The interaction between public and private governments: An empirical analysis

Private governments, found in planned developments and condominiums, are increasingly common methods of delivering local services to residents. This paper provides the first empirical study of their impact on local public finance. A novel data set of homeowners' associations allows construction of a panel of private governments in California. Panel methods test whether public expenditures respond to private government prevalence. Estimates indicate that local governments lower spending moderately in response to private government activity, consistent with strategic substitution. The paper then examines various mechanisms to explain this downloading and shows that the substitutability between public and private providers is key to which services are downloaded. Evidence also suggests that the economies of scale in service production in small cities temper the offloading of public services to private governments.     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

A private universal voucher program’s effects on traditional public schools

K-12 education reformers have often cited increases in spending with little noticeable gain in test scores, coupled with the fact that American students lag behind their foreign peers on standardized tests, as a major policy problem. School choice, specifically voucher programs, have emerged as a possible solution to the K-12 education woes. This article focuses on what is commonly referred to as the “systemic effects” of a private voucher program in the Edgewood Independent School District (EISD) in San Antonio, Texas. Using carefully chosen control districts and a robust econometric analysis, we conclude that the CEO Horizon Scholarship Program had small, positive effects on the traditional public schools of EISD. The rate of change growth, however, does slow as the voucher program nears the end of its term indicating that traditional public school participants need to believe that these programs are long term.     

An Income Tax Increase to Fund Higher Education: A CGE Analysis for Chile

An increase in income taxes to fund education was one of the demands made by the social movements that emerged in Chile in 2011. Currently, the Chilean Congress is enacting a tax reform to raise money for higher education. This study aims to show the dynamic effects on the general equilibrium of the Chilean economy under two alternative approaches: a subsidy to lower the price of higher education (public and private), and greater spending on public higher education to reduce household payments for education. The social accounting matrix (SAM) used to calibrate the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model has 38 economic sectors, including the production structure of private education and public education. The study mainly concludes that a subsidy policy has significant advantages over increasing higher public education spending, regarding its effects on variables such as GDP, investment, and household incomes, while both policies have a similar effect on poverty and income distribution.     

A theory of interregional tax competition

A general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition, where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels. An exact definition of tax competition is provided, and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible. It is argued, however, that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions. Inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled. The amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms.     

‘Klin’-ing up: Effects of Polish tax reforms on those in and on those out

In 2007 and 2008 Polish governments introduced a series of reforms which led to a substantial reduction in the tax “wedge” (in Polish: “klin”) on labour. These consisted of reductions in the disability rate of social security contributions (SSCs) and an introduction of an income tax credit for families with children. We show that the SSCs reforms on their own brought much greater reductions in the tax burden compared to a widely discussed 15% “flat tax”, despite a very similar simulated cost. When considered together the package of introduced reforms reduced the mean ATR on total labour cost from 41.6% to 35.7%. This compares to the mean ATR of 39.6% which would result from the introduction of the “flat tax”. In the analysis we present the effects of the reforms both for the employed and for the non-employed populations. The latter analysis is done in such a way as to account for the entire (simulated) distribution of wages of the non-employed and shows interesting differences between the effects of reforms on employed and non-employed individuals. We argue that to fully appreciate the effect of reductions in labour taxation it is important to bear in mind that one of the reasons for introducing them is to make employment more likely for those who currently do not work, and demonstrate that the introduced package has had a particularly important effect on non-employed second earners. Given the extent of the reductions in the “klin” it is somewhat surprising that so far so little attention has been given to the recent Polish reforms.     

The new view of the property tax A reformulation

The ‘new view’ of the property tax is reformulated within the context of a model with interjurisdictional competition, endogenous local public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes by local governments. Expressions for the ‘profits tax’ and ‘excise tax’ effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a ‘consumption distortion’ away from government services due to local reluctance to tax mobile capital are also examined.     

How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector

This paper investigates the impact of economic integration on the vertical structure of the public sector within a country. To tackle this issue we set up a model of fiscal federalism, where economic integration is assumed to affect central government tax revenues. The main findings are that when an increase of the impact of economic integration brings about a reduction in central government tax revenues, under certain conditions: (a) it reduces central government expenditure; (b) it reduces general government expenditure; (c) it increases local taxation; (d) it increases the degree of public sector decentralization. Quite interestingly, these results are consistent with different patterns of local public spending and grants to local government.     

