运输成本、土地价格与生产集聚区迁移

论文将差异化固定成本引入新经济地理学的中心一外围模型,建立了一个两地区、两部门模型,讨论了生产集聚区在不同固定成本地区之间的迁移,以此来解释和分析在城市的发展和建设中普遍存在的制造业生产向郊区迁移的过程。主要结论为：企业不会自发地向郊区迁移,即使因为郊区地价低廉发生了企业迁移,也仅是个别企业的逐利行为,而整个集聚区的迁移是不能发生的。政府干预是必要的,一是压低迁移目的地的土地价格,另外就是适时加强迁移目的地的基础设施建设,两种措施要循序渐进才能有效推动生产集聚区迁移。     

末端产品资源化的逆向物流体系研究

根据末端产品资源化处理中废旧产品回收阶段的物流建设,探讨了逆向物流的科学内涵、运行模式及发展趋势,旨在为末端产品资源化中逆向物流体系的建设与发展提供参考.     

Investments,wages, prices and demand for labour

Summary Since 1971 the employment in the Netherlands has continuously decreased. Apart from the decrease caused by the recent depression, particularly in the year 1975, the decrease is a more pronounced continuation of a tendency which is manifest already in a number of years before. In this paper an attempt is made to explain the structural development of employment by means of a clay-clay vintage model. It appears that the unfavourable development of employment is connected with the accelerated growth of real labour costs in the past decade.This article is a translation of a revised and somewhat extended version of a paper published earlier in Dutch: H. den Hartog and H. S. Tjan,Investeringen, lonen, prijzen en arbeidsplaatsen, Central Planning Bureau, Occasional Paper, 1974/2, The Hague, 1974. This revised version of the clay-clay vintage model was introduced into a much more complete model of the economy of the Netherlands in: H. den Hartog, Th. C. M. J. van de Klundert and H. S. Tjan, De structurele ontwikkeling van de werkgelegenheid in macro-economisch perspectief, inWerkloosheid, Preadviezen van de Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde, The Hague, 1975.     

Prices,incentives, and economic growth

Zusammenfassung Preise, Anreize und wirtschaftliches Wachstum. - In dem Artikel wird untersucht, wie sich politikbedingte Verzerrungen auf die Effizienz der Ressourcenallokation und das wirtschaftliche Wachstum in entwickelten, unterentwickelten und sozialistischen L?ndern auswirken. Eingriffe in die Güterm?rkte k?nnen in Form der Importprotektion, Preiskontrollen und Wettbewerbsbeschr?nkungen erfolgen. Auf den Arbeitsm?rkten verzerren die Arbeitslosenunterstützung, die Kündigungsschutzabkommen, die Sozialversicherungsleistungen und die Lohnsteuer das Arbeitsangebot, w?hrend Mindestlohngesetze und Sozialversicherungsbeitr?ge auf die Nachfrage nach Arbeit einwirken. SchlieΒlich sind Zinssatzverordnungen, K?rperschaftssteuern und Einfuhrbeschr?nkungen die haupts?chlichen Eingriffe in die Kapitalm?rkte. Nach der Betrachtung der wirtschaftlichen Wirkungen dieser Interventionen werden Vorschl?ge gemacht, wie die Verzerrungen beseitigt oder gemildert werden k?nnen.

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Résumé Prix, incitations et croissance économique. - Cet article examine les effets des distorsions imposées par la politique sur 1’ efficacité de l’allocation des ressources et sur la croissance économique dans les pays développés, développants et socialistes. Les interventions sur les marchés de biens peuvent consister de la protection d’importation, des contróles des prix et des freins á la concurrence. Parmi les distorsions sur les marchés du travail, l’allocation de chómage, la protection contre le licenciement, les prestations de sécurité sociale et les impóts sur les salaires affectent l’offre du travail pendant que le salaire minimum et des cotisations d’assurance sociale chargent la demande du travail. Finalement, les régulations des taux d’intérét, les impóts sur les sociétés, et la protection d’importation sont les interventions principales sur les marchés des capitaux. Après une revue des effets économiques de ces interventions, l’auteur donne des recommandations á éliminer ou relacher les distorsions.

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Resumen Precios, incentivos y crecimiento economico. - Este trabajo trata los efectos que tienen las distorsiones creadas por la politica económica sobre la eficiencia de la asignación de recursos y el crecimiento economico en los pafses desarrollados, en vias de desarrallo y socialistas. Las intervenciones en los mercados de bienes pueden manifestarse como restricciones a las importaciones, controles de precios y limites a la competencia. Entre las distorsiones de los mercados laborales, la compensación por desempleo, la reglamentación sobre la seguridad de las plazas de trabajo, los beneficios de la prevision social y los impuestos a los salarios afectan la oferta de trabajo, mientras que la reglamentación del salario mfnimo y los descuentos para la previsión social inciden en la demanda de trabajo. Finalmente, la regulaci?n de la tasa de interés, los impuestos a las empresas y la restriction a las importaciones constituyen las principales formas de interventión en los mercados de capital. Después de pasar revista a las consecuencias económicas de dichas intervenciones, este trabajo présenta recomendaciones para corregir o aliviar las distorsiones résultantes.

     

The rise and fall of the sliding scale, or why wages are no longer indexed to product prices

Though almost no postwar union contracts indexed wage rates to prices of the employer’s products, union agreements linking wage rates to product prices, known as sliding scales, were common in some industries in the United States and Britain from the 1860s through the 1930s. This paper explains why sliding scales disappeared after the 1930s, and examines what practical experience with sliding scales revealed about fundamental constraints on wage indexation. Paradoxically, the history of sliding scales confirms that workers’ information about product prices and materials costs is generally imperfect, in ways that would substantially constrain wage indexation in long-term contracts. Sliding scales were not indexed long-term contracts, but rather devices to forestall costly strikes in the absence of contracts by revealing employers’ private information about product demand. In the postwar US, unions and employers failed to link wage rates to product prices because they had gained the ability to enter binding contracts, which could achieve the benefits of preventing strikes without incurring the extra negotiation costs and information problems associated with product-price indexation. I present a model to show how sliding scales could forestall strikes by revealing information, and how the introduction of binding union contracts reduced incentives to link wages to product prices.     

