COMPETITION OR COOPERATION IN URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY?

ABSTRACT: Inter‐municipal cooperation is now as common among US local governments as for profit privatization. This article uses data from a national survey in 2007 to explore the benefits of cooperation – economies of scale, service coordination across the metropolitan region and greater community control. While privatization reforms have focused on harnessing the benefits of a competitive market, cooperation may be the new frontier where economies of scale and efficiency gains can be achieved with governments working together in a new form of collaborative service delivery.     

Inflation persistence: The path of labor market structural reforms

In this paper, using a monetary policy framework where the central banker is considered as conservative, we investigate the role of labor market structural reforms in inflation dynamics. Our theoretical model suggests that a more deregulated labor market reduces inflation persistence. Using data from a large sample of OECD countries over the period 2000–2012, we empirically confirm our theoretical proposition. The main policy implication is that the reduction of inflation persistence can be addressed not only by central banks, but also by governments through the path of labor market structural reforms.     

The Effect of the Quasi–market on the Efficiency–equity Trade–off in the Secondary School Sector

Britain’s education system was radically transformed during the 1990s following the Education Reform Act (1988). The primary objective of these reforms was to raise educational standards through the creation of a quasi–market based upon greater parental choice and the transfer of control over resources from local education authorities to schools. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of the quasi–market on efficiency and equity in the secondary education sector in England during the 1990s. Two primary questions are addressed. Has the quasi–market led to an improvement in efficiency in the secondary education sector? Has the quasi–market had any adverse consequences on the social segregation of pupils between schools? Using data obtained from the Schools’ Census and the School Performance Tables, we find strong evidence that the quasi–market has led to a substantial improvement in efficiency (as measured by a school’s exam performance and by the productivity of staff) during the 1990s. The same market forces have led to a greater social segregation of pupils between schools.     

Local governments’ fiscal balance and privatization in transition countries1

Several transition economies have undertaken fiscal decentralization reforms over the past two decades along with liberalization, privatization and stabilization reforms. Theory predicts that decentralization may aggravate fiscal imbalances, unless the right incentives are in place to promote fiscal discipline. This study uses a panel of 20 transition countries over 19 years to address a central question of fact: Did privatization help to promote local governments’ fiscal discipline? The answer is clearly ‘no’ for privatization considered in isolation. However, privatization and subnational fiscal autonomy along with reforms to the banking system – restraining access to soft financing – may prove effective at improving fiscal balances among local governments.     

The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry

This paper employs the economics of shortage framework to examine post-Mao reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. Performance has been disappointing because reforms through 1985 failed to fundamentally alter economic agent behavior. The “soft” budget constraints at the enterprise and local government levels continue to generate “quantity” and “expansion” drives. The resultant inflationary pressures have necessitated administrative interventions and thwarted reform progress. The Maoist legacy of active participation by local governments in economic management is high-lighted as a major obstacle to the elimination of paternalism in state-enterprise relations.     

Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway

Excessive administrative spending in local governments has been a concern in the public debate in Norway. Administration takes resources away from welfare services such as primary education and care for the elderly. Since administrative spending varies considerably between local governments, a study of the political and economic factors involved is warranted. The central hypothesis is that the administrators will have more power relative to the politicians when political control is divided between parties. Estimation of a demand model of administration added political structure shows strong empirical correlations between types of coalition governments and socialist controlled governments and the level of administrative spending. Divided political control strengthens the hands of the agenda setting bureaucrats.     

Policy reforms and asymmetric price transmission in the Zambian and Tanzanian coffee markets

Several governments in sub-Saharan Africa have embarked on various market reforms to improve commodity market performance. However, the success of such market reforms depends partly on the strength of the transmission of price signals between spatially separated markets and between different levels of commodity value chains. This study employs momentum threshold cointegration and error correction models to examine the impact of policy reforms on the transmission of prices between the world coffee market and domestic prices in Zambia and Tanzania. The findings show that in the case of Zambia, where policy reforms liberalized coffee markets, the producer prices respond more swiftly to decreases than increases in world market prices, and this swiftness increased after the policy reforms. For Tanzania, where reforms resulted in increased government intervention, producer prices were found to respond quicker to increases than decreases in world market prices over the period under consideration. However, the period before reforms showed domestic prices responding more swiftly to decreases than increases in world prices, while the post-reform period was characterized by faster responses to increases than decreases in world prices.     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

