Stock market reactions to environmental disclosures: new evidence from China

We study how the stock market in China responds to announcements by an environmental risk index and find that China’s stock market penalizes firms associated with unfavourable environmental news if the information is provided directly to investors in a manner that is easily understood. We also find that the negative impact on stock prices fades after multiple disclosures of the same information.     

Why is the corporate tax rate lower than the personal tax rate?: The role of new firms

In many OECD countries, statutory corporate tax rates are lower than personal income tax rates. This tax rate difference is often particularly large for small firms. The present paper argues that a reduction of the corporate tax rate below the personal tax rate is an optimal tax policy if there are problems of asymmetric information between investors and firms in the capital market. The reduction of the corporate tax rate below the personal tax rate encourages equity financing and thus mitigates the excessive use of debt financing induced by asymmetric information. Our main theoretical result stands in marked contrast to the traditional view of corporate taxation and corporate finance theory, according to which there is a tax disadvantage to equity financing. More recent empirical evidence on this issue, however, is in line with our result.     

Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy

This paper investigates how the presence of foreign investors in privatized firms affects privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly. We find that an increase in the stockholding ratio of foreign investors in a privatized firm increases the optimal degree of privatization, whereas an increase in the penetration of foreign firms in product markets reduces it. These results imply that the degree of openness of financial markets and that of product markets have contrasting implications for the optimal privatization policy.     

会计监管理论:综述及其引申

本文在对现有的会计监管概念进行综述的基础上,对会计监管概念进行了引申。认为会计监管是为了保证会计信息质量、维护利益相关者的产权,企业单位负责人和投资者、债权人、政府机构、注册会计师(会计师事务所)、新闻媒体、社会公众等企业内外部利益相关者,对企业的经济活动和会计行为,基于规则而进行的监督管理的一项制度安排。该定义强调会计监管是一项制度安排,会计人员和会计机构的会计监督不应作为单独的会计监管制度安排。     

Public R&D subsidies,outside private support,and employment growth

In the aftermath of the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the employment effects of public subsidies have been scrutinized because of new emphasis on public accountability and transparency. In this paper, we investigate conditions in which public subsidies of research and development (R&D) in small firms stimulate employment growth. We find, based on an empirical analysis of employment growth induced by US Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research program awards, that the stimulated employment growth is greater under two conditions: one, the presence of outside investors providing additional funding for the R&D and, two, when an exceptional amount of intellectual property is created by the publicly subsidized R&D. In addition to outside investors, other firms that make commercial agreements with the subsidized firm appear important for the employment growth of the subsidized firm. Cooperation between the small business doing the R&D and other firms is an important determinant of the commercial success of the technologies created with the support of public funds.     

Rational inattention,long-run consumption risk,and portfolio choice

This paper explores how the introduction of rational inattention (RI) – that agents process information subject to finite channel capacity – affects optimal consumption and investment decisions in an otherwise standard intertemporal model of portfolio choice. We first explicitly derive optimal consumption and portfolio rules under RI and then show that introducing RI reduces the optimal share of savings invested in the risky asset because inattentive investors face greater long-run consumption risk. We also show that the investment horizon matters for portfolio allocation in the presence of RI, even if investment opportunities are constant and the utility function of investors is constant relative risk aversion. Second, after aggregating across investors, we show that introducing RI can better explain the observed joint dynamics of aggregate consumption and the equity return. Finally, we show that RI increases the implied equity premium because investors under RI face greater long-run consumption risk and thus require higher compensation in equilibrium.     

Corporate social irresponsibility,CEO overconfidence,and stock price crash risk

This study examines whether and how corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) influences stock price crash risk for firms with overconfident CEOs. We find that the positive association between CEO overconfidence and stock price crash risk as shown in prior studies is significantly weakened when firms have higher CSI concerns. As a result, our intriguing findings demonstrate that investors are less surprised at the negative news hoarded by overconfident CEOs of CSI firms, possibly because they are already aware of and have previously reacted to the socially irresponsible behavior in their daily operations.     

