European influence and economic development

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape economic institutions (e.g., property rights) that provide necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that European influence is a crucial economic development determinant, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? Previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence. We propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800–2008 for all countries and find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. These results show how European influence may have fostered growth, and they imply that countries were able to overcome adverse initial conditions over the last 200 years by adopting European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify the specific dimensions of European constitutions that matter most for development: legislative rules and specific provisions that curtail executive powers.     

Family Policies: What Does the Standard Endogenous Fertility Model Tell Us?

Very few studies have explored the optimality properties of the “standard model” of fertility where parents must determine their optimal trade‐off between quality and quantity. The present paper works to fill that gap and find three main results. First, when there exist positive externalities in the accumulation of human capital, it is optimal to subsidize education and to tax births. Second, when the Social Welfare Function does not consist of the average utility, the social returns on educational investments can be weaker than the private returns when the optimal population growth rate is negative. In this case, the optimal economic policy consists in subsidizing births and taxing education. Finally, when the health expenditure is introduced as another source of positive externalities, it can be optimal to tax the parental health expenditure to decentralize the first‐best path even if this expenditure is always too low at the laissez‐faire equilibrium.     

FOUR CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CONSTRAINED PARETO EFFICIENCY IN CONTINUUM ECONOMIES WITH WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES*

In continuum economies, widespread externalities are those over which each individual has negligible control. Nash-Walrasian equilibria with lump-sum transfers are defined, and their existence proved. They are then characterized by the property of “f-constrained Pareto efficiency” for finite coalitions. More general “private good” Nash-Walrasian equilibria are characterized as private-good constrained-Pareto efficient. Introducing complete Pigou taxes or subsidies leads to equilibria that are characterized by constrained efficiency and f-constrained efficiency for given levels of the widespread externalities. But full efficiency requires resolving the public-good problem of determining those aggregate externalities or, equivalently, of setting appropriate Pigou prices.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING TO AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY IN THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY?

This paper extends earlier data series on aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy—the percentage of aggregate economic activity that could be attributed to the largest “X” companies—into the first two decades of the twenty‐first century. We find that there has been a moderate but continued increase in aggregate concentration since the mid‐1990s. This increase appears in data on employment and payrolls that have been compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as well as employment and profits data that are drawn from the annual “Fortune 500” lists. This increase does not, however, appear to have raised aggregate concentration above the levels of the early 1980s. (JEL L10, L11, L19)     

IMPROVING THE ANALYTICAL AND DATA FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR FOR NATIONAL GOALS ACCOUNTING*

Provision of “market goods” follows the decision rules of traditional microeconomics; pricing and resource allocation for such goods tend towards Pareto optimality. The provision of “collective goods,” by contrast, depends on political (or quasi-political) collective decision processes; beneficiaries often receive a share of collective goods free of charge or well below average or marginal (private or social) costs. No inherent tendency towards optimality may be presumed and separate analysis of collective goods becomes an essential part of national goals accounting. The national-income-accounts (NIA) distinction between personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and government purchases of goods and services corresponds roughly to a division between market goods bought by the consumer and a major category of “collective goods” (i.e. “public goods” provided by government). However, a significant proportion of PCE represents “collective goods” paid for by government, business, or nonprofit organizations and provided on behalf of the consumer, whereas a part of NIA government purchases represents services paid for by the consumer (i.e. “market goods”). This article develops operationally meaningful distinctions among “market goods,”“collective goods,” and “tied aid” (a mixed category with market-good and collective-good characteristics). These distinctions are determined by the nature of the decision processes–rather than by the characteristics of the beneficiary or the supplier. This classification is related to the national income accounts and major discrepancies are pinpointed. The blurring of the distinction among market goods, collective goods and tied aid is found to be most consequential in the NIA treatment of “education” and “medical care” services. NIA data for these two services are restructured for national goals accounting purposes in order to illustrate both the quantitative importance and the empirical feasibility of classifying benefits by their respective decision processes.     