Taxes, Federal Grants, Local Public Spending, and Growth

In a dynamic model with both private and local public capital accumulation, this paper examines how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment affect the long-run equilibrium (equilibria) of private consumption, private capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital stock.     

Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents, multiple local governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

Fiscal performance and elections in the context of a transition economy

It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.     

Decreasing average cost in private schools,existence of majority voting equilibrium,and a policy analysis for Turkey

The existing models of mixed public–private school systems usually capture only the decreasing average cost faced by public schools, whereas empirical studies find evidence of it for private schools as well. Motivated by this, an equilibrium model of a mixed public–private school system is studied in this paper, whereby private schools also face decreasing average cost over enrollment. In the model, households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously specified income and child’s ability, choose among a public and a private school. Private school charges tuition whereas public school is free. Public school spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households and the tax rate is determined via majority voting. Achievement of a child depends on its ability and education spending. Under the assumptions on the parameters of the model, a joint lognormal distribution of income and ability, and a Cobb–Douglas utility, majority voting equilibrium is numerically shown to exist. The model is calibrated to match certain statistics from the 2013 Turkish data. Using the calibrated model, we compare the benchmark for a mixed public–private school system with a pure public school system to understand the impact of shutting down some of the private schools in Turkey following the July 15 coup attempt. We find that mean achievement and variance of achievement after high school is \(0.039\%\) higher and \(0.013\%\) lower respectively in a pure public school system.     

Cultural values and public policy: The case of international development aid

This paper investigates whether the quantity and character of aggregate expenditures on foreign aid by donor governments are related to the cultural values held by the people of the donor countries. In particular, we study whether any association exists between three measures of donors’ foreign aid expenditures and two dimensions of culture. We find that the shares of national income governments spend on aid, the proportion of total aid provided in the form of grants, and the proportion of aid directed to humanitarian relief are all related in statistically significant and quantitatively important ways to the location of the cultural values of people in the donor countries on two continua, one from “traditional” to “rational” beliefs about social organization and authority, and the other from “survival” to “self-expression” as the focus of individual aspirations. These results contribute to our understanding of the political economy of aid, and to a growing literature on how culture shapes economic policies, institutions, and performance.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

Commentary on workfare: Servitude or success formula?

In his article entitled “Workfare: Servitude or Success Formula?” Patrick J. Keleher Jr. discusses Project Chance, an Illinois public aid program under which refusal of an aid recipient to participate in job training and work internships can result in termination of public assistance. Despite that seemingly coercive aspect of Project Chance, Keleher defends the program as consistent with the basic moral rights of welfare recipients. In my commentary I present reasons why I am not convinced by Keleher's defense of Project Chance.     

Public welfare and state-local government finance

Many state and local governments in the United States have experienced major financial problems during the economic recessions of the 1970s. These problems can be attributed to (1) the instability associated with the present tax structure, resulting from the increasing importance of unstable taxes and (2) the rapid increase in welfare expenditures which can be categorized as uncontrollable. In financing public services including welfare, state and local governments can organize their tax structures so as to dampen the effect of business cycles. This paper develops concepts and methodology to be used in identifying efficient tax structures.     

Socioeconomic Impacts of Disinvestment on Communities in New York State

Abstract . In order to determine the effect of industrial decline on local tax revenues and to discern the stresses caused by higher demand for social services in a period of government fiscal crisis, the industrial migration activities and local government budgets of New York State from 1962 to 1976 are analyzed. These regression analyses show that: (1) manufacturing decline handicaps the growth of local property tax revenues; (2) when possible, local governments compensate for their lost property tax revenues by raising non-property taxes; displaced workers are likely to seek public assistance; and (4) local welfare expenditures do not correspond to the soaring social service demands. Provided that plant openings seldom re-employ displaced workers, the authors suggest that it is as important for local governments to adopt policies for retaining their current manufacturing plants as to attract new industrial investments.