The Cost of Living and Terror: Does Consumer Price Volatility Fuel Terrorism?

Do fluctuations of consumer prices prompt terrorist activity? A latent assumption among conflict scholars is that price volatilities for basic consumer goods produce hardships for people that increase popular grievances, damage government legitimacy, and raise the chances for terrorism. In this study, I use a series of regression estimations to test volatility in consumer price indices for energy, housing, and foods as predictors of domestic and transnational terrorism in a cross section of countries. I produce several findings. First, food price fluctuations are significant predictors of multiple measures of terrorism, while energy and housing prices are not. Second, rapid food price increases, not decreases, promote terrorist attacks. Third, the relationship between food price volatility and terrorism is most consistently present in nondemocratic and “hybrid” political regimes and in medium human development countries rather than in democracies or in countries characterized by very high or very low economic development.     

Do People Accurately Anticipate Sanctions?

We provide lab data from four different games that allow us to study whether people have accurate expectations regarding monetary sanctions (punishment/reward) and nonmonetary sanctions (disapproval/approval). Although the strength of the sanction is always predicted with some error (particularly in the case of monetary sanctions), we observe that (i) most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction, (ii) expectations covary with sanctions, (iii) the average expectation is very often not significantly different than the average actual sanction, and (iv) the errors exhibit no systematic bias, except in those situations where rewards are frequent. In this line, we find some evidence that punishment is better anticipated than rewards.     

Does decentralization reduce income inequality? Only in rich states

We investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and income inequality using data from U.S. states over three and a half decades. Our study contributes to the literature in several ways in terms of empirical methodology and specification. First, we take into account integration and cointegration properties of the data and estimate the cointegrating relationship between fiscal decentralization and income inequality using Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares, following Pedroni (2000). Second, we investigate the direction of the causality. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we investigate if the relationship between fiscal decentralization and income inequality is conditional on income in each state. We find that fiscal decentralization does reduce income inequality, but only in rich states. We also find that causality runs from fiscal decentralization to income inequality, not the other way around.     

Economics: Friend or Foe of Politics to Support Strategically Important Domestic Industries?

Strategic goods (e.g., food and energy) are defined as necessary prerequisites for the consumption of all other goods in the economy. Private markets fail to provide efficient domestic supply because of externalities. Individuals do not consider that the consumption of a domestically produced strategic good increases domestic supply available to society if international supply is disrupted in a future crisis. Hence, there is a purely economic rationale for government support to domestic strategic industries. But political factors, such as lobbying and political short-termism, also critically influence the actual provision of strategic goods and the case for support.     

Are Homegrown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK Evidence

We compare the characteristics of 77 homegrown Islamic terrorists in the UK to a representative sample of 1363 UK Muslims. UK Muslims are more likely to participate in terrorist acts if they are better educated and young. Other predictors of UK Muslims being involved in terrorism are employment status, UK citizenship, and ethnic origin.     

Sabotage versus Discouragement: Which Dominates Post Promotion Tournament Behavior?

We explore the behavior of losers of promotion tournaments after the tournament is concluded. We do so with an experiment in which we vary the design of the promotion tournament to determine how tournament design affects post tournament effort. Our design allows us to discriminate between two possible reasons tournaments might lead to decreased work effort among the tournament losers: strategic sabotage and a worker becoming discouraged by the tournament outcome. We examine behavior after the tournament and find evidence suggesting that bad tournament design can lead to workers being discouraged. This discouragement effect is strong for low ability workers but not for high ability workers. Conversely, we do find evidence that some high ability workers engage in strategic sabotage but the incidence does not vary with the design of the promotion tournament and the incidence of it is low.     

Separating uncertainty from heterogeneity in life cycle earnings

This paper develops and applies a method for decomposing crosssection variability of earnings into components that are forecastableat the time students decide to go to college (heterogeneity)and components that are unforecastable. About 60% of variabilityin returns to schooling is forecastable. This has importantimplications for using measured variability to price risk andpredict college attendance.     

Selecting public goods institutions: Who likes to punish and reward?

We study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand, and preferences over, as well as behavior within, various public goods institutions on the other hand. We incentive‐compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions. We find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment. Somewhat surprisingly, preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics. Conversely, individual characteristics, including institutional preferences, are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game. For instance, risk‐averse individuals preemptively punish more often. This suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards, it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty—although they may not affect the original selection into institutions.