Do option open-interest changes foreshadow future equity returns?

Recent work considers whether information is simultaneously reflected in both option and equity markets. We provide new evidence supporting Black’s (Financ. Anal. J. 31:36–72, 1975) conjecture that information is first revealed in option markets. Specifically, changes in call and put open-interest levels have predictive power for future equity returns. Large increases in call open interest are followed by significantly increased equity returns. Put open-interest increases precede weaker future returns, but the relationship is considerably less pronounced in the presence of certain controls. The recent change in the call-to-put open-interest ratio has predictive power as to equity returns over the following week, even after controlling for numerous factors.     

Delinquency and Default in Arms: The Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion

This paper extends the extant literature in understanding the effects of equity and debt on delinquency and default by focusing on a variant of borrower equity where part of equity is “protected”. The CPF scheme in Singapore stipulates that the refund of borrower’s retirement funds utilized for property purchase prior to September 2002 takes priority over loan obligations. A decision to utilize CPF for property purchase actually increases ex post delinquency and default risk as it effectively reduces cash equity commitment. In particular, any erosion in house value that places protected equity at risk translates into potential wealth reduction or financial liability for the borrower. While loss aversion is evident for non-distressed sellers, the effect of equity losses for distressed borrowers is not as clear. Our research suggests that averting losses in committed equity may be a secondary consideration for borrower subject to income shocks, recognizing that delinquency and default are precursors to foreclosure. Interestingly, we find that the borrowers are strongly averse to incurring protected equity-induced wealth loss or financial liability. This study suggests that the first-lien “anomaly” associated with CPF refund may reduce delinquency and default risks for mortgage backed securities.

Personal Taxation and Investment Incentives in a Small Open Economy

A simple portfolio model is used to investigate the effects of personal taxes on real investment incentives in a small open economy with large and small firms. When shares in large firms can be traded internationally and their rate of return is exogenously determined on international equity markets, a tax on the return on riskless bonds will induce a portfolio shift from bonds to shares in large firms. This shift reduces the impact of the bond tax on the required rate of return on shares in domestically owned small firms, provided that returns on shares in small and large firms are positively correlated. The total impact of the bond tax may even change from a negative to a counter-intuitive positive one if the “beta” between the returns on small and large firms is above unity. A personal tax on equity returns does in general have an ambiguous impact on the pre-tax rate of return requirement of domestically owned firms. An exogenous rate of return on large company shares is shown to enhance the possibility for the equity tax to reduce the required pre-tax rate of return in small domestic firms. A sufficient condition for a negative relationship is again that the “beta” between the returns in small and large firms is above unity. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Risk-neutral compatibility with option prices

A common problem is to choose a “risk-neutral” measure in an incomplete market in asset pricing models. We show in this paper that in some circumstances it is possible to choose a unique “equivalent local martingale measure” by completing the market with option prices. We do this by modeling the behavior of the stock price X, together with the behavior of the option prices for a relevant family of options which are (or can theoretically be) effectively traded. In doing so, we need to ensure a kind of “compatibility” between X and the prices of our options, and this poses some significant mathematical difficulties.     

On the Good News in Equity Carve-Outs

The announcement of the sale of equity in a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation is received by the market as good news about the value of the existing equity in the parent corporation. This is in stark contrast to announcements of other forms of public equity financing. We show that the apparent inconsistency between the market response to equity carve-out announcements and other forms of equity financing can be easily understood in the Myers and Majluf (1984) framework. It is shown that firms that resort to an equity carve-out will be firms that, on average, are being undervalued by the market.     

The pricing of Bermudan-style options on correlated assets

In this paper, we present a methodology for approximating a correlated multivariate-lognormal process with a recombining or “simple” multivariate-binomial process. The method represents an extension and implementation of previous work by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) and Ho, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1995) on diffusion approximation. The general method is illustrated by pricing a Bermudan-style put option on the minimum of three asset prices, and by pricing Bermudan-style options on bonds, where the value of the bond at a point in time depends upon the interest rate in two currencies and the foreign exchange rate. This type of structure, known as the “Power Reverse Dual” is a popular product in the case of Japanese Yen-US Dollar currencies. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Dynamics of the S&P 500 Implied Volatility Surface

This empirical study is motivated by the literature on “smile-consistent” arbitrage pricing with stochastic volatility. We investigate the number and shape of shocks that move implied volatility smiles and surfaces by applying Principal Components Analysis. Two components are identified under a variety of criteria. Subsequently, we develop a “Procrustes” type rotation in order to interpret the retained components. The results have implications for both option pricing and hedging and for the economics of option pricing. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Optimal Choice for Lenders Facing Defaults: Short Sale,Foreclose, or REO

