Application of optimal control in man power planning

Many techniques are met in the literature (see for instance Bartholomew and Forbes (Statistical Techniques for Manpower Planning. wiley, New York 1979); Gunz (Organiz. Stud. 9(4), 529–554, 1988); Becker and Huselid (Human Resour. Manage. 38, 287–301, 1999); Wagner et al. (J. Manage. Med. 14(5/6), 383–405, 2000); Harris and Ogbonna (J. Business Res. 51, 157–166, 2001); Rogg et al. (J. Manage. 27, 431–449, 2001), among others), for planning the manpower resources. However, we haven’t seen in the literature an empirical study regarding the proper application of optimal control, which considered to be the most efficient method for multi-objective programming. With this in mind, we analyse in this paper the way of applying optimal control for manpower planning. For this purpose, and in order to facilitate the presentation, we first adopted a comparatively simple dynamic system (plant), with analytical presentation of stocks and flows. Next we proceed to the formulation of an optimal control problem, aiming to achieve in the most satisfactory way some preassigned targets. These targets mainly refer to a desirable trajectory of the plant stocks over time, in order to fully satisfy the needs for human resources over the planning horizon. Finally we present a method of solution of the formulated control problem which is based on the use of the generalized inverse Lazaridis (Qual. Quan. 120, 297–306, 1986). We believe that it is very important for successful management, that the policy makers have to know the effect of their polices and to determine the optimal path of the state variables (i.e. the ones describing the system) before the realization of the plan, so as to be able to reform their strategies, reallocate the resources and arrange the infrastructure accordingly, if all these are necessary, as it can be depicted from the optimal control solution.     

Real options and human capital investment

This paper extends the standard human capital model with real options. Real options influence investment behavior when risky investments in human capital are irreversible and individuals can affect the timing of the investment. Option values make individuals more reluctant to invest in human capital and, as a result, required returns on the investment increase. Real options may help to explain a larger human capital premium for higher education, smaller responsiveness of higher educational investments to financial incentives, and larger sensitivity of higher educational investments to low-return outcomes and human capital risks. Higher tax rates (or lower subsidies) depress human capital investments, but to a lesser extent than in the standard human capital model if not all direct costs are tax-deductible. A flat income tax remains neutral if education expenditures are fully deductible.     

Investment planning for irrigation development projects

This paper considers the problem of choosing among the technologies available for irrigation by tubewells to obtain an investment plan which maximizes the net agricultural benefits from a proposed project in a developing country. Cost and benefit relationships are derived and incorporated into a mathematical model which is solved using a modification of the dynamic programming procedure for solving the knapsack problem. The optimal schedule is seen to favor small capacity wells, drilled by indigenous methods, with supplementary water distribution systems.     

Privatization of businesses and flexible investment: a real option approach

In this article, we study the situation, where the opportunity is given to invest into a government-owned business by partial privatization to a private company. After payment of an initial installment cost, the private company’s investments are flexible within a range [0, k] until the business is completed. We model the problem in a real option framework, using geometric mean reversion to describe the dynamics of the business. We determine the optimal time for the private company to enter and pay the initial installment cost as well as the optimal dynamic investment strategy that it follows afterward. For the latter, analytic solution cannot be obtained. We use quadratic splines in order to solve the corresponding dynamic programming problem. Finally, we determine the optimal degree of privatization in our model from the government’s perspective.     

Regional economic models and continuous programming

This paper is concerned with an optimal investment allocation problem in a simple N-regional economic model. The problem is described as a class of optimal control problem, and formulated into a continuous linear programming problem. Both the primal and dual problems are considered. The procedure finds an optimal regional allocation of investment derived in terms of continuous programming.     

A multiperiod model for a training program

This paper is concerned with formulating and optimizing a multiperiod planning model for a manpower training program. Firstly, a time-dependent feed-forward model which traces eligible individuals through an educational (training) program and ultimately to a state of employment or unemployment is developed. The objective function is composed of an educational cost component and a manpower shortage or surplus cost component. Thus, the student (or trainee) optimal acceptance policy is derived. It is also proven that a one-state variable dynamic programming algorithm is much more efficient than a two-state variable algorithm in arriving at the optimal solution.     

A mathematical programming model for planning training opportunities in relation to manpower targets for development

One major obstacle to the implementation of development projects in many developing countries is the inadequate supply of skilled manpower. Thus efficient planning of training opportunities to supply the requisite quantity and quality of skills in phase with project implementation is an important problem. This paper develops a mathematical programming model for planning training opportunities in relation to manpower targets determined for development projects. The projects are assumed to have been selected according to some criteria of desirability deriving either from social cost-benefit analysis or national goals. The model permits alternative avenues of developing skilled manpower to be investigated with a view to ensuring the availability of qualified personnel given a stated work/task schedule, over a period of time, while attempting to minimize costs to the manpower supply system.     

