Beyond the Sovereign Debt Crisis: Alternative Forms of Market-Based Debt Restructuring Schemes

The resolution of the international debt crises has stimulated extensive research onhow to design solutions for countries facing external debt overhang problems. Thispaper analyses the benefits for creditors and debtors of the following `market-based'debt restructuring schemes: (i) issue of collateralised new assets inexchange for the old debt; (ii) automatic roll-over of the debt repayment with astate-contingent penalty rate. The first proposal combines the basic debt conversionscheme proposed by Krugman (1989) with Cline's proposal (1995) of self-enhancementson the new claims as a form of risk-compensation for creditors (seealso Williamson, 1988). Under this scheme the debtor country modifies the streamof the debt service payments by voluntarily exchanging the outstanding debt fornew assets with different debt service characteristics where the principal and/or theinterest rate payment can be fully or partially collateralised. The roll-over schemeentitles illiquid countries to extend the outstanding debt for a specified period at apenalty rate which is contingent on a measure of the country's creditworthiness.This solution has the desirable effect of reducing the future contractual obligationsby lowering the penalty rate on the excess of debt rolled over, thus helping thedebtor country to use additional resources to invest in the economy.     

希腊主权债务危机的成因及对中国的启示

希腊主权债务危机是此次全球金融危机的延续,是希腊政府财政赤字不断累积的必然结果。在外部金融危机的冲击下,希腊政府受制于国内的政治压力和欧元区的货币制度,无力采取有效措施加以应对,从而导致了主权债务危机的深化和扩散,并引发了全球金融市场的持续动荡,影响了世界经济复苏的进程。以此为借鉴,中国应高度关注自身的债权安全,加强对公共债务的控制和管理,谨慎开展区域货币一体化合作,并加快国内经济结构优化调整的步伐,以实现国民经济的长期可持续发展。     

欧洲主权债务危机形成机理及对中国的启示

本文以希腊债务危机为切入点,着重分析此次欧洲主权债务危机的形成机理,同时从中得出对我国的启示。     

Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the creditor in a dynamic, noncooperative game. Its length is shown to depend on the planning horizon of the parties, the discount factor and the growth prospect of the debtor country.     

Profitable Buybacks in Sovereign Debt

Since the 1982 debt crisis, several debtor countries have repurchased fractions of their debts. Bulow and Rogoff have argued that these buybacks benefit the banks but not the countries. Krugman argues the opposite. This paper provides an explanation of why buybacks benefit both countries and banks. A lending environment with terms-of-trade shocks is considered. If a country defaults, banks impose a penalty on the country and incur some costs. It is shown that with a buyback, the country defaults on a smaller loan, if at all, and the economy saves part of these costs, if not all.     

Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

欧债危机与资本主义福利国家新变化

欧债危机爆发后,有一种观点认为危机的原因是高福利。通过分析希腊债务危机与本国福利制度的关系,对比南北欧在危机中的不同表现,可以看出高福利制度只是债务危机的直接推手,欧债危机的发生还有其他原因。本文通过对北欧福利国家改革的历史考察以及这次债务危机中各国财政紧缩和福利改革措施的分析,探讨福利国家改革的走向和趋势。     

The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism

The absence of a formal international regulatory mechanism tofacilitate sovereign debt restructuring has long been recognizedas a most serious gap in the architecture of global finance.Why has it proven so difficult to create such a sovereign debtrestructuring mechanism (SDRM) at the international level? Politicaleconomists have devoted relatively little scholarly attentionto this question. This paper attempts to begin to fill thisgap in the literature by examining four failed initiatives tocreate a SDRM over the past century. In place of a realist orstructural Marxist account, the paper puts forward a more contingentexplanation for these failures that highlights three distinctpolitical problems that must be overcome in the constructionof a SDRM: (1) collective action problems on both the side ofsovereign debtors and that of private foreign creditors; (2)basic distributional conflicts embodied in any debt restructuringeffort; and (3) the uncertain behavior of the private creditors'home states.     

