How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors

This study examined whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs) with narcissistic tendencies are more likely to execute earnings management behavior because of pressure to fulfill earnings thresholds. The results revealed that a CEO who exhibits high narcissism is more likely to be involved in earnings management to compensate for her/his performance. Our findings suggest that CEO narcissism directly influences financial decisions. Considering the earnings thresholds, firms with a more narcissistic CEO experience a regulatory effect on real earnings management behavior. Studies have indicated that CEOs manipulate earnings to satisfy three primary earnings thresholds: prior year’s reported earnings, zero earnings, and analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical results provide further evidence that CEOs engage in earnings management to fulfill positive earnings thresholds and analysts’ forecasts. We infer that CEOs use the abnormal production cost method as an underlying mechanism to increase reported earnings. Our findings help clarify the relationship between CEO personality traits and earnings manipulation to assist investors with decision-making.     

Impact of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate sustainability and firm performance

To explore the personality traits and corporate strategy of chief executive officers (CEOs), this study investigates how narcissistic and hubristic tendencies in CEOs affect the relationship between corporate sustainability practices (CSP) and firm performance. The primary purpose is to examine whether CEO narcissism and hubris can moderate the effect of corporate sustainability on firm performance. We investigate the influence of corporate sustainability on firm performance in three dimensions: economic, environmental, and social. The relationship between the mechanisms of supervision and agency theory is explored to assist investors in decision making. The results of this study show that compared to narcissistic CEOs, hubristic CEOs will further enhance the positive influence of CSP on corporate performance, especially in the environmental and social dimensions. This research strengthens the literature on CEO narcissism and hubris by demonstrating that CEO personality traits influence the relationship between corporate sustainability practices and firm performance.     

The adoption of outside boards by small private US firms

The research issue motivating the present study is concerned with why some small private firms adopt an ‘outside board’ (i.e. larger boards in which the majority of directors are neither managers of the firm nor relatives of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)) and others do not. This issue is addressed by investigating whether differing contextual conditions distinguish adopters from non-adopters of outside boards. The authors consider the adoption of an outside board to be one part of a larger organizational life-cycle process in which organizations implement more ‘professional management’ structures and practices in response to their evolving internal and external contexts. The authors examine simultaneously three contextual pressures that commonly confront small private firms as they develop over time- firm growth and larger size, the succession of the CEO, and the diffusion of equity to individuals outside the firm- to determine which of these are salient in explaining the presence of an outside board. Logistic regression results (3070 respondents toa cross-industry mail survey) indicate that outside boards are more likely when more equity is held by individuals outside the firm, CEOs are older and CEOs do not intend to implement an intra-family transition of leadership. The results suggest that firms adopt outside boards primarily to satisfy the desires of external owners, and only secondarily for the service and resource benefits that outside directors provide.     

The Value of CEO Mobility: Contextual Factors That Shape the Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Market Performance and CEO Compensation

This study examines the value that prior CEO experience has for the companies that hire such CEOs—as reflected in the firms’ subsequent market‐based performance—as well as its value for the CEO that possesses this experience—as reflected in his or her initial compensation. While we suggest that shareholders tend not to benefit from firms hiring experienced CEOs, we also argue that particular firm and industry contextual factors that shaped the prior CEO experience help ameliorate this detrimental effect. Regardless, we also suggest that prior CEO experience generally stands to benefit the CEOs, in that it brings them a compensation premium over those CEOs without such prior experience. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 654 US CEO succession events that occurred between 2001 and 2004 and found broad support for our hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research as well as what they mean for firms hiring experienced CEOs and for CEO careers more generally. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.     

CEO自恋对创新绩效的影响研究 ——基于企业异质性的调节作用

从CEO心理特征视角出发,探究了CEO自恋与企业创新绩效之间的关系。以2011—2016年A股135家上市公司的纵向数据为样本,通过广义估计方程模型进行实证检验。研究发现:CEO自恋对企业创新绩效具有显著促进作用。进一步研究发现,CEO自恋对企业创新绩效的影响受到企业异质性的调节作用:相比小规模企业,大规模企业中CEO自恋对创新绩效的促进作用更显著;相比低财务杠杆企业,高财务杠杆企业中CEO自恋对创新绩效的促进作用更显著;相比非国有企业,国有企业中CEO自恋对创新绩效的促进作用更显著。     

Unionization and CEO turnover

This article investigates whether unions have power to influence turnover of poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs). Employing the transparency coalition framework, we develop hypotheses regarding CEO tenure given unionization, performance-turnover sensitivity, and firm performance following CEO turnover. We use Cox regression and a data set of US firms from 1993 to 2013 to show that CEO turnover is accelerated at firms that unionize. Discontinuity analysis suggests that the relationship is causal. Overall, the results show the significance of unions in the key corporate governance event of CEO turnover and suggest that, though they may proceed independently and for their own traditional goals of good pay and job conditions for their members, unions can be allies of investors and boards or directors when it comes to removing underperforming CEOs.     

