Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?

China's state enterprise reform is often believed to have made profit the most important goal of SOEs. Nonetheless the poor performance of SOEs relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. We offer an explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform, which complements the theory based on a soft budget constraint. Under certainty, the incentives of enterprise managers to maximize their own compensation are consistent with profit maximization with or without a soft budget constraint. Under uncertainty, however, the managers' incentives generally deviate from expected profit maximization. This deviation is dampened by, but still exists even without a soft budget constraint.     

Profit maximization mitigates competition?

Summary. We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders’utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices.     

Profit maximization mitigates competition

Summary We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders' utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices.We wish to thank Hildegard Dierker and Nina Maderner for many helpful comments. This research was partially supported by the Danish Social Science Research Council. E. Dierker is grateful to the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, for its outstanding hospitality. B. Grodal appreciates the support from the Department of Economics, University of Vienna.     

THE POTENTIAL FOR SHORT‐RUN SHIFTING OF A CORPORATE PROFITS TAX

Can the owners of a firm shift a corporate profits tax to consumers? Not in the short run if the tax is stated as a proportion of profits and the firm is a profit maximizer. But what if the firm wishes to pursue a strategy other than profit maximization, say revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint? Under such a condition the firm's reaction to a tax or tax increase might be a price rise that captures part of the foregone profits. We show that firms which operate at a point on their demand curve that differs from profit maximization have an incentive to raise price in response to the tax – and that high cost firms have a greater incentive to raise price than do low cost firms. Our empirical analysis of the US beer industry confirms this finding, and sheds light on the Krzyzaniak–Musgrave analysis of the 1960s which suggested that the corporation income tax produced significant short‐run shifting.     

Capital income taxation and perfect foresight

This paper develops a perfect foresight model of capital income taxation in a representative household neoclassical one-sector framework. The household sector is based on intertemporal utility maximization. The main result is the equivalence of a perfect foresight solution and an artificial central planning solution; if there is no tax, this is the equivalence of a market equilibrium and social optinum. The equivalence result is used to deduce the implications of a partial tax reform policy. It is shown that a partial reform increases capital at each time following the initial period of the program.     

Constrained output maximization and US agriculture

This paper presents a framework for estimating an indirect production function and then applies it to aggregate US agriculture. Issues addressed include tests of standard hypotheses about the underlying technology (homotheticity, neutral technical change, etc.) as well as examination of consistency in aggregation and the effects of changes in the level of aggregate expenditure on farm output. Since there already exist several studies empirically describing agricultural production technologies with indirect objective functions, one might fairly ask whether this paper really breaks any new ground? We feel that it does. One reason is that existing studies (e.g. Binswanger, 1974; Lopez, 1980; Ball and Chambers, 1982; Ray, 1982; and Weaver, 1983) all rely on either profit or cost functions. To date there appears to be only one study using an indirect production (Appelbaum, 1979), and it is not in agriculture. This seems unfortunate because there are many instances in agriculture for which an indirect production function (or revenue function approach) seems more appropriate. The reason why relates directly to one's belief about the objective function and constraints farmers face. Ultimately, it seems plausible in a certainty framework that producers maximize profits. And since cost minimization and output maximization are just constrained versions of profit maximization, both cost and indirect production functions are more appropriately viewed as restricted profit functions. What differs is the constraint. Assuming cost minimization implies that farmers are constrained by a fixed output which they must produce; in most instances, this is implausible. More likely, the level of output is itself a choice variable. Output maximization, on the other hand, suggests that the main constraint is the amount of money that producers can muster to hire resources. In other words, farmers may face binding constraints in obtaining the profit maximizing level on expenditure on input utilization. One might think that expenditure may not be a binding constraint because there exists a relatively active US credit market. However, the US credit market is far from being perfectly competitive in a stylized sense, and thus, the possibility of a farmer being able to finance a given level of expenditure may be limited.