证券交易所的全球整合与中国的对策

各国证券交易所经过互相竞争与自身改制,逐渐整合成几家主要的垄断的交易所体系,这些证券交易所之间还通过建立战略联盟的方式进行合作与整合,并采取各种举措提升市场占有率和竞争优势。中国资本市场要实现跨越式发展,必须对现有证券交易所进行制度变革。在此基础上,实现上海、深圳和香港三大证券交易所的战略分工与合作,进而与国外证券交易所实行战略合作,奠定中国成为资本大国的根基。     

The institutional foundation of China's economic growth

China's economic growth is (undoubtedly, undeniably, unquestionably) regarded as a miracle due to the changes it has brought to the lives of the Chinese as well as to the global economic structure. This paper analyzes China's economic growth from the perspective of institutional reforms. The main argument is that, through the redefinition of property rights, the operation costs of China's planned economy under full public ownership have been reduced dramatically. Human resources have greatly improved in terms of productivity and creativity, thus providing China with competitive advantages in the global market.     

Direct democracy and local government efficiency

This paper studies the role of direct democracy in ensuring efficient and cost-effective provision of goods and services in the public sector. The sample consists of the population of municipalities in the German State of Bavaria, where in the mid-1990s considerable direct democratic reforms granted citizens wide opportunities to directly participate in local affairs through binding initiatives. Using information on the municipal resources and the municipal provision of public goods, and applying a fully non-parametric approach to estimate local government overall efficiency, the analysis shows that more direct democratic activity is associated with higher government efficiency. This result suggests that more inclusive governance through direct decision-making mechanisms may induce more accountable and less inefficient governments.     

Are Banking Systems in East Asia Stronger?*

The Asian crisis was severe because local banking systems were weak. The major policy effort to improve supervision and strengthen banking systems that followed has achieved substantial results. But these achievements have been somewhat uneven across the region. The current favourable environment should not lull governments into complacency: new risks are arising and continued reforms are needed.     

How to reform China’s fiscal system?

ABSTRACT

As the population aging, China’s government expenditures, including general fiscal expenditure, healthcare and social security expenditure, will grow more rapidly than government revenues, tending to elevate government debt. Local governments undertake overwhelming 85% of total general fiscal revenue and are responsible for healthcare and social security, and their debt has been growing. Fiscal reforms are imperative, including tax reforms, the structure of government spending reforms, social security reforms, healthcare reforms, local public finance reforms, and central and local government’s fiscal relationship reforms. This paper will explore the fiscal challenges China faces and discuss how to reform the fiscal system to cope with these challenges.     

制度-垄断地租与中国地方政府竞争:一个马克思主义分析框架

竞争性地方政府作为改革以来形成的重要制度形式,在相当程度上决定了中国社会主义市场经济体制的特点。本文不仅承续了既有文献中将地方政府的经济动机归于租金,并将土地财政视为地方政府利用租金开展战略投资的观点,而且试图在一个马克思主义框架内进一步发展这一观点。为此我们对租金的生产性利用和国家的经济作用的关系做了初步探讨,并将大卫·哈维的制度-垄断地租理论运用于分析中国地方政府围绕营建环境的投资活动。本文的基本结论是,中国地方政府在以土地财政为核心的战略投资中,充当了租金的生产性分配者和使用者的角色,并因之嵌入了原本由企业之间的竞争所带来的相对剩余价值生产过程,形成了中国经济特有的相对剩余价值生产双重结构,从而在相当长的时间内造就了世所罕见的高投资率,推动了中国经济的持续快速增长。     

西部矿产资源生态补偿的利益之争

西部地区矿产资源丰富,但由于其生态补偿体系中的各补偿主体(中央政府、矿产企业、西部与东部地方政府)之间存在多重利益诉求等原因,致使现存的补偿机制失去操作平台,进而造成了资源严重浪费和环境极度恶化。为此,在构建西部生态补偿机制的实践中,中央政府需要切实加强环保政策的支持力度和干预强度,并从制度设计上完善资源税费等配套改革,同时还应设立西部生态补偿基金,积极动员各方力量拓宽筹资渠道。     

