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1.
Rupayan Gupta 《Southern economic journal》2016,82(4):1327-1348
In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption. 相似文献
2.
This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent‐seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent‐seeking activities are price‐inelastic, a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending, other things equal. Using data from U.S. state legislatures, 1970 to 2007, we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust, positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures. 相似文献
3.
Iryna Topolyan 《Southern economic journal》2016,83(1):105-125
We investigate a group all‐pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group‐specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi‐pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups. 相似文献
4.
We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases. 相似文献
5.
In this article, we evaluate the role of elections in governors' state tax policy making. Does it matter for state taxes whether the governor is a Democrat or Republican and whether she is eligible for re‐election or faces a binding term limit? Using a Regression Discontinuity Design and a panel of U.S. states, we find that the manner in which governors of different parties implement different tax policies turns crucially on the incumbent's eligibility for re‐election. Re‐electable Democratic governors increase income taxes relative to similarly situated Republicans, yielding divergence between party policy positions. However, governors facing a binding term limit exhibit the reverse policy difference, resulting in a movement of policy back together. 相似文献
6.
Paul Pecorino 《Southern economic journal》2016,83(2):380-398
I develop a model in which a firm can choose to donate a portion of its profits to the provision of a public good. Consumers value this public good and are willing to pay a price premium to a firm which makes such a donation. When this price premium is sufficiently large, the firm can raise its net profits by pledging a portion of those profits to provision of the public good. This is more likely when the consumer's marginal valuation of contributions to the public good is high and when the firm (in the absence of donations) has a high ratio of fixed costs to operating profits. I also identify circumstances under which corporate social responsibility makes consumers worse off. 相似文献
7.
8.
Matt Van Essen 《Southern economic journal》2013,80(2):523-539
This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumers view as perfect complements. I show that collusion by the firms increases total social welfare and that the collusion problem can be reinterpreted as a problem of provision of public goods from the point of view of the firms. I take this insight further and derive the familiar concepts of the Samuelson marginal condition and the ratio equilibrium for the firms. I compare these outcomes to the first best solution and then apply incentive‐compatible mechanisms to strategically implement the Pareto superior ratio‐equilibrium outcome and the optimal marginal‐cost pricing outcome. Finally, I show how this methodology can be applied to the more familiar Cournot model of oligopoly. 相似文献
9.
Presidential disaster declarations provide disaster aid through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and are known to be motivated by political factors as well as by need. The extent to which politics influence the Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster declaration decision, made by a presidential appointee, has not been previously measured. We use new data covering 1960–2013 to show that SBA declarations are subject to the same political influences as presidential declarations. Disasters occurring during reelection years, as well as those occurring in electorally important states, are more likely to receive SBA declarations. The effect of politics is stronger in the period prior to the passage of the Stafford Act in 1988, showing that the two types of declarations are substitutes for political purposes. 相似文献
10.
Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes incentives in a rank‐order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders and supporters sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the distribution of abilities. These implications are corroborated by data on U.S. gubernatorial primary elections. 相似文献
11.
Robert Ridlon 《Southern economic journal》2016,83(2):364-379
When a manufacturer advertises, what is the impact on retailer advertising? I analyze a contest model of advertising where total advertising by the manufacturer and by retailers determines market size, and the relative level of advertising by each retailer determines market share. If retailers are symmetric I show that there is a crowding‐in effect so increased manufacturer advertising increases retail advertising. But if one retailer is stronger, then marginal increases in manufacturer advertising have a crowding‐out effect on retailer advertising, while sufficiently large increases have a crowding‐in effect by “jump‐starting” competition between retailers for the larger market. Furthermore, asymmetric abilities in such contests can lead the weaker player to effectively drop out of the contest, thereby undermining the ability of increased prizes to increase effort by intensifying competition. 相似文献
12.
Richard J. Cebula 《Atlantic Economic Journal》2005,33(2):159-167
This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to identify and better understand key determinants of the expected benefits from voting and hence key determinants of the aggregate voter participation rate in the US. Using annual data for all years in the 1960–1997 study period, this study finds that the voter participation rate has been positively impacted by strong public approval or strong public disapproval of the incumbent President, a finding unique to this literature and study period. In addition, the aggregate voter participation rate has been positively impacted by such factors as the Gulf War, which is generally regarded as having been popular among the US electorate, and a rising unemployment rate. This study also finds the voter participation rate to have been negatively impacted by the publics dissatisfaction with government, as well as by the Watergate scandal.The author is indebted to Cassandra Copeland for helpful information, comments, and guidance. 相似文献
13.