An optimal-incentive contract for managers with exponential utility

This paper examines the manager–investor relationship in the case of exponential utility when the manager of investments in real or financial assets has an endowment which can be invested in the risky assets for which he has private information. We obtain a relationship showing trade-offs or hedging behavior among the investments the manager can choose for himself and the principal. Even with the hedging ability of the manager, the well-known first-best solution with ‘no moral hazard’ risk-sharing is obtained among these possible solutions to the manager's problem by specifying a ‘no conflict of interest’, zero investment by the manager of his own endowment in those risky assets for which he has private information. Thus, the agent imputes no disutility to the assignment of the principal's investments and the investor is assured of an investment strategy that he would make if he had access to the manager's private information.     

Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4).     

An impulse-control method for investment decisions in dynamic technology

This paper presents a new framework to augment standard methods in evaluating profitability of investments, especially those involved in dynamic technology. In this case there is a possibility that although a certain investment is profitable using standard methods, it should not be undertaken because it precludes a more profitable investment later on, when more advanced equipment will be available. The investment decision faced by a firm is presented here as an impulse-control problem, where the process of technological progress is modelled explicitly. The outcome of the optimization yields, in addition to investment expenditures, the expected time period between consecutive investments. A simple example demonstrates the use of the technique in actual investment decisions.     

Retailers’ incentives for green investment in differentiated competition channels

With increasing public environmental awareness, green activities in retail and distribution processes have become crucial tools for retailers to boost demand and enhance competitiveness. This study develops an analytical model to study the green investment choices of two differentiated retailers dealing with a common green manufacturer. It also explores the impacts of these investment choices on the manufacturer's operational decisions, channel efficiency, consumer welfare, and the environment. We derive three main results. First, the powerful retailer always favors green investments, whereas the less powerful (inferior) retailer may either prefer or avoid green investments. The fiercer the inter-retailer competition, the lower the willingness of the inferior retailer to introduce green investments. Second, although all supply chain parties may disagree on their preferences for retailers' green investments, a bilateral green investment (i.e., both retailers make green investments) can reach an incentive alignment for all firms if the differentiation between retailers is low enough and the competition between them is not substantially fierce. Moreover, a bilateral green investment improves consumer welfare and channel efficiency because of the great demand expansion and double marginalization reduction. Third, the retailers' green investments can motivate the manufacturer to produce greener products, but they do not necessarily benefit the environment. We show that the supply chain's economic sustainability aligns with its environmental sustainability only if the environmental improvement efficiency of green investments is substantially high. We further examine the impact of retailers with differentiated green investment abilities and the manufacturer's green investment efficiency to verify the robustness of the main results.     

Barriers to investment in the informal venture capital sector

Much of the government intervention into the market ‘gap’ for start-up and early-stage equity finance in the UK is based on the belief that the problem is on the supply side. Based on an analysis of the informal venture capital market this paper argues that there is no shortage of finance available. A survey of business angels reveals that many are willing to allocate a higher proportion of their investment portfolio to investments in unquoted companies, with recent tax incentives having a positive effect on their willingness to invest. Over 90% are currently looking to make more investments. However, there are constraints on their ability to invest: they do not see enough deals that meet their investment criteria, the majority of the investment proposals that they receive are of poor quality, and they are often unable to negotiate acceptable investment terms and conditions with entrepreneurs. The implication is that there is a need for further interventions by policy-makers to remove these barriers so that more small firms can take advantage of the substantial pool of angel finance that is available.     

Optimal investment and reinsurance policies for an insurer with ambiguity aversion

In this paper, we study the optimal investment and reinsurance problem for an insurer based on the variance premium principle, in which three cases are considered. First, we assume that the financial market does not exist. The insurer only holds an insurance business, and the optimal reinsurance problem is studied. Subsequently, we assume that there exists a financial market with an accurately modeled risky asset. The optimal investment and reinsurance problem is investigated under these conditions. Finally, we consider the general case in which the insurer is concerned about the model ambiguity of both the insurance market and the financial market. In all three cases, the value function is set to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth. By employing the dynamic programming principle, we derive the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations, which are satisfied by the value functions and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal reinsurance and investment policies and the value functions in all three cases. Most interestingly, we elucidate how investment improves the insurer’s utility and find that the existence of ambiguity can significantly affect the optimal policies and value functions. We also compare the ambiguities in the two markets and find that ambiguity in the insurance market has much more significant impact on the value function than the ambiguity in the financial market. It implies that it is more valuable for insurer to precisely evaluate the insurance risk. We also provide some numerical examples and economic explanations to illustrate our results.     

On robust asymmetric equilibria in asymmetric R&;D-driven growth economies

In R&D-driven growth models with asymmetric fundamentals, the steady-state equilibrium R&D investments are industry-specific, and they are such that R&D returns are equalized across industries. Return equalization, however, makes investors indifferent as to where to target research and, hence, the problem of allocation of R&D investments across industries is indeterminate. Agents’ indifference creates an ambiguous investment scenario. We assume that agents hold “ambiguous” beliefs on the per-industry profitability of their R&D investments. Investors’ aversion towards ambiguity eliminates the indeterminacy of the investment problem. In particular, the asymmetric return-equalizing equilibrium is robust against a however small degree of investors’ ambiguity aversion.     