Veblen,Veblenian Social Practices,and Prosperity Theology

Abstract:

At the turn of the twentieth century (1910), Veblen published an essay which explored the relationship between Christianity and capitalism by focusing on the interaction between the two institutions as they evolved. Veblen’s analysis begins by detailing the evolution of Christianity prior to the age of industrialized capitalism, after which he explores the evolutionary interplay between the two. Just over ten years prior to the publication of this essay (1899), Veblen published the Theory of the Leisure Class while over ten years after the publication of the essay (1923), Veblen dissected the sales efforts of Christianity in a note titled “Salesmanship and the Churches.” Nearly 100 years later, these three works together explain a modern and distinctly American religious movement—Prosperity Theology. This research argues that Prosperity Theology as practiced in the United States over the past nearly half century embodies and integrates all three of these works by Veblen and proposes the conceptual term “Veblenian Social Practice.”     

Adam Smith's Ethics and the “Noble Arts” 1

Adam Smith's character-based ethical system lays the foundation for his vision of the social and economic good. Within this system, the arts perform a critical role. Smith's essays “Of the Imitative Arts” and his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres are useful companions to The Theory of Moral Sentiments in analyzing the mechanisms whereby literature and the arts excite moral development. The arts stretch the boundaries of imagination and perspective, stimulating self-awareness and self-reflective growth. When combined with rational thought, decision-making takes place through an internal dialogue in which this wider perspective weighs upon one's “impartial spectator” and becomes the background for action. According to this view, the arts provide positive externalities for society and should be encouraged through public policy. The arts promote a conversation that becomes part of the common goods of society, including that of science.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model*

This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy‐making authority at the time. A rule‐of‐succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict—class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences—are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision‐making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules‐of‐succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation.     

MARKETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL

The environmental problem is no different from any other economic problem. The basic problem is scarcity. Wants are unlimited while resources are limited. Once we recognize our inability to satisfy all of our ecological wants, how do we decide which wants we will satisfy? Most efforts to address environmental concerns have used political institutions to answer this question and to devise policy responses. Environmental concerns have been addressed in the same manner that socialist nations sought to address broader economic concerns. This paper argues that such policies cannot succeed in the environmental realm any better than they did in the broader economic realm. Whether the political approach chosen relies on command-and-control or “market-based” mechanisms (eco-taxes or eco-quotas) matters little in resolving government's inability to prioritize. The dispersed nature and enormity of information needed to prioritize risks and the inability of government to create the rich system of incentives necessary to mobilize human ingenuity renders effective government controls infeasible. This paper argues for greater attention to environmental problems but concludes that we can better address environmental quality by integrating ecological resources into the economy via ecological privatization. This property rights approach to environmental policy—“free market environmentalism”—may entice more economists to address the important environmental questions and devise more appropriate solutions.     

GLOBALIZATION: CONTENTS AND DISCONTENTS

William Shakespeare's Tragedy of King Richard III, written approximately in 1592, is the story of evil acts by the detested and misshapen hunchback, Richard, who plots to sow discontent among his brother, the King, and others, and has his brother murdered along with other wicked deeds in order to gain the throne. It opens with the line, “Now is the winter of our discontent” (p. 111, ed. Wright 1936). “The Winter of Our Discontent” is also the title of John Steinbeck's (1961) novel of a man who trades his moral convictions to reclaim lost family wealth. “Globalization and Its Discontents” is the title of Joseph Stiglitz's (2002) book that critiques rigid adherence by major economic institutions—such as the International Monetary Fund—to economic orthodoxy in the promotion of globalization. (JEL F6, D72, D3, O23, O24, L17, K33)     

MEGA‐EVENTS AND SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT: THE CASE OF THE 1996 OLYMPIC GAMES

Using the data of the 1996 Olympic Games, this paper analyzes the economic impact of a mega‐sporting event. Earlier studies are extended in several ways. First, monthly rather than quarterly data are employed. Second, the impact is analyzed for 16 different sectors. Third, we use a nonparametric approach to flexibly isolate employment effects. Hardly any evidence for a persistent shift in the aftermath of or the preparation for the Olympic Games is supported. We find significant positive employment effects exclusively during the Olympic Games. These short‐term effects are concentrated in the sectors of “retail trade,”“accommodation and food services,” and “arts, entertainment, and recreation.” (JEL H54, R12, L83)     

Does income inequality sand or grease the wheels of entrepreneurial activity? International evidence