When mortgage borrowers default and have no desire or ability to keep their property, then loss mitigation involves a sale of the property via one of the following options: (1) the lender allows pre-foreclosure “short sale” by the borrower, (2) the lender institutes the foreclosure process under a notice of default and the property is sold during the process by the borrower, and (3) the lender forecloses on the property, takes title, and sells the property in the market as real estate owned (REO). Sale of the property in the above three options is conducted by a motivated seller, either the owner or the lender, who desires to sell the property as quickly as possible. Thus, relative to a no-default sale, the house is most likely to be sold at a discounted price. It is generally expected that the discount would be lower in the case of a “short sale.” This option, however, may result in a longer marketing time, thus a higher total loss, than the other two options. We developed a model that allows simultaneous estimation of price and time-on-market effects of “short sales,” foreclosures, and REO options. We find that the short-sale option has the lowest-price discount, but significantly higher costs associated with marketing time. The pattern of price discount and marketing time reverses as we move to a sale while in the process of foreclosure and to a sale with an REO status.     

Analysis of embedded options in individual pension schemes in Germany

Newly introduced government-subsidized pension products in Germany are required to contain a promise by the seller to provide a “money-back guarantee” at the end of the term. The client is also given the right to stop paying premiums at any time (paid-up option). In this case, the amount of all premiums paid must also be guaranteed by the seller at maturity, no matter when the client stopped paying the premiums. Previous analyses of guarantees in such government-subsidized pension products have ignored this additional option. Within a generalized Black/Scholes framework, we analyze the value of the paid-up option for different products, market scenarios, and client behavior. Our results indicate that the paid-up option significantly increases the value of the money-back guarantee. Furthermore, we find that reducing volatility by shifting the client’s assets from stocks to bonds as maturity approaches is a suitable means of reducing the risk arising from the “pure” money-back guarantee but much less effective in reducing the risk arising from the paid-up option. JEL Classification G13 · G23 · G28     

Return predictability and shareholders’ real options

This study re-interprets the properties of the residual income model by highlighting the shareholders’ abandonment (liquidation or adaptation) option. We estimate the value of this real option as an explicit component of abnormal earnings in the residual income model and test the improvement in valuation after incorporating it into the model. Relative to the traditional specification of the residual income model, this real options model has a stronger predictive power for future abnormal stock returns. We also find that the superior return predictability of the real options model is pronounced in the set of firms with a high probability of exercising liquidation options (for example, those with low profitability, low growth opportunities, high underlying asset volatility, and low intangible assets), which is consistent with the importance of shareholders’ abandonment option in equity valuation. The results are robust to extensive sensitivity checks.     

Efficiency and equity of European education and training policies

This paper reviews empirical evidence, especially from Europe, on how education and training policies can be designed to advance both efficiency and equity. Returns to educational investments tend to decrease over the life cycle. Moreover, they are the highest for disadvantaged children at early stages and for the well-off at late stages of the life cycle. This creates complementarities between efficiency and equity at early stages and trade-offs at late stages. The paper discusses specific policies for efficiency and equity at each educational stage, ranging from early childhood education and schools over vocational and higher education to training and lifelong learning. The available evidence suggests that both efficiency and equity can be enhanced by output-oriented reforms properly designed to each stage, where the state generally sets a regulatory framework that ensures accountability and funding, and uses the forces of choice and competition to deliver best results. Designed this way, education and training systems can advance efficiency and equity at the same time. This paper is an adapted and revised version of the analytical report that accompanied the Communication and Staff Working Paper of the European Commission on “Efficiency and Equity in European Education and Training Systems” (ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/back_gen_en.html).     

Long run forward rates and long yields of bonds and options in heterogeneous equilibria

We prove that, in a heterogeneous economy with scale-invariant utilities, the yield of a long term bond is determined by the agent with maximal expected marginal utility. We also prove that the same result holds for the long term forward rates. Furthermore, we apply Cramér’s large deviations theorem to calculate the yield of a long term European call option. It turns out that there is a threshold risk aversion such that the option yield is independent of the risk aversion when the latter is above the threshold. Surprisingly, the long term option yield is always greater than or equal to the corresponding equity return. That is, in the long run, it is more profitable to buy a long maturity call option on equity than the equity itself.      

