中国排污费制度监管环节博弈分析

对中国排污费监管问题建立博弈模型进行分析、研究得到:(1)当罚金、超标排污费较高时,地方政府能否从超标排污中获得直接利益不是企业超标排污决策的重要影响因素;(2)若罚金与超标排污费较小,超标排污是企业较好的选择;(3)若罚金与超标排污费之和大于污染治理成本两倍,且大于政府监督成本,企业超标排污的概率与监督成本成正比关系,与超标排污费与监督成本之和成发比例关系;(4)地方政府所能获得罚金与超标排污费,以及必须承担的监督成本多少对超标排污有重要影响。     

Out-of-pocket health care expenditure in Turkey: Analysis of the 2003–2008 Household Budget Surveys

This paper analyses the prevalence of ‘catastrophic’ out-of-pocket health expenditure in Turkey and identifies the factors which are associated with its risk using the Turkish Household Budget Surveys from 2003 to 2008. A sample selection approach based on Sartori (2003) is adopted to allow for the potential selection problem which may arise if poor households choose not to seek health care due to concerns regarding its affordability. The results suggest that poor households are less likely to seek health care as compared to non-poor households and that a negative relationship between poverty and experiencing catastrophic health expenditure remains even after allowing for such selection bias. Our findings, which may assist policy-makers concerned with health care system reforms, also highlight factors such as insurance coverage, which may protect households from the risk of incurring catastrophic health expenditure.     

Efficiency,access, and the mixed delivery of health care services

Universal health systems often rely on both pubic provision and contracting arrangements with private hospitals. This paper studies the optimal mix of public and private provision of health care services. We propose a model in which the regulator acts as athird-party payer, and aims to ensure universal access to treatment at minimal cost. Patients need one unit of medical services and differ in the severity of illness. A private and a public hospital are available. Under incomplete contracts, ownership affects the regulatory constraints and the power of managerial incentives. Only the private manager internalizes profits, and has incentives to reject costly patients and to exert effort in cost reduction. Contracting with the private hospital is optimal when managerial effort is relatively effective in reducing costs. By using the public hospital as a last resort provider, the regulator can ensure access, provide incentives to the private manager, and internalize part of the resulting cost savings. Imposing a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital reduces the power of incentives and is not always optimal.     

The cost of imperfect agency in health care: Evidence from rural Cameroun

Health is a pressing problem facing Africans today, yet health care systems in Africa are inadequate and under-funded. We show that pervasive imperfect agency means that they are also inefficient. Imperfect agency (due to unobservable medical effort) is a recognized market failure in health care, but its impact is difficult to measure. We take an indirect approach to estimation and infer the cost of unobservable effort from the behavior of utility-maximizing patients, specifically their willingness to incur measurable costs to avoid practitioners who shirk. We use a unique data set from rural Cameroun where patients choose between the government health system, church-operated (mission) health facilities and, importantly, traditional healers. Traditional healers provide health services on an outcome–contingent basis where patients pay only if they are cured. Both government and mission facilities, in contrast, are paid on a fee-for-service basis. Patients' choices of practitioners, combined with quantitative information about patients' illnesses, permit a structural estimation of the value of unobservable medical effort. The results allow investigation into the nature of agency, its costs, and the manner in which contracts reduce and patient behavior mitigates those costs. We estimate that in the absence of imperfect agency, utility from health care would increase by at least 160%. Even in the face of imperfect agency, the sophistication of patients in choosing between existing contracts for different illnesses increases utility by up to 20%.     

产业共性技术研发政府支持合同

建立了产业共性技术研发三阶段博弈模型,基于政府视角研究了以企业研发投入最大化为目标的共性技术支持合同的最优设计问题,并分析了合同性质。研究结果表明:足够多的政府预算是共性技术研发最优合同存在的前提,企业的最优研发投入随着政府预算的增加而增加,且其增长速度比政府支持投入的增长速度更快;企业的最优研发投入与共性技术市场化预期收益、企业及政府投入对共性技术研发成功的影响系数正相关,与双方单位投入成本系数负相关。     

DO HEALTH INSURERS CONTRACT THE BEST PROVIDERS? PROVIDER NETWORKS,QUALITY, AND COSTS

We provide a modeling framework to analyze selective contracting in the health‐care sector. Two health‐care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low‐cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power reduces the scope for signaling, thereby leading to lower quality and inefficiency.     

