Debt

Since the 1982 debt crisis, several debtor countries have repurchased fractions of their debts. Bulow and Rogoff have argued that these buybacks benefit the banks but not the countries. Krugman argues the opposite. This paper provides an explanation of why buybacks benefit both countries and banks. A lending environment with terms-of-trade shocks is considered. If a country defaults, banks impose a penalty on the country and incur some costs. It is shown that with a buyback, the country defaults on a smaller loan, if at all, and the economy saves part of these costs, if not all.     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

Per Capita Income and the Mystery of Missing Trade

The literature on the Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek (HOV) model has concentrated on the production side, particularly the unrealistic assumptions of identical techniques and factor price equalization. However, less is known about the demand side. In this paper, we compare the supply side assumptions versus the demand side assumptions as a cause of the empirical failures in the HOV prediction. While the relaxation in the supply side assumptions is crucial to predict the direction of factor trade, the demand side assumptions are shown to play an important role in explaining why factor trade is “missing” in relation to the HOV prediction. For example of the slope test for labor, the supply side repair improves from 0.026 to 0.162, whereas the demand side repair improves significantly from 0.162 to 0.891.     

Optimal Sovereign Debt for an Overdebted Country

In this study, the role of debt maturity is analysed in a framework that blends a number of key macro‐economic factors with a process of estimating an optimal debt maturity maximising net present value. The purpose is to reduce the real value of government liabilities for a highly indebted country, as for example in the case of Greece, over a 35‐year period. The conclusion that emerges is that management of debt maturity is an essential component of the equilibrium policy and, as such, it can play an important role both in implementing tax smoothing programmes and in reducing costs associated with debt financing.     

债务重组上市公司重组绩效与证券市场监管

本文利用2006年债务重组准则实施前后两年进行债务重组的上市公司相关数据研究债务重组上市公司重组绩效与证券市场监管关系问题。结果表明,2006年发生债务重组收益公司重组后会计业绩显著提高,股票回报率与市场总体无显著差异,2007年发生债务重组收益公司重组后会计业绩无显著变化,股票回报率显著高于市场总体,说明证券市场监管政策的扭曲导致资源的严重错配。     

新旧债务重组准则的比较分析

为了规范债务重组的确认、计量和相关信息的披露,财政部于2006年2月发布新的会计准则体系中,对债务重组准则进行了修订,发布了《企业会计准则第12号——债务重组》（以下简称新准则）。此前为《企业会计准则———债务重组（2001）》（以下简称旧准则）研究新旧债务重组准则的变化以及执行新准则对企业财务状况的影响具有重要的现实意义。     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

Testing for Regime Changes in Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis

This paper examines whether the efficiency market hypothesis for the Greek sovereign debt holds. As in Blanco et al. (2005) we test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap (CDS) and spreads that dictates a CI relationship between the two. The main innovation of the present analysis is the use of a threshold vector error-correction (TVECM) model, thus allowing thresholds within the sample covering the period 1990 to 2010. Moreover, by employing this methodology we are able to evaluate the degree and dynamics of transaction costs resulting from various events due to external market imperfections but also domestic factors. The main hypothesis we test is to what extent spreads and CDS are indeed integrated that may result in an efficient and integrated segniorage capital market. Our findings support the gradual integration hypothesis. We find that spreads and CDS are cointegrated, though threshold effects are also revealed in terms of events that have impacted on markets.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

希腊主权债务危机的成因及对中国的启示

希腊主权债务危机是此次全球金融危机的延续,是希腊政府财政赤字不断累积的必然结果。在外部金融危机的冲击下,希腊政府受制于国内的政治压力和欧元区的货币制度,无力采取有效措施加以应对,从而导致了主权债务危机的深化和扩散,并引发了全球金融市场的持续动荡,影响了世界经济复苏的进程。以此为借鉴,中国应高度关注自身的债权安全,加强对公共债务的控制和管理,谨慎开展区域货币一体化合作,并加快国内经济结构优化调整的步伐,以实现国民经济的长期可持续发展。     

Sudden Stops,Time Inconsistency,and the Duration of Sovereign Debt

We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.     

中国主权债务的现状分析及其风险防范对策

20世纪70年代以来,国际债务危机频繁发生,陷入危机的国家都遭受了重大损失。2007年由次贷危机所引发的经济衰退使一部分发达国家和发展中国家陷入债务危机,造成了全球的金融动荡。为此,改革国际货币体系、控制外债流动性风险、增强中国在国际市场上的融资能力具有重要的意义。