Chief executive officer attributes,sustainable performance,environmental performance,and environmental reporting: New insights from upper echelons perspective

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) attributes on sustainable performance, environmental performance, and environmental reporting, which are motivated by institutionally driven environmental policies, regulations, and management in the context of Chinese listed firms. With the use of a comprehensive dataset of 2,854 Chinese listed firms over the 2010–2017 period (i.e., making over 16,000 individual firm‐year observations), our findings are fourfold. First, our overall findings reveal that CEOs with research background tend to engage more in activities that improve sustainable performance, environmental performance, and environmental reporting than do those without research background. Second, CEOs with financial expertise are positively linked with increased sustainable performance and environmental reporting. Third, CEOs with foreign exposure are more eager to engage in activities that enhance sustainable and environmental performance than do those without foreign exposure. Fourth, young CEOs tend to take actions that reduce both sustainable and environmental performance than do their older counterparts. We interpret our results within upper echelons theoretical perspective. The results are robust to alternative measures, potential endogeneities, and sample selection problems.     

Friend or foe? Employee ownership and CEO dismissal

This paper examines 2 research questions. First, does the level of employee stock ownership impact the likelihood of dismissing poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs)? Second, does the level of employee stock ownership affect the likelihood of appointing an outsider or an insider after the dismissal of an incumbent CEO? We suggest that employee stock ownership reinforces the firm performance—CEO dismissal link because employee shareholders' welfare consisting of fixed claims (wages, bonuses, etc.), residual claims (dividends, increase in stock value, etc.), and human capital (generic and idiosyncratic) are highly linked to their firm performance. Moreover, under conditions of poor performance, employee shareholders are likely to favor an outsider CEO because he or she is more likely to initiate and implement drastic changes to the strategy of the firm, and therefore, he or she is more likely to improve firm performance. Drawing on a longitudinal sample of French firms, we find that employee stock ownership strengthens the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal likelihood. We find also that the higher employee ownership, the more likely that the underperforming CEO is replaced by an outsider. In contrast, employee ownership has no moderating impact on the likelihood of insider CEO appointment.     

The Roles of Chinese CEOs in Managing Individualistic Cultures in Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions

The individualism-collectivism culture represents an important and well-researched distinction across cultures. Yet research is less clear about how the different levels of individualistic cultures in host countries affect the success of an increasingly important firm strategy – cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs). This study addresses this key research question in the context of Chinese firms’ CBMAs, as Chinese firms are increasingly acquiring targets outside of China in the New Normal global business landscape. This study further theorizes and tests how the Chinese acquirer CEOs’ characteristics moderate the wealth creation relationship. In an analysis of 404 Chinese firms’ CBMAs, we found that an individualistic culture in the host country is negatively associated with Chinese acquirers’ CBMA wealth creation. We also demonstrate that Chinese CEOs’ exposure to foreign culture and female gender weaken that negative relationship, while CEO duality strengthens this negative relationship. Our research thus suggests that culture in host countries can negatively affect acquirers’ CBMA performance, but CEOs may be able to manage the effects of the culture to increase their CBMA performance.     

企业成长性、CEO财务专长与企业价值

中国有一个成语叫"南橘北枳",意思是同一个物种在不同的生长环境下会表现出不同的性状.举一反三,企业管理者的才能是否也会因为组织环境的差异而发挥不同的作用?本文结合企业的成长性水平,从投资行为和成本管控的视角,系统分析与检验了CEO财务专长对企业价值的影响.研究结果显示,对于高成长性企业,财务出身的CEO会抑制企业的投资水平,易错失投资机会,有损企业价值;而对于低成长性企业,CEO的财务专长则有助于企业实现成本领先,提升企业价值.路径检验发现,对于高成长性企业,CEO的财务专长对企业价值的影响存在部分的投资水平路径;对于低成长性企业,CEO的财务专长对企业价值的影响存在部分的成本管控路径.进一步研究发现,CEO财务专长对企业投资水平、企业价值的抑制作用,只存在于具备高成长性的国有企业之中;成长性水平降低后,无论是国有企业还是民营企业,具有财务专长的CEO均能够显著提高企业成本管控水平,促进企业价值上升.     

