Introduction to judgment aggregation

This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous impossibilities, as discussed in the symposium. We then consider each of four possible escape-routes explored in the symposium.     

The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.     

Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation

According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.     

On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture

The universally beneficial manipulation conjecture of Campbell and Kelly states that for a social choice rule, if everyone gains as a result of any optimal manipulation, then the rule satisfies universally beneficial manipulation, i.e., everyone gains as a result of any manipulation, optimal or not. We prove the conjecture for three alternatives and any number of individuals. We also construct a counterexample in a general form with more than three alternatives and at least two individuals.     

Majority voting on restricted domains

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen's triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results support the robustness of majority rule.     

Justifiable group choice

We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied “doctrinal paradox” provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that genuine possibility results emerge if there is a gap between the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the decision. This happens, for instance, if there is only a partial consensus about the appropriate criteria for the decision, if only a subset of these criteria can be elicited, or if the judgment on criteria is based on probabilistic acceptance thresholds.     

Abstract Arrowian aggregation

In a general framework of abstract binary aggregation, we characterize aggregation problems in terms of the monotone Arrowian aggregators they admit. Specifically, we characterize the problems that admit non-dictatorial, locally non-dictatorial, anonymous, and neutral monotone Arrowian aggregation, respectively. As a consequence of these characterizations, we also obtain new results on the possibility of strategy-proof social choice and the “concrete Arrowian” aggregation of preferences into a social ordering on generalized single-peaked domains.     

Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty

We axiomatize in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences called rank-dependent additive preferences that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty as well as state dependent versions of these models. We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if and only if (society's) preferences are uncertainty neutral. The latter means that society cannot have a non-neutral attitude toward uncertainty on a subclass of acts. A corollary to our theorem is that it is not possible to aggregate multiple prior agents, even when they all have the same set of priors. A number of ways to restore the possibility of aggregation are then discussed.     

Ordinal aggregation and quantiles

Consider the problem of aggregating a profile of interpersonally comparable utilities into a social utility. We require that the units of measurement of utility used for agents is the same as the units of measurement for society (ordinal covariance) and a mild Pareto condition (monotonicity). We provide several representations of such social aggregation operators: a canonical representation, a Choquet expectation representation, a minimax representation, and a quantile representation (with respect to a possibly non-additive set function on the agents). We also isolate an additional condition that gives us a quantile representation with respect to a probability measure, in both the finite and infinite agents case.     

Between liberalism and democracy

We study and characterize axiomatically a class of voting rules, called consent rules, that incorporate aspects of majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. Consent rules are parameterized by the weights given to individuals in determining their own qualification. In one of these rules, the liberal rule, each individual's qualification is determined by her. In other rules, an individual's qualification requires social consent in various degrees. We also show the relation between self-determination and the liberal rule.     

Community standards

I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concerns. These require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between individuals and (d) between works. I show that any rule which satisfies these properties must be “similar” to unanimity rule. I also explore the relationship between the model and the doctrinal paradox of Kornhauser and Sager [12].     

Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation

Recently, Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) and independently Chameni and Andjiga (2008) gave an analytic formulation for all valued solutions to the n-person TU-games that satisfy linearity, efficiency and symmetry axioms. Our main purpose in this paper is to recast the proposed formulation to a more potentially interpretational one. We are focused on an interpretation based on the idea of marginal contribution, a concept already familiar in the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. A general null player axiom is introduced, and it turns out that any valued solution satisfying the three properties is characterized by a null player model.     

Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters vote informatively. We prove that with three alternatives, there are cases in which informative voting is rational and yet leads to the election of a wrong alternative.     

Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.     

Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities

In the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by Barberà and Beviá [Self-selection consistent functions, J. Econ. Theory 105 (2002) 263-277; Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation, Games Econ. Behav. 56 (2006) 185-200], we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision, and a constructive algorithm for efficient and consistent decisions.     

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.     

The Possibility of Issue-Specific Decisions on Multiple Social Choice Issues

This paper considers an aggregation rule when each alternative consists of elements of multiple issues. I assume that each issue-specific aggregation rule can be applied to each issue and explore whether various different issue-specific aggregation rules are compatible. When the set of alternatives has some structure (which we call a set connected by loops), there exists a powerful individual whose preference always coincides with the social ordering in every issue. As a corollary, Arrow's General Possibility Theorem is obtained.     

The supercore for normal-form games

This paper analyzes the supercore of a system derived from a normal-form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the last game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoner's dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal-form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria.