Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

How networks reshape organizations--for results

Recently a new term-networks-has entered the vocabulary of corporate renewal. Yet there remains much confusion over just what networks are and how they operate. Ram Charan, a leading international consultant, has spent four years observing and participating in the creation of networks at ten companies in North America and Europe. These companies--which include Conrail, Dun & Bradstreet Europe, Du Pont, and Royal Bank of Canada-are clear about why they are creating networks, what networks are, and how they operate. A network is recognized group of managers (seldom more than 100, often fewer than 25) assembled by the CEO. Membership criteria are simple but subtle: What select group of managers, by virtue of its business skills, personal motivations and drive, and control of resources is uniquely positioned to shape and deliver on the strategy? Networks begin to matter when they change behavior-the frequency, intensity, and honesty of the dialogue among managers on priority tasks. The process of building a network starts at the top. Senior managers work as change agents to build a new "social architecture." Once the network is in place, they play three additional roles: 1. Define with clarity the business outputs they expect of the network and the time frame in which they expect it to deliver. 2. Guarantee the visibility and free flow of information to all members of the network who need it. 3. Develop new criteria for performance evaluation that emphasize horizontal collaboration and leadership.     

The fruitful flaws of strategy metaphors

The business world is rife with metaphors these days, as managers look to other disciplines for insights into their own challenges. And metaphors can--despite their somewhat flaky image--be powerful catalysts for generating new business strategies. But metaphors are often improperly used, their potential left unrealized. We tend to look for reassuring parallels in business metaphors instead of troubling differences, the author contends. In fact, using metaphors to come up with new strategic perspectives begins to work only when the metaphors themselves don't work, or at least don't seem to. Take the following case in point. An insurance company's corporate headquarters put together a team of experts to discuss ways the firm might respond to the challenges of conducting business via the Internet. Once the team drafted a master plan, the idea was that it would be promulgated to the individual agents and offices of this widely dispersed organization. In a meeting with the company's top managers, the author talked about Charles Darwin's conceptual breakthrough in formulating the principles of evolution. As his overview of Darwin's theories about variation and natural selection gave way to questions, a heretical notion took shape: Those far-flung agents' offices, instead of being strategic liabilities in a suddenly virtual age, might instead be the mechanism for achieving an incremental but powerful corporate transformation in response to the changing business environment. But it was only when the evolutionary metaphor began to break down--when the elements of Darwin's theory clearly were at odds with the besieged insurance company's situation--that real strategic insight occurred. This anecdote offers, in a compressed form, an example of how the process of using metaphors can play out and what managers can learn from it.     

We don't need another hero

Everybody loves the stories of heroes like Martin Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa, and Gandhi. But the heroic model of moral leadership usually doesn't work in the corporate world. Modesty and restraint are largely responsible for the achievements of the most effective moral leaders in business. The author, a specialist in business ethics, says the quiet leaders he has studied follow four basic rules in meeting ethical challenges and making decisions. The rules constitute an important resource for executives who want to encourage the development of such leaders among their middle managers. The first rule is "Put things off till tomorrow." The passage of time allows turbulent waters to calm and lets leaders' moral instincts emerge. "Pick your battles" means that quiet leaders don't waste political capital on fights they can't win; they save it for occasions when they really want to fight. "Bend the rules, don't break them" sounds easier than it is--bending the rules in order to resolve a complicated situation requires imagination, discipline, restraint, flexibility, and entrepreneurship. The fourth rule, "Find a compromise," reflects the author's finding that quiet leaders try not to see situations as polarized tests of ethical principles. These individuals work hard to craft compromises that are "good enough"--responsible and workable enough--to satisfy themselves, their companies, and their customers. The vast majority of difficult problems are solved through the consistent striving of people working far from the limelight. Their quiet approach to leadership doesn't inspire, thrill, or provide story lines for uplifting TV shows. But the unglamorous efforts of quiet leaders make a tremendous difference every day in the corporate world.     

How to pitch a brilliant idea

Coming up with creative ideas is easy; selling them to strangers is hard. Entrepreneurs, sales executives, and marketing managers often go to great lengths to demonstrate how their new concepts are practical and profitable--only to be rejected by corporate decision makers who don't seem to understand the value of the ideas. Why does this happen? Having studied Hollywood executives who assess screenplay pitches, the author says the person on the receiving end--the "catcher"--tends to gauge the pitcher's creativity as well as the proposal itself. An impression of the pitcher's ability to come up with workable ideas can quickly and permanently overshadow the catcher's feelings about an idea's worth. To determine whether these observations apply to business settings beyond Hollywood, the author attended product design, marketing, and venture-capital pitch sessions and conducted interviews with executives responsible for judging new ideas. The results in those environments were similar to her observations in Hollywood, she says. Catchers subconsciously categorize successful pitchers as showrunners (smooth and professional), artists (quirky and unpolished), or neophytes (inexperienced and naive). The research also reveals that catchers tend to respond well when they believe they are participating in an idea's development. As Oscar-winning writer, director, and producer Oliver Stone puts it, screen-writers pitching an idea should "pull back and project what he needs onto your idea in order to make the story whole for him." To become a successful pitcher, portray yourself as one of the three creative types and engage your catchers in the creative process. By finding ways to give your catchers a chance to shine, you sell yourself as a likable collaborator.     

Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

Extreme jobs: the dangerous allure of the 70-hour workweek

Today's overachieving professionals labor longer, take on more responsibility, and earn more than the workaholics of yore. They hold what Hewlett and Luce call "extreme jobs", which entail workweeks of 60 or more hours and have at least five often characteristics-such as tight deadlines and lots of travel--culled from the authors' research on this work model. A project of the Hidden Brain Drain Task Force, a private-sector initiative, this research consists of two large surveys (one of high earners across various professions in the United States and the other of high-earning managers in large multinational corporations) that map the shape and scope of such jobs, as well as focus groups and in-depth interviews that get at extreme workers' attitudes and motivations. In this article, Hewlett and Luce consider their data in relation to increasing competitive pressures, vastly improved communication technology, cultural shifts, and other sweeping changes that have made high-stakes employment more prominent. What emerges is a complex picture of the all-consuming career-rewarding in many ways, but not without danger to individuals and to society. By and large, extreme professionals don't feel exploited; they feel exalted. A strong majority of them in the United States-66%-say they love their jobs, and in the global companies survey, this figure rises to 76%. The authors' research suggests, however, that women are at a disadvantage. Although they don't shirk the pressure or responsibility of extreme work, they are not matching the hours logged by their male colleagues. This constitutes a barrier for ambitious women, but it also means that employers face a real opportunity: They can find better ways to tap the talents of women who will commit to hard work and responsibility but cannot put in over-long days.     

Why Capital Efficiency Measures Are Rarely Used in Incentive Plans, and How to Change That

Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.     

Discovering new points of differentiation

Most profitable strategies are built on differentiation: offering customers something they value that competitors don't have. But most companies concentrate only on their products or services. In fact, a company can differentiate itself every point where it comes in contact with its customers--from the moment customers realize they need a product or service to the time when they dispose of it. The authors believe that if companies open up their thinking to their customer's entire experience with a product or service--the consumption chain--they can uncover opportunities to position their offerings in ways that neither they nor their competitors though possible. The authors show how even a mundane product such as candles can be successfully differentiated. By analyzing its customers' experiences and exploring various options, Blyth Industries, for example, has grown from a $2 million U.S. candle manufacturer into a global candle and accessory business with nearly $500 million in sales and a market value of $1.2 billion. Finding ways to differentiate one's company is a skill that can be nurtured, the authors contend. In this Manager's Tool Kit, they have designed a two-part approach that can help companies continually identify new points of differentiation and develop the ability to generate successful differentiation strategies. "Mapping the Consumption Chain" captures the customer's total experience with a product or service. "Analyzing Your Customer's Experience" shows managers how directed brainstorming about each step in the consumption chain can elicit numerous ways to differentiate any offering.     

The experience trap

When companies put seasoned managers in charge of important projects, they don't expect missed deadlines, budget overruns, and rampant defects. However, that's what researchers found when they tested hundreds of experienced project managers with computer games that simulated software development projects. The study, conducted by two professors from Insead and one from Naval Postgraduate School, strongly suggests that veterans in complex environments suffer a breakdown in the learning process. The research reveals three reasons for the breakdowns: Time lags between causes and effects make it difficult to see how they're connected; fallible estimates color the chain of decisions that determine a project's outcome; and a bias toward the initial goals prevents managers from setting revised, more appropriate, targets when project circumstances change. Sticking to an initial low budget goal after a project grew in scope, for instance, led subjects to ignore quality assurance, which led to soaring defect rates--and costs. Companies can take practical steps to fix the learning cycle. They can provide feedback that shows the relationships between important variables in the environment. Such feedback might reveal, say, the 20-day ramp-up that a new quality assurance team needs before becoming fully effective. Tools that apply formal models to calculate such things as the effect of turnover on team productivity also help. Setting goals for behavior, instead of targets for performance, is critical as well. Finally, firms can create project "flight simulators" that mimic actual learning environments but don't let complexity overwhelm trainees. Managers can continue learning only if they get decision support tailored to the challenges they face. Firms would do well to focus more on training people higher up in the organization and stop leaving them to fend for themselves.     

The weird rules of creativity

For at least the past decade, the holy grail for companies has been innovation. Managers have gone after it with all the zeal their training has instilled in them, using a full complement of tried and true management techniques. The problem is that none of these practices, well suited for cashing in on old, proven products and business models, works very well when it comes to innovation. Instead, managers should take most of what they know about management and stand it on its head. In this article, Robert Sutton outlines several ideas for managing creativity that are clearly odd but clearly effective: Place bets on ideas without much heed to their projected returns. Ignore what has worked before. Goad perfectly happy people into fights among themselves. Good creativity management means hiring the candidate you have a gut feeling against. And as for the people who stick their fingers in their ears and chant, "I'm not listening, I'm not listening," when customers make suggestions? Praise and promote them. Using vivid examples from more than a decade of academic research to illustrate his points, the author discusses new approaches to hiring, managing creative people, and dealing with risk and randomness in innovation. His conclusions? The practices in this article succeed because they increase the range of a company's knowledge, allow people to see old problems in new ways, and help companies break from the past.     

How to make experience your company's best teacher

In our personal life, experience is often the best teacher. Not so in corporate life. After a major event--a product failure, a downsizing crisis, or a merger--many companies stumble along, oblivious to the lessons of the past. Mistakes get repeated, but smart decisions do not. Most important, the old ways of thinking are never discussed, so they are still in place to spawn new mishaps. Individuals will often tell you that they understand what went wrong (or right). Yet their insights are rarely shared openly. And they are analyzed and internalized by the company even less frequently. Why? Because managers have few tools with which to capture institutional experience, disseminate its lessons, and translate them into effective action. In an effort to solve this problem, a group of social scientists, business managers, and journalists at MIT have developed and tested a tool called the learning history. It is a written narrative of a company's recent critical event, nearly all of it presented in two columns. In one column, relevant episodes are described by the people who took part in them, were affected by them, or observed them. In the other, learning historians--trained outsiders and knowledgeable insiders--identify recurrent themes in the narrative, pose questions, and raise "undiscussable" issues. The learning history forms the basis for group discussions, both for those involved in the event and for others who also might learn from it. The authors believe that this tool--based on the ancient practice of community storytelling--can build trust, raise important issues, transfer knowledge from one part of a company to another, and help build a body of generalizable knowledge about management.     