Fiscal incentives,competition, and investment in China

This paper explores how fiscal incentives offered to local governments in China affect investment rates in their jurisdictions. Theoretically, we build a simple fiscal competition model to establish the linkage between local fiscal incentives and expenditure policy and consequently, capital movement. The key prediction of the model, borne out by data from Chinese provinces spanning 2004–2013, is that an increase in the local corporate income tax-sharing ratio, which proxies fiscal incentives offered to local governments, motivates local governments to compete for capital investment through increased public expenditure. Our results contribute to the literature on both fiscal federalism and state capacity by showing that local fiscal incentives significantly shape policy choices and local economic performance. In addition, by exploring fiscal incentives offered to local governments, we offer a novel explanation for the unusually high investment rate in China that has been sustained over a prolonged period.     

Consensus,Dispersion and Security prices*

Abstract. This study establishes and tests, within the framework of a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model, the existence of a formal linear relationship between security prices, the average (consensus) and the dispersion of agents' expectations. Variations in the average and in the dispersion of agents' expectations, measured by the earnings forecasts produced by financial analysts, which are gathered and made available by The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), have respectively a positive and negative effect on security prices. The difficulties raised by this estimation, as well as the institutional dimensions of the financial analysis industry are examined. The main results are the following: (1) the most important changes in consensus (in absolute value) correspond to the most important changes in dispersion in the analysts' forecasts, (2) the changes in the consensus and the dispersion of forecasts are respectively positively and negatively linked to Canadian security returns, but given the delay between the production and the public availability of the forecasts, an important part of the price adjustment occurs before the disclosure of forecast changes, (3) the effect on security returns of variations in the consensus dominates the effect of variations in the forecasts' dispersion. Thus, it seems that the impact of information arrival on security prices does not only depend on the direction and the magnitude of the expectations' average revision, but also depends on the direction and the magnitude of the change in the expectations' dispersion.     

House prices, money, credit, and the macroeconomy

This paper assesses the links between money, credit, house prices,and economic activity in industrialized countries over the lastthree decades. The analysis is based on a fixed-effects panelvector autoregression, estimated using quarterly data for 17industrialized countries spanning the period 1970–2006.The main results of the analysis are the following. (i) Thereis evidence of a significant multidirectional link between houseprices, monetary variables, and the macroeconomy. (ii) The linkbetween house prices and monetary variables is found to be strongerover a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006. (iii) The effectsof shocks to money and credit are found to be stronger whenhouse prices are booming.     

Regulation, competition, and the structure of prices

Many competition policy issues in regulated industries concernthe structure of prices charged by multi-product firms - forexample price discrimination, non-linear pricing, cross-subsidies,and network access pricing. This article first sets out the(Ramsey) principles of optimal pricing to recover fixed costs.The sometimes conflicting aims of promoting competition andpursuing social objectives are brought into the analysis. Questionsof whether to allow pricing structure discretion to the firm,and how much, are considered next. With asymmetric information,some discretion is often desirable, but its optimal form ishard to characterize. The article then turns to the controversialnetwork access pricing problem - on what terms should an integrateddominant firm be required to supply inputs required by its rivals?Finally, there is discussion of pricing structure regulationin the transition from more to less regulation, which, it isto be hoped, is in prospect in parts of the regulated industriesas effective competition develops.     

Taxation,procurement and collective incentives in Chinese agriculture

Contrary to the view held by many, the organization of agriculture in China has been based on a carefully devised system of incentives which rewards efficiency even at the cost of permitting some degree of inequality. This paper looks at the way taxation and procurement policies in China have been designed to provide such incentive to the collective units in Chinese agriculture. The overall result is a rate of ‘marginal tax’ which is much lower than the rate of ‘average tax’ that is levied both directly and implicitly through procurement. Since liberation there has been a steady reduction in the rate of extraction of resources out of agriculture.     

Economic incentives, natural resources and conflict in Africa

This paper reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers to fightin wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel leaders do useeconomic incentives, but they also avail themselves of otherstrategies to motivate their soldiers, including political indoctrination,ethnic mobilisation and coercion. The type of incentive employedwill depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted.In particular, those movements that face competent nationalmilitaries will have to evolve into viable armies while rebelsfighting states that are weak and corrupt can afford to leadmovements that employ coercion and pursue economic agendas.     

Wages,prices, and technology in early Catalan industrialization

Catalonia was the only Mediterranean region among the early followers of the British industrial revolution. The roots of this process can be traced back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the Catalan economy became integrated into international trade, and a successful printed calico industry concentrated in the city of Barcelona. Although the factory system was largely adopted by the cotton industry in the 1840s, the diffusion of the spinning jenny in Catalonia had occurred earlier, in the 1790s. In line with Allen, this article explores whether relative factor prices played a role in the widespread adoption of the spinning jenny in Catalonia. First, series of real wages in Barcelona are supplied for the period 1500–1808. Second, the prices of labour and capital are compared and the potential profitability of the adoption of the spinning jenny is analysed. Findings show that although Catalonia was not a high wage economy in the way that Britain was in the second half of the eighteenth century, evidence from the cotton spinning sector confirms the relevance of relative factor prices in the adoption of new technology. Within the booming cotton sector after the 1780s, high wages created strong incentives for the adoption of the labour‐saving spinning jenny.