Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions

A general model of aggregation of binary evaluations over interrelated issues, introduced by Wilson and further studied by Rubinstein and Fishburn and by the authors, is extended here to allow for abstentions on some of the issues. It is shown that the same structural conditions on the set of feasible evaluations that lead to dictatorship in the model without abstentions, lead to oligarchy in the presence of abstentions. Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions, Gibbard's oligarchy theorem for quasi-transitive social decision functions, as well as some apparently new theorems on preference aggregation, are obtained as corollaries.     

The binary policy model

We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a majority of the electorate better off, given his fixed positions. We characterize existence conditions for majority-efficient positions. The candidates' fixed positions in our framework imply that only some voters are “swing voters,” and we analyze how the distribution of swing voters determines whether candidates choose majority-efficient positions. We also analyze plurality and runoff elections with multiple candidates in our framework.     

Correspondence to what? Coherence to what? What is good scenario-based decision making?

This paper provides a framework for the evaluation of scenario planning and other strategic decision making methods or techniques. If scenario planning is useful, we should be teaching it in schools and we as individuals should be using it to cope with the uncertainty inherent in modern life. A prerequisite to this is the need to identify why, where and how (in what way) scenario planning and other methods or techniques are useful. Here, I review evaluations of scenario planning. Taking a Brunswikian perspective, I highlight the issues that have failed to be addressed in this evaluation. I demonstrate that there are many ways in which scenario planning could be useful other than those that have appeared in previous discussions. These multiple routes are dependent upon the interaction between the individual organisation, the environment in which they are operating and the method being followed.     

Valuation and management of tropical forests

This paper develops a framework for the valuation and management of tropical forests that reflects their ecological and economic characteristics. The analysis demonstrates the importance of modeling the feasible use patterns and the information structure in tropical forest management decisions. The model predicts that cases exist where the foresighted management of forests leads to more preservation than the traditional expected value approach. An application in Thailand provides evidence that such cases occur in relevant ranges of benefit flows. The model focuses tropical forest management on assessments of sustainability and feasible sequences in light of uncertainty and information flows.     

Local resource reallocation considering practical feasibility: a centralized data envelopment analysis approach

Many studies have addressed resource allocation issues by using centralized data envelopment analysis models. However, few of them provided a local resource reallocation plan which may be carried out more easily. This article proposes two models to get such plans. The first one considers an acceptable percentage of changes in resources to ensure practical feasibility. The second one further considers a situation where resources can only be allowed to shift within specific units. The proposed models are applied to an empirical study based on a hospital system in Taiwan. To demonstrate the practical feasibility of the suggested plans, we compare our reallocation suggestions to a plan that can make the whole system be perfectly efficient. The main conclusion is that the plans derived from our models are more practically feasible than that with perfect efficiency.     

Anonymous social influence

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modeled by ordered weighted averaging operators, which are anonymous: they only depend on how many agents share an opinion. For instance, this allows to study situations where the influence process is based on majorities, which are not covered by the classical approach of weighted averaging aggregation. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to consensus and characterize outcomes where the society ends up polarized. Our results can also be used to understand more general situations, where ordered weighted averages are only used to some extent. Furthermore, we apply our results to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers, i.e., expressions like “most” or “at least a few”.     

Beyond the veil — The real value of Foresight

The wide application of foresight would benefit from a common assessment framework that hardly exists. This would require a higher level of reference, i.e. pursuing more generic goals. This is offered by the two concepts of “knowledge society” and “participatory governance”. The aim of the research is to develop an impact assessment framework of foresight programmes in developing more participatory “knowledge societies” beyond their specific aims.Research shows that the major impacts of foresight belong to three groups, i.e. in relation to knowledge, network creation, and promoting public engagement in policy-making. At the same time, the major features of modern societies are of three types, i.e. related to knowledge value, to innovation-driven growth and to consequences of a “risk society”. Thus, the relevant areas where foresight might contribute are: knowledge, networking, and coping with a ‘risk society’.The new framework is built on the features and pre-conditions of more participatory societies and draws upon existing evaluation approaches and concepts (“theory-based evaluation”, “knowledge value framework”, “behavioural” and “cognitive capacity additionality”) to tackle short-comings of earlier evaluation efforts. It is then tested in a case study that demonstrates its feasibility and comprehensiveness and further refines the assessment criteria it is based on.     

Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets

This paper considers feasible Bayesian implementation for an environment with state dependent feasible sets. We assume no externality in individual feasibility constraint sets and no exaggeration on the part of agents, but allow for flexible information structures. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Closure, and Bayesian Monotonicity are found to be necessary and sufficient for feasible Bayesian implementation. This result is applied to an exchange economy where agents have fixed preferences but uncertain initial endowments and complete information. A condition called the Endowment Condition, which is weaker than Individual Rationality, is identified as necessary and sufficient for feasible Nash implementation.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D70; D71; D74; D82.     

我国历史文化名城的可持续发展

本文认为,在我国社会发展中,历史文化名城具有特殊的地位和作用.加强我国历史文化名城的保护,合理利用名城历史文化资源,促进名城可持续发展是必须要研究的理论和现实问题.本文探索了历史文化名城可持续发展的涵义和内容;剖析了,目前我国名城发展中存在的主要矛盾和问题;进而,结合实际提出了,促进我国历史名城可持续发展的新途径和措施.     

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper has three parts. The first part attempts to analyse the prevailing situation in developing countries. The second part presents a feasible accounting system for such countries, by and large within the framework of the SNA. The third part goes beyond this and tries to obtain a more concise matrix (covering, in concept, those given in the accounting system) furnishing minimal sets of variables and classifications which one has, in any case, to play within the context of policy issues of developing countries. All three authors are jointly responsible for the first part. Uma Datta Roy Choudhury has drafted the second part. The third part has been drafted by the other two authors.     

Games of Status

A status game is a cooperative game in which the outcomes are rank orderings of the players. They are a good model for certain situations in which players care about how their "status" compares with that of other players.
We present several formal models within this class. Included are authoritarian status games (where coalitions may assign positions in the rank ordering to nonmembers) and oligarchic status games (where they are unableto do so). We consider the issues of a value concept for authoritarian games and that of core existence for oligarchic games. We then add a transferable resource to the models, obtaining "games of wealth and status."
Finally, we consider an interesting variant, called a "secession game," where coalitions have the right to secede from the grand coalition and form their own smaller "subsocieties," each with its own hierarchy.     

Nonconvergent Electoral Equilibria under Scoring Rules: Beyond Plurality

We use Hotelling's spatial model of competition to investigate the position‐taking behavior of political candidates under a class of electoral systems known as scoring rules, though the model also has a natural interpretation in the firm location context. Candidates choose ideological positions so as to maximize their support in society. Convergent Nash equilibria in which all candidates adopt the same policy were characterized by Cox (1987). Here, we investigate nonconvergent equilibria, where candidates adopt divergent policies. We identify a number of classes of scoring rules exhibiting a range of different equilibrium properties. For some of these, nonconvergent equilibria do not exist. For others, nonconvergent equilibria in which candidates cluster at positions spread across the issue space are observed. In particular, we prove that the class of convex rules does not have Nash equilibria (convergent or nonconvergent) with the exception of some derivatives of Borda rule. We also look at “two‐party” equilibria. Implications for the firm location model are discussed.     

From equality to inequality: The Diamond–Sen criticism of Harsanyi's criterion of social justice

It is difficult to resolve conflicts of interests even in a society consisting of identical persons. Such an issue has been perceived as a serious difficulty posed to Harsanyi's axiomatic utilitarianism by Diamond's critique which Sen seemed to approve. Recent treatments tried to resolve this criticism by modifying Harsanyi's analytical framework so as to render it immune to Diamond's view about fairness. This paper shows that Diamond's view of fairness may be read as a "simple form" of Rawls' justice as fairness; and hence its clash with Harsanyi's social welfare criterion reflects the Harsanyi–Rawls debate about social justice. Sen's position on the debate is also discussed. In the case where individual preferences share some common characteristics in the manner described in Harsanyi's 1955 axiomatization of utilitarianism, various conceptions of equal treatment of equals are possible. To each of these conceptions corresponds a specific social welfare function, and there is no way to find which one is the best, from the scientific or ethical points of view.     