Unleash innovation in foreign subsidiaries

In multinational corporations, growth-triggering innovation often emerges in foreign subsidiaries from employees closest to customers and least attached to the procedures and politeness of the home office. But too often, heavy-handed responses from headquarters squelch local enthusiasm and drive out good ideas--and good people. The authors' research into more than 50 multinationals suggests that encouraging innovation in foreign subsidiaries requires a change in attitude. Companies should start to think of foreign subsidiaries as peninsulas rather than as islands--as extensions of the company's strategic domain rather than as isolated outposts. If they do, innovative ideas will flow more freely from the periphery to the corporate center. Basing their arguments on a rich array of examples, the authors say that encouraging such "innovation at the edges" also requires a new set of practices, with two aims: to improve the formal and informal channels of communication between headquarters and subsidiaries and to give foreign subsidiaries more authority to see their ideas through. The challenge for executives of multinationals is to find ways to liberalize, not tighten, internal systems and to delegate more authority to local subsidiaries. It isn't enough to ask subsidiary managers to be innovative; corporate managers need to give them incentives and support systems to facilitate their efforts. The authors suggest four approaches: give seed money to subsidiaries; use formal requests for proposals as a way of increasing the demand for seed money; encourage subsidiaries to be incubators for fledgling businesses; and build international networks. As part of the last approach, multinationals also need to create roles for idea brokers who can link entrepreneurs in foreign subsidiaries with other parts of the company.     

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA UNDER BLACK RULE

An article published in this journal three years ago defended the South African corporate ownership system with its five largest "groups" then exercising effective control over companies representing nearly 80% of the value of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange–as "an efficient outcome of a largely voluntary market process in which owner-managers compete for capital supplied mainly by South African institutional investors." This article extends the earlier analysis by noting that, since the beginning of black majority rule in 1994, the South African group system has adapted by finding ways for black entrepreneurs to participate in the control and ownership of major South African businesses. And such experiments in "black empowerment" have produced a number of notable successes. At the same time, the idea of investing in shares has now become widely accepted in black communities that once viewed the Stock Exchange as a bastion of exclusive white interests.
The larger import of such changes is their apparent success in "legitimizing" the established financial structure for the new South Africa, thereby protecting a fundamentally market-based system from potentially damaging intervention by the State. But if that system is to prosper over the longer run, economic efficiency must remain the primary goal; and, as share ownership spreads among the black community, it must become a more important source of black wealth than the successes of a small group of black entrepreneurs controlling large stakes on the JSE.     

Managing the right tension

Of all the competing objectives every company faces, three pairs stand out: profitability versus growth, the short term versus the long term, and the whole organization versus the units. In each case, progress on one front usually comes at the expense of progress on the other. The authors researched the performance of more than 1000 companies worldwide over the past two decades and found that most struggle to succeed across the three tensions. From 1983 to 2003, for example, only 32% of these companies more often than not achieved positive profitability and revenue growth at the same time. The problem, the authors discovered, is not so much that managers don't recognize the tensions--those are all too familiar to anyone who has ever run a business. Rather, it is that managers frequently don't focus on the tension that matters most to their company. Even when they do identify the right tension, they usually make the mistake of prioritizing a "lead" objective within it-for example, profitability over growth. As a result, companies often end up moving first in this direction, then in that, and then back again, never quite resolving the tension. The companies that performed best adopted a very different approach. Instead of setting a lead objective, they looked at how best to strengthen what the two sides of each tension have in common: For profitability and growth,the common bond is customer benefit; for the short term and the long, it is sustainable earnings; and for the whole and its parts, it is particular organizational resources and capabilities. The authors describe how companies can select the right tension, what traps they may fall into when they focus on one side over the other, and how to escape these traps by managing to the bonds between objectives.     

A SENIOR MANAGER'S GUIDE TO INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT

This paper provides an overview of corporate risk management for senior managers. The author discusses the integrated risk management framework, emphasizing that a company can implement its risk management objectives in three fundamental ways: modifying its operations, using targeted financial instruments, or adjusting its capital structure. "Integration" refers both to the aggregation of all risks faced by the firm into a net exposure and to the coordinated use of these three risk management techniques. The author provides a functional analysis of integrated risk management using a wide-ranging set of case illustrations to show how the risk management process influences, and is influenced by, a company's overall strategy and business activities. Based on such analysis, the article concludes by sketching a framework intended to help managers design a value-maximizing, enterprise-wide corporate risk management system.     

