ROE as a performance measure in performance-vested stock option contracts in China

In this paper, we hand-collect the performance measures adopted in performance-vested stock option plans in China. We find that return on equity (ROE) is a widely used performance measure. Different from most of the other performance measures, ROE is affected by the number of shares outstanding. When executive compensation contracts are explicitly tied to ROE performance, in order to avoid the reduction in reported ROE through the issuance of additional common shares (i.e., ROE dilution), managers have an incentive to influence ROE performance through financing decisions. We find that managers are more likely to avoid ROE dilution related to debt-versus-equity choice when their performance-vested stock option plans are explicitly tied to ROE performance and when firms have a high level of access to bank loans. However, there is no such link for firms with a low level of access to bank loans. Our study shows that the association between executive compensation design and corporate financing decisions depends on the accessibility of bank loans, demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in China. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in executive compensation and corporate financing decisions. Our study contributes to both the executive compensation and corporate finance literature.     

国外CEO权益报酬研究的进展与启示

对管理者、特别是CEO的报酬和激励是公司治理的一个重大问题.文章在总结国外众多关于CEO权益报酬的文献基础上,主要从权益报酬激励及其效应、CEO股票期权的价值确定、CEO权益激励水平的决定、关于权益报酬有效性的争议等方面就国外的最新研究进行了综合评述,在此基础上分析了对我国公司的高管人员实行权益报酬的借鉴和启示.     

A Three-Country Study of Unethical Sales Behaviors

A major challenge in global sales research is helping managers understand sales ethics across countries. Addressing this challenge, our research investigates whether a few demographic variables and psychographic variables reduce unethical sales behaviors (USBs) in Canada, Mexico, and the USA. Further, using literatures associated with business ethics, national culture, and customer orientation advocacy, we hypothesize why sales managers should expect similarities and differences in USBs between countries. We tested hypotheses using a sales contest scenario and six USBs, examining survey responses from 948 business-to-business salespeople of a multinational company??s sales force in Canada, Mexico, and the USA. The results reveal that several psychographic variables (such as commitment, relationship to sales manager, and achievement need) affect salespeople??s tendency to engage in USBs differently in each country. In addition, business ethics, individualism, and customer orientation advocacy associated with each country can be used to anticipate similarities and differences in USBs between countries. This research offers important theoretical contributions and implications for more effectively managing sales forces and reducing USBs across countries.     

Impact of Sales Call Adaptiveness and Customer Willingness on Sales Call Length: A Cross-Country Study of India,China, Korea,and Philippines

ABSTRACT

In this empirical study across four countries (India, China, Korea, and Philippines), we examine the impact of sales call adaptiveness and customer willingness on sales call length (duration) of salespersons in these four countries. Sales call length as well as sales call quality—although important constructs in sales—are still underresearched in the domain of sales management. Our study in these four emerging markets sheds new light on enhancing sales force effectiveness. Using survey data from 847 salespersons in four countries, we analyze using multivariate analysis, and our results suggest that sales force effectiveness can be enhanced by giving them the autonomy to decide the sales call length based on the prospect quality. We also demonstrate that salespeople indulging in sales-oriented behaviors may be detrimental to the long-term relationship with customers. Emphasis on relational sales approaches would reduce sales practices such as pitching products or services to unwilling customers. Our study also highlights the interactive role of customer willingness and sales adaptiveness. We found several inter-country differences across sales practices in four countries, which have several meaningful managerial implications.     

Managerial pay and financial performance of small business

The purpose of this study is to examine empirically whether managerial pay of small-firm executives is more closely related to profitability or generation of sales. Conventional economic doctrine supports the hypothesis that chief executives are paid primarily to advance profitability. The contrary hypothesis, given impetus by Baumol [2] and Galbraith [8], asserts a closer relationship between compensation and sales. Previous studies of large corporations have produced conflicting results. Regression analysis of the 78 small firms in this study reveals managers receiving compensation correlating fairly closely with both profitability and sales. The cumulative forces at work in these firms impacting upon managerial pay appear to have wrought a linkage conductive toward motivating managers to be both “bottom line” and marketing oriented.     

Cross-border banking,credit access,and the financial crisis

We study the sensitivity of credit supply to bank financial conditions in 16 emerging European countries before and during the financial crisis. We use survey data on 10,701 applicant and non-applicant firms that enable us to disentangle effects driven by positive and negative shocks to the banking system from demand shocks that may vary across lenders. We find strong evidence that firms' access to credit was affected by changes in the financial conditions of their banks. During the crisis firms were more credit constrained if they were dealing with banks that experienced a decline in equity and Tier 1 capital, as well as losses on financial assets. We also find that access to credit reflects the balance sheet conditions of foreign parent banks. The effect of positive and negative shocks to a bank is greater for riskier firms and firms with fewer tangible assets.     