中国主权债务的现状分析及其风险防范对策

20世纪70年代以来,国际债务危机频繁发生,陷入危机的国家都遭受了重大损失。2007年由次贷危机所引发的经济衰退使一部分发达国家和发展中国家陷入债务危机,造成了全球的金融动荡。为此,改革国际货币体系、控制外债流动性风险、增强中国在国际市场上的融资能力具有重要的意义。     

我国基础教育债务危机探讨

文章对基础教育债务的危害和形成原因进行了深入剖析,认为彻底解决基础教育债务问题需要从防范新债务产生和化解已有债务两方面着手,防范的措施包括构建教育债务风险预警体系、建立常规的农村基础教育基建投入机制等,化解的措施包括依靠社会中介机构“锁定”教育债务、建立教育债务归口管理制度等。     

债务视角下的经济危机

按照债务率高低可将经济运行分为两种状态:债务正常状态和债务非正常状态。在债务正常状态下,负债对经济没有反馈作用,不过经济运行对债务具有反馈作用。在一定条件下(如稳定状态下的贷款利率大于经济增长率时),债务随经济增长而不断累积,从而使经济体从债务正常状态转向非正常状态。当经济进入债务非正常状态时,高负债开始对经济运行产生负反馈作用,进而导致经济危机。由债务所引发的经济危机通常无法由需求管理型的常规宏观稳定政策予以熨平,唯有非常规宏观稳定政策才能帮助经济摆脱危机。所谓非常规宏观稳定政策,本质上就是以政府直接购买债务的方式来缓解企业或金融机构的债务问题。不过,非常规宏观稳定政策会产生动态不一致和道德风险等问题。有鉴于此,政府救助必须辅以相应的惩罚,惩罚性救助是政府应对债务危机的根本之道。     

欧债危机下的意大利研究与创新改革

为了尽快走出欧债危机,意大利政府提出了一系列改革方案,其中,研究和创新是重要的改革内容。具体的改革举措包括:简化公共研发竞争性基金资助程序,改革企业激励机制,为年轻研究人员提供专项资金,引入需求驱动型创新机制,出台一系列研发税收减免机制,推出新的创业文化支持创新型中小企业创业等。通过介绍意大利研究与创新体系的基本特点,并对欧债危机发生后意大利研究与创新体系的变化以及采取的重要创新改革举措进行分析和总结,以期对我国的创新决策提供参考和借鉴。     

欧美债务危机与中国经济发展

在世界经济逐步摆脱金融危机的阴影,我国集中精力实施“十二五”规划的进程中,欧关经济又先后受到债务危机的困扰。、美国债务危机的深层根源在于由基本矛盾而产生的有效需求不足,直接原因是为弥补这种不足而采取的财政赤字政策,举债过度。欧美债务危机对我国经济必将造成一系列的负面影响,但就我国经济发展的基础和趋势看,如果因应得当,国民经济继续保持较快持续发展的态势不会因此而改变。欧美债务危机对我国有深刻的启示,应从中吸取教训,采取必要的措施,把我国的经济搞得更好。     

市场经济、现代社会文明与欧债危机——对欧债危机成因的一个新解释

欧债危机实质上是市场经济固有特征与现代社会文明矛盾的产物,反映出欧盟经济发展方式的深层次矛盾。欧盟国家长期通过扩大债务方式维持高水平"公平"导致了经济效率的降低,长期通过提高虚拟经济比重方式维持经济增长导致了产业结构的不合理,长期通过加大社会保障力度方式提高公民福利水平导致了社会发展责任意识的淡漠。为避免欧债危机问题在中国出现,中国要确保公平的实现依靠效率的提高,确保虚拟经济的发展依靠坚实的实体经济基础,确保权利的实现与责任的担当相匹配。     

关于解决主权债重组问题的讨论:基于博弈均衡的分析框架

集中于国际主权债重组的理论诠释,并通过对主权债重组中的两个问题--集体行动困境和道德风险的博弈模型建立和分析,讨论如何建立一个解决主权债务重组问题的机制,使遇到债务困难的国家和债权人循此机制解决问题从而减少债权债务双方的损失,总结出处理主权债务问题应特别考虑的几个关系,提出一些启发性的政策建议.     

欧洲债务危机、财政联盟与蓝色债券

自希腊发生主权债务危机以来,欧元区持续动荡。欧元区总体财政状况并不差于美国等国,但欧元区却率先陷入债务危机困局,未建立统一的财政政策是一个重要原因。在债务危机的逼迫下,欧元区针对危机采取了一系列救助措施,这事实上是某种形式的财政联盟。在对比美欧财政和公共债务状况的基础上,本文探讨了欧元区建立财政联盟的必然性,分析了欧元区财政联盟的实际进展,并进一步剖析了建立财政联盟的一种方案——"蓝色债券"的优点和障碍等。