Measurement of Changes in Economic Welfare in India: 1970–2001

This paper provides time series estimates of measures of economic welfare, inequality, decile class specific true cost of living index and poverty measures based on 20 rounds of National Sample Survey data for the period 1970–2001. It has estimated piece-wise Linear Expenditure System (LES) for very poor, moderately poor, non-poor low and non-poor high expenditure groups for rural as well as urban areas. Money metric utility for deciles are derived from the money metric utility function and social welfare index is constructed by aggregating metric utility of the deciles. Using social welfare index as well as real per capita consumption, the paper analyses the changes in economic welfare over the three decades. Using conventional measures, the paper analyses the changes in poverty and inequality during 1970–2001. The paper also provides estimates of the welfare effects of commodity prices.

     

The Impact of the NHS Reforms on Queues and Surgical Outcomes in England: Evidence From Hip Fracture Patients

National Health Service (NHS) reform introduced incentives for efficiency and cost effectiveness, yet little is known about their effectiveness in reducing waiting times for surgery or improving post-surgical outcomes. This paper finds that waiting times for hip fracture surgery declined after the NHS reforms, and patients were more likely to be discharged to another provider. However, hospitals have not simply shifted the burden of care to other providers, since lengths of stay ending in a discharge to home fell. The effect of wait time on surgical outcomes is small in magnitude and cannot explain the post-reform improvements in outcomes.     

我国公立医疗机构按病种收费研究

我国医疗改革已进行了几十年,政府已尽到了最大努力,但收效并不如意,看病难、看病贵的问题依然存在,我国医疗改革如何深入进行？这是一个摆在党和政府面前的一个难题。一个带有方向性治本性的改革方案,那就是我国公立医疗机构实行按病种收费。为此,文章首先设计了一个按病种收费系统完整实施方案,全面深入剖析了其重要意义,预测了实施中可能出现的问题,提出了对策建议。     

审计收费与审计质量的关系研究——基于第一大股东不同持股比例的视角

以2002—2009年度因财务舞弊受到中国证监会处罚的上市公司为样本,分析在第一大股东不同持股比例下,审计收费与审计质量的关系,在控制了审计意见的相关影响因素后发现:在上市公司第一大股东持股比例较高时,审计收费与审计质量呈负相关;第一大股东持股比例较低时,审计收费与审计质量正相关。     

Impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management Programme: a study from forest‐dependent households in West Bengal

This study seeks to explore the impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme between the government and forest fringe communities of a province in West Bengal, India. It suggests that if there is no incentive plan for the poor, it is hard for the government to monitor their actions. The poor tend to take welfare subsidies and yet harvest optimally. A good incentive fee dependent on their work (output) is required for livelihood sustenance of poor people and sustainability of forest resources.     

LIABILITY AND ANTIFRAUD INVESTMENT IN FINTECH RETAIL PAYMENT SERVICES

Motivated by recently introduced retail payment schemes using information technology, often called “FinTech,” we examine the effect of fraud liability regime on antifraud investment in a FinTech payment scheme, where the front‐end and back‐end services are vertically separated. In an environment where a FinTech payment service provider (FPP) covers only the front‐end services, delegating the back‐end services to an integrated payment service provider (IPP) such as banks and credit card companies, we show that under the IPP liability regime, the IPP invests more in general, while the respective investment depends on the range of the access fee under the FPP liability regime. Specifically, given a sufficiently great loss from accident, if the access fee is in a certain range, the FPP liability regime is superior in terms of antifraud investment. When the FPP makes its indirect revenue from its user base in addition to the revenue from user fees, we can observe greater antifraud investment under both liability regimes, but the overall decrease in fraud probability is higher under the IPP liability regime. Our results suggest that it might be desirable to induce FPP liability regime, which might necessitate regulating the access fee to achieve such an outcome. (JEL G23, G28, D43, L22)     

The marketplace and health care reform: the unfinished agenda of the '90s

A long-term approach to health care reform demands an agenda that involves purchasers, payers and providers, as well as users. The overall goal of such an effort must be integrating ongoing cost reductions with continuous improvements in quality of care.     

Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers

Motivated by interventions in poor countries to increase the use of local labor in foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), we address the behavior of these organizations under host government regulation. We extend existing NGO models by distinguishing between local workers and expatriates. The model covers both NGO monopoly and competition in the market for donations. Assuming that NGOs maximize output, we show that regulations in the form of a quota on the number of expatriates or a work permit fee for foreigners reduces NGO output, but increases employment of locals. The optimal quota is more likely to bind in the market structure generating the highest total fundraising surplus. An optimal work permit fee is equivalent to an optimal quota in both the monopoly and duopoly cases. For both instruments, the optimal tightness of regulation is decreasing in the weight the government attaches to the public good relative to domestic incomes and in the importance of NGO output to the supply of the public good. Aggregate NGO output and the level of the public good produced could be higher with a monopoly NGO.     

考虑集成商营销努力的养老服务提供商服务质量激励研究

在考虑养老服务集成商营销努力的情况下,通过设计成本分担契约、收益共享契约激励养老服务提供商改善服务质量,分析了两类激励契约的适用条件;比较了对养老服务质量、营销水平决策和各成员利润的改善作用。研究结果表明：提供商的服务质量、利润会随着成本分担比例的增加而递增,随着收益共享比例的增加而递减;集成商的营销水平会随着成本分担比例的增加而增加,而随着收益共享比例的增加而递减,利润水平会随着成本分担比例和收益共享比例的增加而递减;需求影响系数对三种情境下的提供商和集成商利润产生正向作用,签订成本分担契约对提供商较为有利,集成商可能更倾向于收益共享契约;成本影响系数则对利润产生负向作用,签订收益共享契约对提供商较为有利,对于集成商来说,其利润在三种情境下的差异不大;成本分担契约对激励提供商改善服务质量和集成商提升营销水平具有最佳的激励作用。在大多数情况下,提供商获得的利润总是高于集成商。     

The Use and Cost of Child Care in Australia

The use and cost of child care have become important policy issues with rising labour force participation for women responsible for young children. In this article it is shown that for children aged less than 2 informal care is much more important than formal care. For children aged 3 to 5 by far the most important, and cheapest, form of formal care is preschool. The category of formal care which has expanded most rapidly is child care centre places. However the recent expansion of female employment has been effected with no rise in the share of formal care in the total. Publicly supplied child care centre places are over 40 per cent more expensive to produce than private ones. It is argued that for those who do not receive a fee relief subsidy public care is more expensive than private care. The inference is drawn that people are willing to pay more for public than private care because public care is of higher quality. However those buying this higher quality care pay (at most) only 80 per cent of the cost of producing the care. The shortage of care in the public sector is not solved by private sector expansion because users of care are not willing to pay the price of producing high quality care.     

The implications of private tutoring on the school education in LDCs

In many LDCs, we observe that the public school teachers receive low wages, expend less than their full effort at school, and provide private tutoring to the students for a fee. To capture this institutional arrangement, we develop a theoretical model which shows that in comparison with ‘no-tutoring’, ‘tutoring’ is welfare reducing for all students in the economy. However, if the government considers only the students in the public system, then ‘tutoring’ can be welfare improving. In that case, the government would set a lower tax rate to pay wages to the teachers and let them provide tutoring to the students for a fee.     

Poverty among ethnic minorities: the transition process,inequality and economic growth

This article investigates the process of reducing poverty in ethnic minority households. Using two recent Vietnam household surveys, we find that ethnic minority households are more likely to be persistently poor and less likely to be persistently non-poor than ethnic majority households. The within-group component generated by the variation in income within each ethnicity group explains more than 90% of the change in total inequality. Income redistribution plays an important role in decreasing the poverty gap and decreasing poverty severity. Different ethnic groups have different poverty patterns, which should be noted when designing policies to alleviate poverty and inequality.     

Optimal pricing of public lotteries and comparison of competing mechanisms

This article establishes optimal pricing rules for rationing indivisible units of rival and otherwise nonexcludable goods by lottery or a hybrid of a lottery and outright sale by posted price. Given the distributional objective of maximizing expected consumer surplus, the solutions to unconstrained and constrained versions of the pricing problem may be expressed in classic inverse elasticity form, with the lottery price appearing as an entry fee, user fee or a combination of the two. Numerical analysis of a rich class of private value distributions indicates that sizable gains in expected consumer surplus can be realized over competitive pricing and zero pricing.