MULTI‐CRITERIA OPTIMIZATION OF REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY: A SIMULATION ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY

The distribution of European and national aid among 271 German labor market regions is considered as an optimization problem with three targets: (i) interregional equalization of unemployment rates; (ii) minimization of total (national) unemployment; and (iii) maximization of GDP, subject to budget constraints and some administrative restrictions. The analysis of the German program in 2000–2002 shows that the results actually obtained for 6 billion euro required only 241 million euro under optimal planning (4% of the actual budget). Such an inappropriate implementation of active labor market policies can be the cause of low efficiency, often misinterpreted as uselessness. This paper suggests a decision aid for optimal planning and shows that tax returns from the additional GDP due to jobs subsidized can transform regional policy into a winning governmental strategy.     

Overinvestment in partially relationship-specific assets and R&D

This paper considers a firm that can engage in partially relationship specific investments. The firm does not have the option to engage in investments that are not at all relationship specific. I show that, in such a setting, equilibrium investment may exceed the socially optimal level. This is contrary to the intuition obtained from standard idiosyncratic (i.e., relationship-specific) investment models, in which the possibility of “hold-up” leads to underinvestment. The driving force behind this result is that when assets are only partially relationship-specific, marginal investment may yield higher benefits when transacting with the market at large even though cumulative investment yields higher benefits within a bilateral relationship. This finding is relevant to many bilateral relationships in which investments that are targeted to improve the joint payoff of the relationship inevitably have spillover effects that improve the payoff of transacting with the market.     

Dynamic inventory decisions for humanitarian aid materials considering budget limitations

In case of disaster, providing relief supplies to the affected people has vital importance. Governmental or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) prepare for disasters by purchasing and stockpiling these aid materials in appropriate quantities. They operate under a limited budget and this budget can either be used before the disaster for stocking decisions under uncertainty or it can be used after the disaster to satisfy the required demand at a higher cost when the uncertainty is resolved. If all the budget is used before the disaster, and if there is no disaster in a long term, there will be a high holding cost. On the other hand, if all the budget is reserved for use after the disaster, meeting the demand will be more costly or the demand may not be met within a certain period of time. Thus, NGOs need to decide how to allocate the budget for pre and post-disaster usage. In this system, the budget of NGOs may also change over time through donations or other incomes. In this point of view, NGOs need to make dynamic stock and budget allocation decisions, under the available budget at hand. In our study, we analyze the dynamic stocking decisions of NGOs using stochastic dynamic programming formulations under budget constraints. We develop infinite horizon stochastic dynamic programming models with and without budget considerations, and compare the results of these models via numerical analysis. Detailed numerical studies and results of the sensitivity analysis show the significance of budget considerations in inventory decisions and the effects of different parameters on the system results.     

Investment timing and efficiency in incomplete contracts

This paper considers a buyer and seller capable of making observable but nonverifiable relationship-specific investments before the parties' valuations of trade (also observable but nonverifiable) are known. Our formulation allows investments to have direct external effects and the investments to occur sequentially. We characterize an incomplete contract that implements the first-best investments and trade. This optimal contract states negotiation procedures used to determine a monetary transfer made during the investment phase and the terms of trade.     

Assessment and budget allocation of Iranian natural gas distribution company- A CSW DEA based model

Regarding the importance of budgeting in organizations, this research proposes an empirical approach to budget allocation problems. The methodological instrument utilized is data envelopment analysis (DEA) which is a nonparametric mathematical programming technique. In the DEA methodology a standard DEA model should be independently solved to evaluate each decision making unit (DMU). Consequently, it is hard to find the magnitude of budget for each DMU by applying a budget allocation model based on standard DEA models because identifying the DMU under evaluation is problematic. Also, to overcome problems of evaluation using standard DEA models, common set of weights (CSW) DEA models were suggested. These models can be developed for use in budget allocation DEA models that lead to finding a single magnitude of budget for each DMU. Moreover, the opinion of the decision maker can be incorporated into the model using budgetary constraints. As a result, a restricted linear budget allocation CSW DEA model is proposed in which the central authority would like to plan for improving the total efficiency scores of all DMUs. In essence, the proposed model is used to reallocate the available budget and, thus, the results obtained will be a suggestion for budget allocation in subsequent periods. Finally, the proposed model is applied to budget allocation in the Iranian gas industry in which the available budget is reallocated to increase the total efficiency scores of Iranian gas distribution branches.     

加强员工教育培训 打造高素质员工队伍 为油田持续高效发展提供智力支持和人才保证

员工教育培训是企业进行人力资本投资的最基本方式,也是企业人力资源开发的核心内容。围绕油田的生产经营和改革发展,加强员工教育培训,以员工教育培训工作促进人才队伍的壮大,打造高素质员工队伍,是油田持续高效发展的智力支持和人才保证。