Voter participation rates vary widely across the 50 states. This empirical study seeks, within the context of a broadened
version of the ‘rational voter model,’ to identify determinants of this interstate variation. Using the 2004 general election
as the study period, it is found that the voter participation rate in a state is positively related to the percent of the
state's adult population with at least a high school education, the state's unemployment rate, the percent of the state's
population age 65 and older, and the female labor force participation rate in the state. In addition, it is found that voter
turnout in a state is negatively related to the state's median family income and the percentage of its population that is
Hispanic. 相似文献
14.
Gordon Tullock 《Atlantic Economic Journal》2006,34(1):41-46
Since the rational voter model was first introduced, the issue of voting determinants has been the subject of extensive study. Moreover, the significance of the democratic process has long been a subject of extensive study and controversy. This study addresses a related pair of issues and offers some challenges for students of voting, the voting process, and the nature of democracy to ponder. The two issues are: (1) what does democracy mean? and (2) which is the best or least bad of these various choices. 相似文献
15.
Arthur Zillante 《Southern economic journal》2017,84(1):98-119
We experimentally compare electoral outcomes when donor contribution limits are varied. The effect of contribution limits is studied under three levels of transparency: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We find that a combination of stricter contribution limits and full transparency is most successful at limiting donors' influence on policy choice. We also find that stricter contribution limits improve social welfare in some treatments. We further find that the partial and no anonymity settings lead to “centrist bias,” whereby implemented policies, on average, are more centrist than the candidate's preferences in most treatments. 相似文献
16.
tj agiobenebo 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2006,74(2):294-300
This paper seeks to reopen a discussion on what the profession has considered settled and closed, namely the issue of the optimal quantity of a pure public good. We argue that determination of the optimal quantity by the intersection of the collective willingness to pay curve and the supply curve is inappropriate because it exaggerates the aggregate demand for the public good, thus giving rise to misleading supply decisions. The reason lies in the basic properties of pure public goods, in particular that of non‐rival consumption (joint supply). The paper submits that the optimal quantity of a public good is the largest quantity demanded by any single consumer (individually or as a collective). The individual demand curves are required in the analysis only for the purposes of determining the optimal benefit taxes and an equitable cost sharing formula. We show that under such a formula, based on benefit shares, the budget will be balanced, and since the tax burden is smaller than the benefits, less resentment to taxation could be anticipated under this framework. 相似文献
17.
The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High‐powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest. 相似文献
18.
Allard van der Made 《Southern economic journal》2019,85(3):939-959
I explain the ubiquitous use of graduated punishments by studying a repeated public good game in which a social planner imperfectly monitors agents to detect shirkers. Agents’ cost of contributing is private information and administering punishments is costly. Using graduated punishments can be optimal for two reasons. It increases the price of future wrongdoing (temporal spillover effect) and it can lead to bad types revealing themselves (screening effect). The temporal spillover effect is always present if graduated punishments prevail, but screening need not occur if agents face a finite horizon. Whether or not a screening effect is exploited has a substantial impact on both outcomes and actual punishments. If the temporal spillover effect is sufficiently strong, then first‐time shirkers are merely warned. 相似文献
19.
George R. Crowley 《Southern economic journal》2015,81(3):742-768
This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal “Law of 1/n” and “Leviathan” theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature. 相似文献
20.
Economists argue that rich information environments and formal enforcement of contracts are necessary to prevent market failures when information asymmetries exist. We test for the necessity of formal enforcement to overcome the problems of asymmetric information by estimating the value of information in an illegal market with a particularly rich information structure: the online market for male sex work. We assemble a rich data set from the largest and most comprehensive online male sex worker Web site to estimate the effect of information on pricing. We show how clients of male sex workers informally police the market in a way that makes signaling credible. Using institutional knowledge, we identify the specific signal male sex workers use to communicate quality to clients: face pictures. We find that there is a substantial return to the signal in this market. The findings provide novel evidence on the ability of rich information environments to overcome problems of asymmetric information without formal enforcement mechanisms. 相似文献