Binomial Option Pricing Biases and Inconsistent Implied Volatilities

We evaluate the binomial option pricing methodology (OPM) by examining simulated portfolio strategies. A key aspect of our study involves sampling from the empirical distribution of observed equity returns. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we generate equity prices under known volatility and return parameters. We price American–style put options on the equity and evaluate the risk–adjusted performance of various strategies that require writing put options with different maturities and moneyness characteristics. The performance of these strategies is compared to an alternative strategy of investing in the underlying equity. The relative performance of the strategies allows us to identify biases in the binomial OPM leading to the well–known volatility smile . By adjusting option prices so as to rule out dominated option strategies in a mean–variance context, we are able to reduce the pricing errors of the OPM with respect to option prices obtained from the LIFFE. Our results suggest that a simple recalibration of inputs may improve binomial OPM performance.     

Preferred stock: Some insights into capital structure

This study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announcement of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity announcement effect of − 0.65%. This reaction is positively influenced by a number of measures of firm creditworthiness and transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The equity market reaction is negatively influenced by convertibility (and the moneyness of the embedded option) and by the firm's accounting treatment of the issue (specifically if the issue is classified as equity). We find that average credit default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after the issue announcement. This decrease is also larger for more creditworthy and transparent firms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. In aggregate, the decrease in equity value is much smaller than the increase in the value of the issuer's debt.     

The Impact of Financial Arrangements and Institutional Form on Housing Prices

Dwellings in housing cooperatives constitute 15% of the Norwegian housing property market. The price paid for such dwellings consists of two elements: An equity price and a share of the mutual debt held by the cooperative. The interest rate paid on the housing cooperative’s mutual debt is in Norway lower than the interest rate paid on private loans. This gives rise to an “interest discount effect”. We find convincing empirical support for the interest discount effect, which contributes to a higher equity price for dwellings in housing cooperatives than for self-owned dwellings. On the other hand, we also find empirical support for a co-op discount of 9.3%. The co-op discount work in the direction of making cooperative dwellings more affordable.     

Option Expensing and Managerial Equity Incentives

We examine the impact of mandatory option expensing on managerial equity incentives. Though effective only after June 15, 2005, there is evidence that U.S. firms begin preparing for option expensing as early as 2002 by making changes to their equity incentive plans. We find that (1) CEO option incentives exhibit a sharp reversal during the period 1993-2005, with the median CEO option incentives increasing 25% a year before 2002 but declining 17% a year after 2001; (2) the reduction in option incentives after 2001 is larger for firms that use excessive levels of equity incentives prior to 2002; (3) firms make similar reductions to options granted to CEOs, other top executives and lower-level employees; (4) CEO stock incentives increase throughout the entire 13-year period, rising at an even greater rate after 2001; and (5) the increase in stock incentives after 2001 is far from offsetting the corresponding decrease in option incentives. These findings are robust to controls for firm and CEO characteristics and for concurrent regulatory, business and market events such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the option backdating scandal, and the 2000 stock market crash. We also provide a theoretical explanation for the documented changes in option incentives.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

Informed Trading Around Earnings Announcements: Another Look

This study is an empirical test of the Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) multimarket sequential trade model of stock and option markets. We employ two approaches to determine the information content of signed stock and option trades executed around quarterly earnings announcements. The first approach expands the vector autoregression (VAR) technique of Hasbrouck (1991a) to include signed option trade volumes and inter‐trade durations. Estimates from the VAR models provide insight into whether both equity and option trades are viewed as informative by the equity specialist. The second approach focuses on the information content of the earnings releases to determine whether signed equity and option trades executed prior to the announcements are informed. Results indicate that although informed traders prefer to transact in both markets around earnings announcements, option market transactions contain no incremental information.     

On the range of options prices

In this paper we consider the valuation of an option with time to expiration and pay-off function which is a convex function (as is a European call option), and constant interest rate , in the case where the underlying model for stock prices is a purely discontinuous process (hence typically the model is incomplete). The main result is that, for “most” such models, the range of the values of the option, using all possible equivalent martingale measures for the valuation, is the interval , this interval being the biggest interval in which the values must lie, whatever model is used.     

Regulation of systemic liquidity risk

This paper provides a baseline model for regulatory analysis of systemic liquidity shocks. We show that banks may have an incentive to invest excessively in illiquid long-term projects. In the prevailing mixed-strategy equilibrium, the allocation is inferior from the investor’s point of view since some banks free ride on the liquidity provision due to their limited liability. The paper compares different regulatory mechanisms to cope with the externalities. We show that a combination of liquidity regulation ex ante and lender of last resort policy ex post can maximize investor payoff. In contrast, both “narrow banking” and imposing equity requirements as a buffer are inferior mechanisms for coping with systemic liquidity risk.