Emergy evaluation perspectives of an irrigation improvement project proposal in China

Emergy theory and method are used to evaluate the feasibility of an irrigation improvement project in China and its contribution to local agricultural development. An emergy method for evaluating the costs and benefits of the project and a composite index named the emergy cost-benefit ratio (EmCBR) were developed. The emergy evaluation shows that the major costs associated with the proposed project come from earthwork (77.4% of the total cost) and concrete work (15.4%), and that water saving (43.0% of the total benefit) and agricultural yield increase (56.9%) are the most important contributions. The calculated EmCBR is 0.97 (the lowest value for a feasible project is 1.0) which indicates that this project would not be feasible in emergy terms. The regional agricultural system could not benefit from the proposed project, according to several emergy indices: emergy yield ratio (EYR), emergy investment ratio (EIR), environmental load ratio (ELR) and environmental sustainability index (ESI). The results show that conventional cost-benefit analysis could fail to provide an adequate decision-making framework because it is unable to value resources and environmental impacts properly. More additional emergy evaluations should be completed on other alternatives to the proposed project to provide adequate guidelines for selecting the best alternative that contributes most to agricultural development with limited environmental impact.     

Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain*

There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international “trade” negotiations. Different countries, firms, and activist groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor, and human rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing this question. It employs a two‐country, two‐issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is “comparative interest,” analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff. We also provide an application of our analysis to negotiations on trade liberalization and environmental protection.     

Futures We Are In

The economics literature includes several critiques of the dominant utilitarian position, as respectively offered by Posner (1979), Rawls (1971), Sen (1987) and institutionalist followers of John Dewey. There is also now a rapidly growing literature on the economics of happiness. Another quite distinctive position of social importance on these issues is provided by Joseph Ratzinger, also known as Pope Benedict XVI. It offers an alternative conception of ontology and teleology, and reflects conceptions of freedom, happiness, man and rationality different from those found in orthodox economics, and different too from those found in the above-mentioned critiques. It intersects with recent writings of Lawson (2003), Nelson (2010) and Tilman (2008).

In order to promote critical scrutiny of the a priori positions embedded in contending schools of economic thought, it follows that the implications of this Ratzinger critique should be consciously confronted by economists, including institutionalists, with whom various starting points are shared.     

The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation

In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. Our analysis is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and is arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory.     

Cooperative Firms as a New Mode of Production

The importance of the notion of ‘the mode of production’ is emphasised by all those scholars who hold that the ‘history-as-totality’ approach is the core of Marx's theory of society. Among them, Gramsci argued that while scientific advancements could shed little light on the issues with which philosophers and economists had traditionally been concerned, concepts such as ‘social relations of production’ and ‘mode of production’ had provided valuable insights for philosophical and economic inquiry. Hence our interest in the question of whether a system of producer cooperatives would actually lead to the establishment of a new mode of production. Opinions in the matter diverge greatly, and major implications stem from the distinction between worker managed firms (WMFs) and labour managed firms (LMFs), where the latter strictly segregate capital incomes from labour incomes. We conclude that LMF cooperatives do implement a new mode of production because they reverse the typical capital–labour relation right within a capitalistic system. An additional major point addressed in some detail is the main contradiction in capitalism.     

Psychology,social evolution and liberalism: a Hayekian trinity

Abstract

The work of Friedrich Hayek describes an extensive political economy, with explicit consideration of the psychological limits to human understanding, the market as a mechanism of information gathering and social coordination, and the relationship between market processes and the free society, where moral and political issues are relevant within a framework of continuous adaptation. Although the survival characteristics of social institutions largely defy rational enquiry, political liberalism secures the diversity that is necessary for evolutionary social adaptation.