Dynamics of social factors in technological substitutions

Diffusion models of technological innovations are often based on an epidemic structure which has a good fit to historical data but whose communication assumptions lack explanatory power. They assume a simplified decision process, uniform decision criteria across adopters categories, and a fully interconnected social structure. The objective of this paper is to show that the dynamics of social factors during technological substitutions have significant effects on substitution patterns. The success of a paradigmatic shift is not only a function of technological characteristics but also depends on change agents and many social dynamics. Such complexity requires analysis at several levels of granularity. We start with cognitive processes at the individual level using concepts from cognitive psychology and decision making under uncertainty and then move to interpersonal communications at the aggregate social level. We show that population heterogeneity generates different decision criteria and a social topology which greatly affect perceptions and the formation of expectations. The structure of interpersonal networks also explains how the relevance and credibility of information impact the critical mass dynamics of technology adoption. A more complete model accounting for social interactions provides a useful framework for understanding complex substitution patterns and reducing the risk of misreading the market.     

Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule

Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.      

Compromise effect and consideration set size in consumer decision-making

The compromise effect dictates that a decision-maker chooses a middle option over an extreme one given a set of choice alternatives since choosing an intermediate option is easier to justify, less likely to be criticized, and is consistent with loss aversion. Our experiment is designed to identify whether the connection between the extremeness of the options and the size of the consideration sets is economically and statistically significant and thus would have important behavioural implications. Specifically, we compare decision-making under small and large consideration sets where the extremeness of the comprising choice options is high, as opposed to low. The results demonstrate that an increase in consideration set size leads to weaker compromise effect (i.e. boundary condition) but when composed of high extremeness, strengthens the compromise effect.