Knowledge capital,CEO power,and firm value: Evidence from the IT industry

Disruptive innovation dramatically changes the demand of a product market in the information technology (IT) industry. In response to the impact of disruptive innovation, IT firms that may be eliminated from the competitive race actively develop innovative products and adjust their operating strategies to strengthen their survivability in the fiercely competitive market. Thus, this study explores the factors that affect firm value in the IT industry under the impact of disruptive innovation. The empirical results reveal that knowledge capital and CEO power play crucial roles in explaining firm value. IT firms with powerful CEOs and increased knowledge capital have high firm values. The effects of knowledge capital and CEO power on firm value are especially significant for founder and duality CEO firms. Furthermore, the influence of CEO power is more prominent in periods of financial crisis.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity,Monitoring Complexity,and CEO Pay‐for‐Performance Sensitivity

We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board‐chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome‐based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large‐, medium‐, and small‐cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock‐based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome‐based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Do CEO characteristics influence a firm’s investment in brand equity? Evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper contributes to the upper-echelons theory by extending the investigation of how CEO characteristics, namely gender, age, tenure, education attainment, and duality, influence firms’ strategic decisions regarding brand equity investment. We gather 8830 firm-year observations from the Chinese listed firms for the period of 2012 to 2018. We develop several hypotheses and use a probit regression specification to test each hypothesis. The empirical results show that a CEO’s tenure and duality have a positive influence. Interestingly, the CEO’s age has a negative influence while their gender and education have no significant influence on a firm’s propensity to invest in brand equity. It indicates that longer tenures and duality lead CEOs to be confident making them more willing to invest in high-risk projects. It also indicates that older CEO’s are risk-averse, while gender does not play a role in the risk-taking appetite of the CEO. The results provide several implications for firms looking to develop influential brands, especially in China.

     

Components of CEO Transformational Leadership and Corporate Social Responsibility*

abstract We use transformational leadership theory to explore the role of CEOs in determining the extent to which their firms engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). We test this theory using data from 56 US and Canadian firms. CEO intellectual stimulation (but not CEO charismatic leadership) is found to be significantly associated with the propensity of the firm to engage in ‘strategic’ CSR, or those CSR activities that are most likely to be related to the firm's corporate and business‐level strategies. Thus, studies that ignore the role of leadership in CSR may yield imprecise conclusions regarding the antecedents and consequences of these activities. We also critique transformational leadership theory, in terms of its overemphasis on charismatic forms of leadership. This leads to a reconceptualization of transformational leadership, which emphasizes the intellectual stimulation component in the context of CSR.     

The impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firms’ performance and profitability

This paper investigates whether the performance variables of newly added intangible capital elements give the appointment relationship a deeper impact on the firms’ performance and profitability. We document that after correcting for endogeneity, when considering intangible capital, Total Q is a better proxy than Tobin’s Q for explaining the effect of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability. Furthermore, we show that the influence of directors on company performance and profitability is more important than that of executives or managers. We also find that the stronger the appointment relationship, the worse the company’s performance and profitability. We further provide a series of alternative interpretations and robustness test evidence showing that intangible capital is more important for high technology and internet firms than industrial firms. Further, we find that the greater the number of executives appointed by the CEO, the better the firm’s research and development, but the worse the firm’s investment policy.     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential managerial entrenchment. Additionally, CEOs of firms with governance provisions that offer them protection from takeovers enjoy more generous pay. We also examine the change in CEO compensation relative to the change in shareholders' wealth. The evidence shows that when there is an increase in shareholders' wealth, the CEO is able to obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. On the contrary, when shareholders' wealth falls, there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Given the empirical evidence, we argue that CEO compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting.     

Can environmentally oriented CEOs and environmentally friendly suppliers boost the growth of small firms?

The core question addressed in the natural resource‐based view (NRBV) of the firm is how to develop and exploit resources beneficial for both the natural environment and firm performance. Due to the resource constraints and increased competition facing small manufacturing firms, achieving this is a challenge for such companies. Building on the NRBV and resource orchestration literatures, we examine the relationship between green purchasing capabilities (GPCs), CEO's environmental orientation (EO), and firm growth. Results from 304 Swedish small manufacturing firms indicate a significant relationship between GPC and growth, and this relationship is positively moderated by the EO of the CEO.