Using a large panel of countries, this research examines the influence of income inequality on entrepreneurship. The impact of income disparities on entrepreneurship is not clear a priori—with a positive effect when inequality encourages entrepreneurship (“greasing effect”) or a negative effect when entrepreneurship discourages entrepreneurship (“sanding effect”). Our findings, across alternative measures of income inequality and even allowing for simultaneity, are consistent with the motivation or greasing effect. An equally insightful finding is that the effect of inequality switches across the prevalence of entrepreneurship—the sanding effect exists in nations with a low prevalence of entrepreneurship, and switches to a greasing effect as the prevalence of entrepreneurship increases. This is suggestive of positive network externalities from entrepreneurship—it takes a threshold level of entrepreneurship in a nation for greasing from income inequality to take hold.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

The perils of copyright regulation

The most robust framework for understanding the evolution and consequences of copyright statutes in the United States is the dynamics of interventionism. I apply the framework of Kirzner’s (1985) perils of regulation to the general revision of copyright law in 1976, and explore its effects on entrepreneurship and discovery processes. Critics of copyright commonly recognize the distortions of rent-seeking, but I emphasize the utility of interventionism to explain the “unsimulated” and the “stifled” discovery processes set in motion by copyright interventions, which use legal processes to allocate resources, and deter future discovery by raising transaction costs.     

DOES CULTURE AFFECT ELECTORAL OUTCOMES? EVIDENCE FROM TRANSITION COUNTRIES

Why do some societies fail to adopt “good” economic institutions? Recent literature points to the role of complementarities between social norms and proposed formal rules in advancing institutional change. To shed light on one potential mechanism, we track election performance of executive parties in up to 18 post‐communist democracies over 1991–2015 to test whether cultural attitudes influenced voters' response to market reform. We show that in more individualistic cultures, reform is associated with greater reward for the incumbent in the next election. The implication is that in democracies, voters select policies and institutions that are in line with prevailing culture. (JEL O17, P35, Z1)     

Post-Crisis Experiments in Development Finance Architectures: A Hirschmanian Perspective On ‘Productive Incoherence’

Abstract

The Asian and especially the global crisis of 2008 have catalyzed decentralization of the developing world’s financial governance architecture. I understand this state of affairs via the concept of “productive incoherence” which is apparent in a denser, multilayered development financial architecture that is emerging as a consequence of heterogeneous practical adjustments to changing circumstances rather than as the embodiment of a coherent doctrine. Drawing on Albert Hirschman, I argue that the absence of an encompassing theoretical blueprint for a new economic system—i.e. a new “ism” to replace neoliberalism—is in fact a vitally important virtue. If we cannot live without a new “ism,” I propose “Hirschmanian Possibilism” as a new doctrine—one that rejects an overarching theoretical framework from which to deduce the singly appropriate institutional structure of the economy. Hirschmanian Possibilism asserts instead the value of productive incoherence as a framework for pursuing democratic, ethically viable development institutions.     

The clinical and economic burden of significant bleeding during lung resection surgery: A retrospective matched cohort analysis of real-world data

Objectives: The objective of this retrospective study was to quantify the clinical and economic burden of significant bleeding in lung resection surgery in the US.

Methods: This study utilized 2009–2012 data from the Premier Perspective Database^TM. Adult patients with primary pulmonary lobectomy or segmentectomy procedures were categorized by the surgical approach (VATS vs open) and primary diagnosis (primary or metastatic lung cancer vs non-lung cancer). Patients requiring ≥3 units of blood products with at least 1 unit of PRBCs: “significant bleeding” cohort; those requiring <3 units: “non-significant bleeding” cohort; and those not requiring blood products: “no bleeding” cohort. A matched cohort analysis was performed between the “significant bleeding” and the “no bleeding cohort” using matching variables: hospital, lung cancer diagnosis, year of surgery, APR-DRG severity score, procedure type and approach, age, and gender.

Results: The “All-patient” cohort comprised 21,429 patients: 213 “significant bleeding”; 2,780 “non-significant bleeding”; and 18,436 “no bleeding”. Overall incidence of significant chest bleeding was 0.99%. Patients from “significant bleeding” cohort and “non-significant bleeding” cohort had 2.5 days and 2 days (p?p?Conclusions: Although significant bleeding during lung resection surgery is rare, patients with such complication could stay longer at the hospital and cost an average of $13,103 more than those without.