The dangers of feeling like a fake

In many walks of life-and business is no exception-there are high achievers who believe that they are complete fakes. To the outside observer, these individuals appear to be remarkably accomplished; often they are extremely successful leaders with staggering lists of achievements. These neurotic impostors--as psychologists call them--are not guilty of false humility. The sense of being a fraud is the flip side of giftedness and causes a great many talented, hardworking, and capable leaders to believe that they don't deserve their success. "Bluffing" their way through life (as they see it), they are haunted by the constant fear of exposure. With every success, they think, "I was lucky this time, fooling everyone, but will my luck hold? When will people discover that I'm not up to the job?" In his career as a management professor, consultant, leadership coach, and psychoanalyst, Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries has found neurotic impostors at all levels of organizations. In this article, he explores the subject of neurotic imposture and outlines its classic symptoms: fear of failure, fear of success, perfectionism, procrastination, and workaholism. He then describes how perfectionist overachievers can damage their careers, their colleagues' morale, and the bottom line by allowing anxiety to trigger self-handicapping behavior and cripple the very organizations they're trying so hard to please. Finally, Kets de Vries offers advice on how to limit the incidence of neurotic imposture and mitigate its damage through discreet vigilance, appropriate intervention, and constructive support.     

RETHINKING RISK MANAGEMENT

This paper presents a theory of corporate risk management that attempts to go beyond the "variance-minimization" model that dominates most academic discussions of the subject. It argues that the primary goal of risk management is not to dampen swings in corporate cash flows or value, but rather to provide protection against the possibility of costly lower-tail outcomes –situations that would cause financial distress or make a company unable to carry out its investment strategy. (In the jargon of finance specialists, risk management can be viewed as the purchase of well-out-of-the-money put options designed to limit downside risk.)
By eliminating downside risk and reducing the expected costs of financial trouble, risk management can also help a company to achieve both its optimal capital structure and its optimal ownership structure. For, besides increasing corporate debt capacity, the reduction of downside risk also encourages larger equity stakes for managers by shielding their investments from "uncontrollables."
The paper also departs from standard finance theory in suggesting that some companies may have a comparative advantage in bearing certain financial market risks–an advantage that derives from information acquired through their normal business activities. Although such specialized information may lead some companies to take speculative positions in commodities or currencies, it is more likely to encourage "selective" hedging, a practice in which the risk manager's "view" of future price movements influences the percentage of the exposure that is hedged.
But, to the extent that such view-taking becomes an accepted part of a company's risk management program, it is important to evaluate managers' bets on a risk-adjusted basis and relative to the market. If risk managers want to behave like money managers, they should be evaluated like money managers.     

Why good accountants do bad audits

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. Accountants might seem immune to such distortions because they work with seemingly hard numbers and clear-cut standards. But the corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status, thereby misleading investors, regulators, and even management. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.     

Reclaim your job

Ask most managers what gets in the way of their success, and you'll hear the familiar litany of complaints: Not enough time. Limited resources. No clear sense of how their work fits into the grand corporate scheme. These are, for the most part, excuses. What really gets in the way of managers' success is fear of making their own decisions and acting accordingly. Managers must overcome the psychological desire to be indispensable. In this article, the authors demonstrate how managers can become more productive by learning to manage demands, generate resources, and recognize and exploit alternatives. To win the support they want, managers must develop a long-term strategy and pursue their goals slowly, steadily, and strategically. To expand the range of opportunities, for their companies and themselves, managers must scan the environment for possible obstacles and search for ways around them. Fully 90% of the executives the authors have studied over the past few years wasted their time and frittered away their productivity, despite having well-defined projects, goals, and the necessary knowledge to get their jobs done. Such managers remain trapped in inefficiency because they assume they do not have enough personal discretion or control. They forget how to take initiative--the most essential quality of any truly successful manager. Effective managers, by contrast, are purposeful corporate entrepreneurs who take charge of their jobs by developing trust in their own judgment and adopting long-term, big-picture views to fulfill personal goals that match those of the organization.