政绩推动、政治关联与民营企业投资扩张

地方政府以行政方式推动民营企业投资扩张是造成投资过度和产能过剩的重要原因。以2004-2011年民营上市公司为样本,本文实证分析了地市级政府面临的政绩压力对民营企业投资的影响,并重点考察了政治关联在其中的作用以及政绩压力对信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现,控制地区固定效应后,地方政府政绩压力影响辖内民营企业投资,政绩压力特别是经济增长压力越大时,辖内民营企业过度投资越严重。政治关联弱化了政绩压力对民营企业投资的推动作用,地方政府面临较大的政绩压力特别是经济增长压力时,政治关联民营企业过度投资程度相对较低。进一步研究还发现,地方性政治关联对政绩压力推动民营企业投资扩张的弱化作用更为显著。政绩压力特别是经济增长压力增大时,地方政府同样有着强烈的动机推动非管制行业民营企业扩张投资。信贷资源在政绩压力影响政治关联民营企业投资行为方面扮演了重要角色。本文的相关结论对于理解地方政府推动企业投资扩张造成产能过剩以及政治关联的经济后果具有一定的参考价值。     

退耕还林中的中央政府与地方政府最优激励合约

在对地方政府执行退耕还林政策的成本收益进行分析的基础上,文章运用Holmstrom和Milgrom(1991)提出的多项任务委托—代理模型的精神,构建了一个中央政府与地方政府之间的双重任务委托—代理模型,并将土地资源禀赋因子引入该模型中,形成了一个新的分析框架,据此对中央政府与地方政府在退耕还林工程实施过程中的最优激励合约作出了研究。结果表明,在设计激励合约时,中央政府应根据地区的土地资源禀赋、地方政府的Arrow-Pratt绝对风险规避度量、退耕还林实施绩效的变异性等因素确定地方政府的可变收益分配率,并让地方政府的收益与退耕还林的实施绩效直接挂钩。在此基础上,文章就提高地方政府执行退耕还林政策的积极性提出了一组政策建议。     

美国政府对联邦土地及其附属资源的管理模式

美国宪法确立了联邦政府对其拥有的土地及附属自然资源的专属管理权,但这种专属管理权的行使不可能排斥州和地方政府的参与。联邦政府与州政府以及地方政府在对联邦土地及附属自然资源的管理上,实际实行的是联邦政府主导的合作型联邦制。在保证联邦政府对联邦土地管理最终决定权的前提下,联邦政府通过制定法律和签订协议的形式与州和地方政府分享权力,以便对联邦土地及附属自然资源进行富有成效的管理。     

Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic policy changes

Do sovereign bond markets react systematically to microeconomic policy reforms? Some observers suggest that investors are very attentive to supply‐side policies such as those related to labor markets, corporate taxation, and product standards. They argue that, along with macroeconomic outcomes and broad financial market conditions, such reforms affect sovereign bond premiums, for developed as well as emerging economies. In contrast, we predict few systematic effects of supply‐side policy reforms on sovereign bond market outcomes. Our theory draws on a standard three‐equation model of the economy, widely accepted among economic and finance professionals. That model makes few clear predictions regarding the anticipated effects of microeconomic policy changes; as a result, we expect that such reforms will not generate systematic market reactions. Our analyses, based on daily data from 37 countries from 2004 to 2012, indeed reveal little evidence of a systematic bond market reaction to the 47 most significant reforms to corporate taxation and labor market regulation. These results call into question the notion that “bond market vigilantes” play a central role in compelling governments to enact specific microeconomic policy changes.     

中央政府与地方政府的政策博弈及其治理

本文描述了中央政府和地方政府政策博弈的凸现与加剧,认为这种政策博弈的制度性根源是市场取向的分权制以及以GDP为核心的政绩指标考核体系,制度性根源对政策博弈具有传导机制.这种政府博弈的积极影响促进了中央政府政策的更加合理、完善,而消极影响则是中央政府调控能力大打折扣、中央政府遭遇信任危机和扰乱市场秩序.治理途径则在于建立新型中央政府和地方政府关系,采取消除政策博弈的措施,即真正做到财权与事权的统一、建立居民的退出与呼吁机制、构建更加合理的政绩观与指标考评体系.