Readers familiar with the dual approach to production problems may already be asking why these ideas rule out cost functions since it is well known that the cost function is the distance function of the indirect production function (Blackorby et al., 1978)? In principle, therefore, one could always estimate a cost function and then invert it to obtain the indirect production function. There are two problems with this approach: the first is that if output maximization is truly the objective, output is not predetermined and cannot be treated as exogenous in cost function estimation. Second, estimation of direct and indirect functions using the same data set does not always yield comparable results. Estimation of a transcendental logarithmic (translog) indirect production function and a translog cost function, separately, does not generally yield identical estimates of the Allen elasticities of substitutions. Solving the first problem in simple, but the second suggests that estimation should proceed on the basis of the objective function the researcher deems most appropriate. Therefore, if output maximization is more plausible than cost minimization an indirect production function should be used.

The plan of the paper is as follows. We first outline the theoretical developments necessary to our approach (included are conditions necessary for consistent aggregation over firms). We then present estimates of an indirect production function and use these estimates to investigate the plausibility of various restrictions on the technology, consistency in aggregation, substitution possibilities in agricultural production, and the effect of expenditure on agricultural input utilization. The paper closes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for future research.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

Joint Profit Maximization,Negotiation, and the Determinacy of Price in Bilateral Monopoly

Many economists teach that joint profit maximization leads to a determinate quantity and indeterminate price of the intermediate good traded. Using isoprofit curves, the Truetts argue that only one price is consistent with rational behavior and the goal of profit maximization.     

利益最大化实现的法律思考

利益最大化是市场经济主体的普遍追求。追求利益最大化的界限就是主体在不侵害他人利益最大化和社会利益最大化的合理范围内实现各自利益最大化。市场调节机制在调整利益实现过程中的作用是显而易见的,但也是有限的,民商法是保障利益最大化实现的基础性法律,经济法则以社会总体经济效益和社会利益为其立法本位,二共同构成了利益最大化实现的保证。     

Constrained sales maximization under a linear technology

This paper employs the activity analysis framework of linear programming to solve the decision problem of maximizing sales revenue in the presence of a minimum acceptable profit constraint. One of the advantages of using this model relative to the standard neoclassical approach is that, in addition to determining the firm's optimal product mix, we can also explore the ramifications of constrained revenue maximization on the imputed valuation of the firm's resources. The primal and dual solution values for the constrained revenue maximization problems are then compared with those derived from a linear profit maximization model. A computational technique is offered which demonstrates how constrained revenue maximization is carried out in actual practice.     

More on alternative objectives of labor-managed firms

This paper focuses on an alternative theory of a labor-managed firm where the main behavioral assumption is profit per laborer maximization subject to an employment constraint, or, alternatively, employment maximization subject to a profit per laborer constraint. This theory and its implications are derived employing a standard duality approach. The results are then compared with those obtained in the theory of the traditional labor-managed firm which maximizes profit per laborer.     

The company you keep: Qualitative uncertainty in providing a club good

Clubs are typically experience goods. Potential members cannot ascertain precisely beforehand their quality (dependent endogenously on the club's facility investment and number of users, itself dependent on its prices). Members with unsatisfactory initial experiences discontinue visits. We show that a monopoly profit maximizer never offers a free trial period for such goods. For quality functions homogeneous of degree of at least minus one, a welfare maximizer, motivated by distributional concerns to mitigate disappointed consumers' losses, always does. We demonstrate the robustness of this finding by showing that (i) without qualitative uncertainty (thus, no disappointed customers), neither welfarist nor monopolist offers free trials; and (ii) if the planner pursues an objective mixing welfare maximization with profit maximization, the likelihood of free trials increases with the weight put on welfare maximization. Regarding club quality and usage, the monopolist provides a socially excessive level of quality to repeat buyers when the quality function is homogeneous of degree zero. With nonhomogeneous quality functions, the monopolist permits too little club usage; quality may or may not be socially excessive.     