Risk taking by banks and captial accumulation: A portfolio approach

This paper shows the risk taking role of banks within a continuous-time portfolio model. Banks are considered as risk-averse utility maximizers which differ from private investors and firms only by their degree of risk aversion. Since bankruptcy risk, described by a Poisson jump-process, restrains the capability of firms to mobilize funds from private investors, banks foster capital accumulation by investing in risk-bearing credits financed by risk-free deposits. The provision of collateral by the borrowing firms is found to be necessary for the viability of financial intermediation. This result adds to the explanation of collateral given by the theory of asymmetric information.I would like to thank Manfred Neumann, Thusnelda Tivig, two anonymous referees, and my husband for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.     

Contracts and asymmetric information in the theory of the firm

This paper extends the Coase notation of firms as intermediaries between consumers and input owners to incorporate asymmetric information. We show that in some cases it is optimal for consumers to pay a fixed price for a product and to ignore how the firm operates and the profit that it makes. If firms have private information that consumers cannot cheaply obtain, however, we demonstrate that the optimal contract may require constraints on firms internal operations and profits. Our work provides conditions under which cost-plus contracts are optimal, and demonstrates when nonprofit firms are the preferred organization structure.     

PURPOSELY INDUCED ASYMMETRTC INFORMATION

The theory of optimal employment contracts under asymmetric information generally assumes that the firm is unable to convince workers about the truth of its reports about the state of the world. However evidence indicates that firms are actually unwilling to reveal information for reasons connected with collective bargaining. The present note sets out a bargaining model which rationalizes this attitude and shows that it may cause employment to diverge from its optimal level.     

Bubbles and Crises

In recent financial crises a bubble, in which asset prices rise, is followed by a collapse and widespread default. Bubbles are caused by agency relationships in the banking sector. Investors use money borrowed from banks to invest in risky assets, which are relatively attractive because investors can avoid losses in low payoff states by defaulting on the loan. This risk shifting leads investors to bid up the asset prices. Risk can originate in both the real and financial sectors. Financial fragility occurs when positive credit expansion is insufficient to prevent a crisis.     

Fund Portfolio Holdings and Affiliated Analyst's Objectivity: Do Equity and Employment Relationship Matter?

The author investigates how the equity relationship between fund company and brokerage firm as well as employment relationship between analyst and brokerage firm affect affiliated fund stock portfolio holding and the affiliated analyst's objectivity. By using the specific data of such equity and employment relationship, the author finds that equity and employment relationship do matter in fund portfolio holdings and analyst objectivity. Specifically, analysts tend to release more optimal ratings on stocks that have been hold by the funds, and the funds tend to significantly reduce the stocks in their portfolio once the analysts have announced high ratings on the stocks. Moreover, the analysts in employment relationships with majority shareholders of funds and with a low reputation reveal worse objectivity. In addition, from the point of abnormal return, analysts in employment relationships with majority shareholders of funds and with a low reputation damage the interests of common investors.     

SOUTH AFRICAN DISINVESTMENT: CAUSES AND EFFECTS

Divestment pressure is one channel through which those interest groups opposing apartheid have attempted to induce U.S. firms to withdraw from South Africa. This paper investigates empirically the relationship between stockholder influence, disinvestment, and the behavior of South Africa-active firms. The paper finds that if institutional investors hold a large proportion of a firm's shares, then that firm will be induced to participate in fair employment and social programs to benefit its black labor force. However, the same "socially responsible" firm is also more likely to disinvest—leaving a less progressive employer in its place.     

Firm size,employment risk and wages: further insights on a persistent puzzle

Recent inquiries into the observed positive relationship between wages and firm size suggest that unobservable characteristics give rise to a sorting of workers into large and small firms. Specifically, smaller firms tend to offer more unstable employment prospects and will tend to attract workers who are themselves unstable. As demonstrated by empirical analysis, the risk of permanent employment separation (i.e. the risk of firm failure) is in fact negatively correlated with firm size. Moreover, when this measure of employment risk is included as a determinant of wages, the independent influence of firm size on wages vanishes. These results suggest that firm size merely proxies for the risk of firm failure by capturing unobservable sources of heterogeneity in workers and firms.     