自然垄断产业经营者的薪酬激励机制研究——基于不同风险偏好经营者的委托代理理论

企业所有权与经营控制权的分离带来了委托代理问题,对经营者薪酬进行激励是解决此问题的有效办法之一。基于委托代理理论,突出针对经营者的利益偏好差异,应制定不同的薪酬激励设计,对企业管理中影响薪酬的因素进行分析,在此基础上对我国自然垄断企业管理者薪酬机制的优化提出建议。     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.     

Compensating corporate venture managers

This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey addressed to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies concerning incentive practices for venture managers. Data was also collected for venture performance history in these companies.Highlights of the results are:Most companies are not providing different incentives for venture managers than for other managers.Companies that do and companies that do not provide special incentives seem to agree on the types of incentives which would promote improved venture performance, which include milestone bonuses, equity, and/or options in the new venture, variable bonuses based on venture ROI.The primary obstacle to installing such incentives is reported by firms without special incentives in place to be concern about internal equity.Firms with special incentives already in place have less concern with this problem. A moderate problem to such firms is difficulty in defining venture objectives.There is no evidence, from this study, that special incentives for venture managers affected the outcome in venture performance, when such performance was measured by the percentage of “successes” and “failures.” About 50% success rate was reported by each group.The article deals with these questions:Are performance incentives essential?Certainly not, from the data in this sample, but this was a “head count” of successes and failures—a study of overall economic performance might yield a different result. One expensive failure can wipe out the gains from many small successes.Are the incentives reported effective?Obviously not enough to show a difference between those who use them and those who don't. Analysis of the incentive elements used and the earnings limits imposed suggest that the special incentives are not particularly special, nor very much of an incentive. Further, the most common incentive reported, based on venture ROI, fails to consider the time period usually required to achieve a positive ROI, and the many changes of management which occur during that period.What criteria should be used for designing an incentive program for venture managers?Recognition of the probability of management change, incentives which promote early identification of need for change of direction or to abort, focus on event completion milestones rather than the calendar, the relationship of reward potential to risk potential including job security and actual financial risk by the venture manager, achievability, and simplicity are factors to be considered.What kind of financial incentives might be included in incentive design?Depending on the life cycle stage of the venture, fixed and variable bonuses, options for equity or shadow equity in the venture itself, actual equity in the new venture, and to a lesser extent, salary increases and equity or equity options in the parent are suggested. How can the obstacles to installation of performance incentives for venture managers be reduced?To reduce perception of internal inequity, relating potential risk to potential reward and extending performance incentives to other managers is suggested. The problem of defining venture objectives as an obstacle is instantly solved as an incentive issue by making ownership possibility a reality for venture management, especially with financial investment required by venture management.     

How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation

While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial reporting and operational outcomes. This is somewhat surprising given the critical role CFOs play in the financial reporting process of a firm. Using managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried in J Econ Perspect 17:71–92, 2003) and the theory of power and self-focus (Pitesa and Thau in Acad Manag J 56(3):635–658, 2013), we predict that powerful CFOs employ a two-part strategy to camouflage excessive incentive compensation above what efficient contracting would dictate. First, powerful CFOs use their power and influence to negotiate shorter incentive pay duration to maximize the present value of their performance—based compensation. Second, when their incentive equity compensation vests, we suggest that CFOs manage earnings to further enhance their personal income. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find higher levels of income-increasing accrual-based earnings management and real transactions management, a potentially unethical practice, in firms with powerful CFOs who have short pay durations. We discuss the implications of our analysis in the context of mitigating CFO power and managing the ethical environment “tone at the top.”     

Does Geographic Proximity Change the Passiveness of Equity Ownership by Bank Trust?

We provide evidence that while concentrated bank trust ownership is passive with distant firms, it is nonpassive with local firms and reduce their risk‐taking. Concentrated local bank trust ownership is associated with (i) lower future firm equity beta and (ii) less uncertain corporate policies. The results cannot be explained by private information alone, are not driven by local bank trusts as a mixed debt‐equity holder, and are robust to various tests for endogeneity. We also explore channels through which local bank trusts could exert their influence, including their stabilizing function during crisis periods and joining force with local independent directors.     

Incentive pay and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Austrian,German, and Swiss banks

We use payroll data in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sector to identify incentive pay in the critical banking segments of treasury/capital market management and investment banking for 67 banks. We document an economically significant correlation of incentive pay with both the level and volatility of bank trading income—particularly for the pre-crisis period 2003–2007, in which incentive pay was strongest. This result is robust if we instrument the bonus share in the capital market divisions with the strength of incentive pay in unrelated bank divisions like retail banking. Moreover, pre-crisis incentive pay appears too strong for an optimal trade-off between trading income and risk, which maximizes the net present value of trading income. Further analyses indicate that the bonus moderation during the crisis has removed excessive pre-crisis incentive pay.     

CEO retirement compensation: Is inside debt excess compensation or a risk management tool?

