Investor protection and income inequality: Risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more risk taking. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, the relationship between investor protection and income inequality is non monotonic, since the risk-taking effect dominates at low levels of investor protection, while risk sharing becomes stronger when more risk is taken. Empirical evidence from up to sixty-seven countries spanning the period 1976–2004 supports the predictions of the model.     

Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

We analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted towards (more) creditworthy borrowers. We find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and, therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares. Information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market, whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power. Thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets.     

Risk aversion and allocation to long-term bonds

As risk aversion approaches infinity, the portfolio of an investor with utility over consumption at time T is shown to converge to the portfolio consisting entirely of a bond maturing at time T. Previous work on bond allocation requires a specific model for equities, the term structure, and the investor's utility function. In contrast, the only substantive assumption required for the analysis in this paper is that markets are complete. The result, which holds regardless of the underlying investment opportunities and the utility function, formalizes the “preferred habitat” intuition of Modigliani and Sutch (Amer. Econom. Rev. 56 (1966) 178).     

Risk taking with additive and multiplicative background risks

We examine the effects of background risks on optimal portfolio choice. Examples of background risks include uncertain labor income, uncertainty about the terminal value of fixed assets such as housing and uncertainty about future tax liabilities. While some of these risks are additive and have been amply studied, others are multiplicative in nature and have received far less attention. The simultaneous effect of both additive and multiplicative risks has hitherto not received attention and can explain some paradoxical choice behavior. We rationalize such behavior and show how background risks might lead to seemingly U-shaped relative risk aversion for a representative investor.     

Stochastic investor sentiment,crowdedness and deviation of asset prices from fundamentals

This study constructs a theoretical model to address how stochastic investor sentiment affects investor's crowdedness, and how stochastic investor sentiment and crowdedness affect asset prices. An asset pricing model incorporating stochastic investor sentiment and crowdedness is developed, which can provide efficient explanations for the deviations of asset prices from fundamentals and the maverick risk of investors. This model indicates that the optimistic (pessimistic) investor sentiment and the long (short) crowdedness caused by optimistic (pessimistic) sentimental investors can push asset price above (below) fundamental value. Also, the sentimental investors who are wrong and alone would take the maverick risk. Our results are consistent with the idea that investor sentiment and investor behavior matter for the asset prices and the deviations of asset prices from fundamentals.     

Incentive contracts in delegated portfolio management under VaR constraint

This paper studies the incentive effect of linear performance-adjusted contracts in delegated portfolio management under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. It is shown that a linear performance-based contract can provide incentives for the portfolio manager to work at acquiring private information under a VaR risk constraint. The expected utility and optimal effort of a risk-averse manager are increasing functions of the return sharing ratio in the contract. However, a risk constraint causes the portfolio manager to reduce effort in gathering private information, suggesting that the VaR constraint increases the moral hazard between the investor and the manager.     

Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules

We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer's individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.     

Investment choices: Indivisible non-marketable assets and suboptimal solutions

Several investment decisions deal with non-marketable assets. Non-marketable assets are available only to one investor and are often indivisible. This has relevant consequences on investor investment opportunities. Adhering to a mean–variance representation of the investment space and considering a non-marketable asset (divisible or not), we derive some possible investment scenarios an investor may face. Furthermore, we show how a limited ability to gather and process information affects investor portfolio choices. Our results define a set of conditions under which the non-marketable asset represents a good investment and show that, under certain assumptions, the efficient frontier exhibits non-linearities and intervals of discontinuity.     

A new measurement method of investor overconfidence

We present an alternative measurement method of investor overconfidence, using unique survey data on stock market predictions of investors. We apply the Parkinson estimate based on extreme bounds around the stock forecast to deduce investor confidence. The results support overconfidence.     

Bank Mergers, Information, Default and the Price of Credit

This paper addresses the impact of bank mergers on the price of firm credit, through an information channel. It is shown that, as bank mergers imply a wider spreading of information among banks concerning firms' past defaults, they may increase the expected revenue from lending. Therefore, interest rates may decline as long as a sufficiently competitive environment is preserved. A fall in interest rates, in turn, reduces the incentives for firms to strategically default, which reinforces the downward effect on the price of credit. The results are a function of the level of information sharing and of the sensitivity of the default probability to the interest rate .     

Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design

We create a dynamic theory of endogenous risk sharing groups, with good internal information, and their coexistence with relative performance, individualistic regimes, which are informationally more opaque. Inequality and organizational form are determined simultaneously. Numerical techniques and succinct reformulations of mechanism design problems with suitable choice of promised utilities allow the computation of a stochastic steady state and its transitions. Regions of low inequality and moderate to high wealth (utility promises) produce the relative performance regime, while regions of high inequality and low wealth produce the risk sharing group regime. If there is a cost to prevent coalitions, risk sharing groups emerge at high wealth levels also. Transitions from the relative performance regime to the group regime tend to occur when rewards to observed outputs exacerbate inequality, while transitions from the group regime to the relative performance regime tend to come with a decrease in utility promises. Some regions of inequality and wealth deliver long term persistence of organization form and inequality, while other regions deliver high levels of volatility.     

Securitization of mortgage debt,domestic lending,and international risk sharing

Abstract Securitization makes mortgage‐related risks internationally tradeable and thus contributes considerably to the international diversification of macroeconomic risk: in the years 2003–2008, the increase in international cross‐holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered industrialized countries’ conditional consumption volatility (relative to the United States) by about 10–15 percentage points. We turn to the role of domestic credit in explaining this result. Domestic credit leads to better international risk sharing only if debt is securitized and traded internationally. Conversely, the risk‐sharing benefits from securitization seem to evaporate if credit dries up – as it did in the recent financial crisis.     

Limited investor attention and the mispricing of American Depositary Receipts

I test whether more investor attention leads to a better exploitation of arbitrage opportunities and, in turn, to less mispricing of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Using data on 536 stocks I find that more investor attention significantly reduces ADR mispricing.     

A Soft Budget Constraint Explanation for the Venture Capital Cycle

Abstract. We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture, which multiplies the well-known agency problems. We argue that an inside investor cannot provide a hard budget constraint while a less informed outsider can. Therefore, the venture capitalist delegates the continuation decision to the outsider by ex ante restricting the amount of capital he has under management. The soft budget constraint problem becomes the more important the higher the entrepreneur's private benefits are and the higher the probability of failure of a project is.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

Will Self‐Managed Superannuation Fund Investors Survive?

The relative risk aversion coefficient that characterises the representative self‐managed superannuation fund (SMSF) investor reveals not only how much that investor dislikes risk but also other information about the investor's economic characteristics, including how his or her allocations to risky assets change as his or her wealth changes. Determination of the relative risk aversion coefficient for the average SMSF investor reveals a value of 5.05. This value is too high to be consistent with logarithmic utility. This is significant because it implies that SMSF investors may be too risk averse to maximise the expected growth rate of wealth share accumulation. We are left to consider a very important question: Will SMSF investors survive?     

Asymmetric signals and skewness

This paper develops a model for analyzing skewness in returns when an investor observes a novel skew-normally distributed signal about a risky asset's payoff. The equilibrium third moment increases with the signal's skewness, and its magnitude increases with the signal's noisiness. Using institutional ownership and market capitalization as proxies for information precision, we find that both proxies are significantly and negatively correlated with the future absolute third moment in firm returns in China. We show that these relations are mainly driven by the negative third moment. The two proxies are positively correlated with future skewness, which contradicts the corresponding relations found in the US. Our model can reconcile the opposite findings if the US evidence is driven by positive skewness. This paper suggests that it is more appropriate to forecast positive and negative skewness separately when using information-precision proxies.     

Fundamentals, information, and international capital flows: A welfare analysis

In the recent discussion surrounding the design of a new international financial architecture, enhancing transparency has widely been proposed as a policy essential for increasing the efficiency of international capital markets. This paper uses a simple two-country (two-agent) general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and production to explore the welfare consequences of an increase in public information about country-specific fundamentals (increase in transparency). An improvement in the quality of information has two effects on the ex ante welfare of individual countries: A direct effect that increases the efficiency of global capital allocation and welfare, and an indirect general equilibrium effect that increases asset price volatility and may decrease welfare. When the degree of risk-aversion is low, at least one country will gain from an increase in information quality. If the degree of risk-aversion is high, then there are robust examples of economies for which an increase in information hurts all countries. The paper also discusses how certain institutional arrangements (international derivative markets, international agency) could ensure that all countries gain from better information by providing insurance against information-induced asset price risk.     

Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets

We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two assets with identical payoffs. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one asset, but can decide which one. We show the existence of a “clientele’’ equilibrium where all short-horizon investors search for the same asset. This asset has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, and trades at a higher price relative to its identical-payoff counterpart. The clientele equilibrium dominates the one where all investor types split equally across assets, implying that the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable.     

HETEROGENEOUS RISK ATTITUDES IN A CONTINUOUS‐TIME MODEL*

We prove that every continuous‐time model in which all consumers have time‐homogeneous and time‐additive utility functions and share a common probabilistic belief and a common discount rate can be reduced to a static model. This result allows us to extend some of the existing results of the representative consumer and risk‐sharing rules in static models to continuous‐time models. We show that the equilibrium interest rate is lower and more volatile than in the standard representative consumer economy, and that the individual consumption growth rates are more dispersed than in the absence of uncertainty.