企业专利与外部融资

除保护技术输出的传统职能外,专利在企业和利益相关者沟通中也发挥着重要的信号传递职能。其中,专利在资本市场上的信号价值近年来备受关注,已有研究指出专利作为质量信号有助于企业获得投资者认可,并且专利信号效果依赖于投资者获得企业信息的多少。在此基础上,进一步讨论了投资者获得企业信息的内容对信号价值的影响。具体地,在负面信号情境下（企业过去的财务绩效差、收益波动性大、未来不确定性高）,专利的信号价值更强,而在正面信号情境专利信号效果减弱。利用来自深沪两市1 787家上市公司2000-2011年面板数据验证了以上假设,专利数量和外部融资之间存在正向关系,并且在负面信号情境下二者正向关系更强。稳健性检验进一步表明,发明专利的信号效应比非发明专利更强,而私企的专利信号效应比国企更强。     

Institutional investors and opportunistic seasoned equity offerings in the Korean stock market

This study examines the impact of institutional monitoring on opportunistic seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the Korean stock market. With a firm’s accrual quality as a measurement for the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors, we hypothesize that the managers of firms with poor accrual quality are likely to engage in opportunistic SEOs, but such opportunistic activity is weak in firms strongly monitored by institutional investors. The empirical findings indicate that opportunistic SEOs tend to be deterred by institutional monitoring.     

An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China

This paper empirically studies the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the market valuation of publicly listed firms in China. The authors construct measures for corporate governance mechanisms and measures of market valuation for all publicly listed firms on the two stock markets in China by using data from the firm’s annual reports. They then investigate how the market-valuation variables are affected by the corporate governance variables while controlling for a number of factors commonly considered in market valuation analysis. A corporate governance index is also constructed to summarize the information contained in the corporate governance variables. The index is found to have statistically and economically significant effects on market valuation. The analysis indicates that investors pay a significant premium for well-governed firms in China, benefiting firms that improve their governance mechanisms. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 2 (in Chinese)     

STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION

We provide a new theory to explain why firms multitask workers instead of specializing them. Workers overperform in tasks they like and underperform in tasks they dislike to favorably influence future job assignments. Anticipating this, firms may find it optimal to commit to future multitasking to induce workers to appropriately allocate effort early in the employment relationship. We show that when the product market is volatile, so that future product prices are uncertain, the firm's ability to credibly commit to a multitasking strategy diminishes. This generates a negative relationship between multitasking and product market volatility, consistent with recent empirical evidence.     

Efficient risk sharing,non-marketable labor income and fixed-wage contracts

This paper seeks to explain fixed-wage labor contracts. The traditional rationale that fixed wages represent an implicit sale of ‘wage insurance’ by risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers is rejected as being incompatible with the fact that firms are owned by risk-averse investors. Instead, it is shown that fixed-wage contracts might arise from the non-marketability of labor income. When human capital is not marketable, it becomes optimal to shift all the risk in production onto the firm, since trading in equity markets enables efficient allocation of the uncertainty. The fixed-wage contract shifts the risk to equity owners and in fact replicates the first-best equilibrium that would emerge if individuals were paid their realized marginal product and allowed to trade shares in human capital.     

Financial constraints on investments: A three-pillar approach

Recent theoretical analyses demonstrate how informational asymmetries between financiers and investors may generate credit rationing and positive cost differentials between external and internal financing sources. The traditional empirical approach used to test for the presence of financing constraints at firm level is based on two pillars: a priori identification of relatively more financially constrained firms and econometric estimation of an investment demand function. This approach has been seriously questioned due to several methodological problems. This paper intends to amend it by adding a third pillar: the informational content of direct revelation through qualitative data. The paper estimates a reduced form investment equation following the Euler equation approach, and combines a priori information and direct qualitative information to consistently estimate for each firm the probability of being financially constrained. Our main finding is that when financially constrained firms are properly identified, the neoclassical model is rejected only for unconstrained firms. This indirectly rescues the validity of the Euler equation approach. Moreover, financially constrained firms show a positive correlation between investment and lagged cash flow.