CEOs face constant scrutiny over their compensation packages. This scrutiny has only intensified amid discussions of CEO-to-employee pay ratios and income inequality nationwide. CEO retirement packages are criticized as camouflage compensation used to award excessive compensation to CEOs and were, prior to 2006, less transparent than they are now. Thanks to the transparent disclosures now required by the SEC, we have a better understanding of the types and amounts of compensation owed to CEOs after they depart or retire, termed inside debt. I investigate whether all CEO inside debt components share similar incentive effects and offers some thoughts on how companies might structure these packages to be most effective. I discuss the structure and incentive effects of the two primary components of inside debt: deferred compensation and supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs). I explain why inside debt, particularly CEO SERPs, may actually help companies manage firm risk. Finally, I outline the best ways to structure inside debt so that it functions as a resource to manage firm risk and foster a long-term perspective rather than mirroring the incentive effect of equity, increasing risk, and encouraging a myopic focus.     

Leverage and Corporate Performance: Does Institutional Environment Matter?

This paper aims to provide new empirical evidence on a major corporate governance issue: the relationship between leverage and corporate performance. We propose two major findings to this literature by applying frontier efficiency techniques to measure performance of medium-sized firms from seven European countries. A maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate a stochastic cost frontier and the parameters of an equation relating cost inefficiency to leverage simultaneously. We find that the relationship between leverage and corporate performance varies across countries, which tends to support the influence of institutional factors on this link. We then suggest the influence of the efficiency of the legal system and in a lesser degree of the access to bank credit on the relationship between leverage and corporate performance.      

Management styles across Western European cultures

Management styles differ greatly across Europe although Europeans themselves may not always be aware of it. European executives usually deal with the countries closest to them and more distant countries are not as well known to them, whether linguistically, culturally, or geographically. As Europe 1993 makes executive transfers and recruitment easier than before across the European Community, it seems important to make managers aware of the variety of management styles across Western European countries. European managers frequently know more about American management and even Japanese management than they do about other European management styles. Their lack of understanding about European management styles may inhibit the emergence of a unified European management style in the future. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

How sales managers control unethical sales force behavior

Researchers have studied marketing ethics from several perspectives. Few studies, however, have analyzed supervisory reactions to unethical behavior by salespeople. The results of this study using a 2 × 3 factorial design showed that the performance level of the salesperson and the consequences of the salesperson's actions influenced some types of discipline used by a sample of 246 sales managers. The findings both support and contradict prior research on how sales managers respond to unethical sales force behavior.James B. DeConinck is an Assistant Professor of Marketing at The University of Dayton. His publications have appeared inThe Journal of Business Research, The Journal of Business Ethics, andThe Journal of Applied Business Research. Prior to being in academics, he held industry positions in transportation and sales.     

Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of equity incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms. We address the sample selection problem by employing the propensity score matching methodology. Results show that, (1) On the whole, performance is positively related to equity incentives even after controlling for sample selection bias; (2) The final control rights have an important impact on the effects of equity incentives. The execution of equity incentives in privately owned firms can significantly decrease the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but such effects cannot be observed in state-owned firms; (3) Effects of equity incentives depend on the incentive type, that is, comparing to stock-based incentives, option-based incentives can reduce the agency costs significantly, thus are more effective; (4) Ownership structure also has important impacts on the effects of equity incentives. The agency costs decrease in firms with more decentralized ownership after introducing equity incentive, while in concentrated firms the effect is negligible.     

Using Trade Incentives to Promote Customer Relationships in a Retail Setting

Suppliers and retailers use a variety of techniques designed to motivate salespeople to engage in specific selling behaviors that will provide results that will assist in achieving either the supplier's or retailer's goals. One method that is commonly applied is the sales incentive. This research examines popular forms of incentives to assess the relationships that exist between the incentives offered and salesperson behaviors. The study also examines the types of incentives commonly used by both suppliers and retailers and salesperson perceptions of these incentives. To accomplish this, 95 salespeople working for a major automotive parts company responded to questions designed to assess their attitudes and behaviors toward incentives. The results provide information which may be valuable to manufacturers, retailers, and academicians as they investigate the use of incentive based compensation programs and sales force behavior.     

Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family Firms: Evidence from a Structural Analysis

This paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay mediates the effect of family preferences on corporate investment policy. Our study focuses on the option portfolio volatility sensitivity vega, which motivates the risk‐taking behavior of undiversified managers. After controlling for factors that affect incentive pay and investment policy simultaneously, we find that one‐third of underinvestment in riskier R&D projects in active family firms can be attributed to a significantly lower vega. Passive family firms allocate more capital to R&D as opposed to active family firms, and are more active in M&A deal making. In contrast to many prior studies, pay incentives and families are not associated with capital expenditures. Overall, our empirical results suggest that CEO pay incentives induce investment policy contingent on firm risk. Family CEO incentive pay manifests the family preference for lower risk, especially in firms with higher firm risk. Nonetheless, after replacing family CEOs with outside professionals, investments in both R&D and M&A increase, which is consistent with the family preference for extended investment horizons. Interestingly, such a preference seems not to be manifested in incentive pay.