当代经典论文对企业利润最大化目标的思考

古典经济学理论认为利润最大化是企业的根本目标,但是科斯、阿尔钦、FAMA、张五常等当代经济学家在其经典论文中分别对企业的本质、规模、相互关系、委托代理机制等方面进行分析时均从成本最小化的角度进行分析的。本文通过论证企业成本最小化和利润最大化的对称性和可转换性,解释了从成本最小化进行分析的原因。同时提出由于利润最大化的不确定性和成本最小化的易操作性,企业在相对确定的条件下,可将利润最大化目标转化为成本最小化形式进行实际运作。     

Eliciting Willingness to Pay without Bias using Follow-up Certainty Statements: Comparisons between Probably/Definitely and a 10-point Certainty Scale

Correction for hypothetical bias using follow up certainty questions often takes one of two forms: (1) two options, “definitely sure” and “probably sure”, or (2) a 10-point scale with 10 very certain. While both have been successful in eliminating hypothetical bias from estimates of WTP by calibrating based on the certainty of yes responses, little is known about the relationship between the two. The purpose of this paper is to compare the two using data from three field experiments in a private good, dichotomous choice format. We compare four types of yes responses that differ in the criterion used to determine if there is sufficient certainty for a hypothetical yes response to be considered a true yes response. We make several comparisons, but focus on determining which values on the 10-point scale give the same estimates of WTP as “definitely sure” hypothetical yeses and real yeses (actual purchases). Values that produce equivalence are near 10 on the certainty scale.     

Fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a professional sports league

Motivated by aspects of European soccer club governance (members' clubs supporters' trusts), a first formal analysis of fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a sports league is provided, with comparisons to objectives studied previously (profit and win maximization). Positive comparisons focus on team qualities, ticket prices, attendances and the impact of capacity crowds; empirically observed ticket black markets and inelastic pricing are consistent only with fan welfare maximization. Normatively, social welfare (aggregate league surplus) is well-served by a league of fan welfare maximizers, or sometimes win maximizers, but not profit maximizers; leagues should not normally make profits.     

Some Implications of Imperfect Competition For Recent Trade Theory*

This paper argues that in a general-equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono-polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal cost.     

An evolutionary stable strategy for retailers selling complementary goods subject to indirect network externalities

A two-population evolutionary game model is constructed for retailers and used to investigate the effect of indirect network externalities (INEs) and product complementarity on the strategic choice of marketing objective of the retailers. The results show that their strategic choice of marketing objective is correlated with market reservation price (MRP) when the strength of the INE is low. When the MRP is low, the retailers tend to adopt a strategy of profit maximization. As MRP increases, low-cost retailers adopt a strategy of revenue maximization instead of profit maximization to maximize revenue at an earlier stage than high-cost retailers. However, when the strength of the INE is high, retailers only choose a strategy of revenue maximization as their marketing objective. The probability that a retailer uses a revenue maximization strategy increases as the strength of the INE grows, and product complementarity increases, when there is an equilibrium between two pure marketing objective strategies. An optimal preference ratio for retailers may exist when the strength of INE is found to be not large enough. Numerical examples reveal that the degree of preference of retailers to maximize profit is shown to be negatively correlated with both INE and product complementarity. On the other hand, their profits are positively correlated with both of these factors.     

The Law of Comparative Advantage Without Social Utility Functions

This paper derives sufficient conditions under which the Law of Comparative Advantage and the General Law of Comparative Advantage are true when the preferences of the trading countries may not be represented by "well-behaved" social utility functions. It shows that in the neoclassical framework with convex technologies, profit maximization and Walras' Law, the laws of comparative advantage under a natural trade are still valid if either the General Law of Demand or the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference holds, or if losers are compensated using lump-sum transfers or consumption taxes.     

Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models

Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence between expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory in the spatial model of elections with probabilistic voters.     

Empirical analysis of profit maximization and cost minimization behaviour of Kansas farms

A farm-level deterministic and stochastic nonparametric tests of profit maximization and cost minimization behaviour for a sample of 112 Kansas farms was completed from 1996 to 2013. Allowing for monotonic non-regressive technological change and using a 10% significance level, 73 farms violated the profit-maximization hypothesis and 58 farms violated the cost minimization hypothesis. More profit maximization violations existed relative to cost minimization violations. However, comparing these results with results for 289 Kansas farms using data from 1973 to 1990, farms have significantly reduced profit maximizing violations. Cost minimizing behaviour has not changed substantially.