Foreign Currency Derivatives versus Foreign Currency Debt and the Hedging Premium

This paper compares the effect on firm value of different foreign currency (FC) financial hedging strategies identified by type of exposure (short‐ or long‐term) and type of instrument (forwards, options, swaps and foreign currency debt). We find that hedging instruments depend on the type of exposure. Short‐term instruments such as FC forwards and/or options are used to hedge short‐term exposure generated from export activity while FC debt and FC swaps into foreign currency (but not into domestic currency) are used to hedge long‐term exposure arising from assets located in foreign locations. Our results relating to the value effects of foreign currency hedging indicate that foreign currency derivatives use increases firm value but there is no hedging premium associated with foreign currency debt hedging, except when combined with foreign currency derivatives. Taken individually, FC swaps generate more value than short‐term derivatives.     

Foreign currency borrowing surrounding the global financial crisis: Evidence from Korea

We present a complete profile of firms’ foreign currency borrowing surrounding the 2007 global financial crisis. Employing extensive data from Korean firms during 2002–2012, we find that foreign currency borrowing is significantly related to firm attributes of export revenues, firm size, tangible assets and asset growth, as well as to macro-level factors. These results offer two important implications. First, macroeconomic factors alone cannot fully explain firms’ foreign currency borrowing. Second and more importantly, these firm attributes are indicative of a lower default probability and larger collateral value, which would not only facilitate borrowers’ access to foreign currency debt markets but also offer lenders a better protective cushion from possible loan defaults in the face of exchange rate changes and information asymmetry on borrowers’ credits. Period wise, asset-related firm attributes have more pronounced effects in the post- than pre-crisis period. We further show that banking regulations following the crisis effectively limit the access to foreign currency borrowing by Korean firms, most significantly by those belonging to large business groups.     

Is operational hedging a substitute for or a complement to financial hedging?

This paper investigates operational hedging by firms and how operational hedging is related to financial hedging by using a sample of 424 firm observations, which consist of 212 operationally hedged firms (firms with foreign sales) and a size- and industry-matched sample of 212 non-operationally hedged firms (firms with export sales). We find that non-operationally hedged firms use more financial hedging, relative to their levels of foreign currency exposure, as measured by the amount of export sales. On the other hand, though operationally hedged firms have more currency exposure, their usage of financial derivatives becomes much smaller than that of exporting firms. These results can explain why some global firms use very limited amount of financial derivatives for hedging purpose despite much higher levels of currency risk exposure. We also show that hedging increases firm value.     

Resolving the exposure puzzle: The many facets of exchange rate exposure

Theory predicts sizeable exchange rate (FX) exposure for many firms. However, empirical research has not documented such exposures. To examine this discrepancy, we extend prior theoretical results to model a global firm's FX exposure and show empirically that firms pass through part of currency changes to customers and utilize both operational and financial hedges. For a typical sample firm, pass-through and operational hedging each reduce exposure by 10–15%. Financial hedging with foreign debt, and to a lesser extent FX derivatives, decreases exposure by about 40%. The combination of these factors reduces FX exposures to observed levels.     

The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging: Does Foreign Currency Debt Induce a Bias?

In this paper we use UK data to present strong empirical evidence that explains the mixed results in previous studies with respect to the effect of financial distress on the demand for corporate hedging. We build on recent studies that have identified a strong link between foreign currency (FC) debt use and leverage. Given this relationship, we show that using leverage variables as proxies for financial distress and the failure to distinguish between FC debt users and non‐users causes misleading inference. More specifically, when we partition our sample of FC hedgers into firms that use and do not use foreign debt, we show that leverage variables are significantly related to the FC hedging decision for firms that use FC debt either in isolation or in combination with FC derivatives but not for firms that only use FC derivatives. This suggests that FC debt users are influencing these results. However, we also find that other financial distress cost proxies with no obvious link to FC debt use are significant determinants in the corporate demand for FC hedging, including derivatives use.     

Corporate risk management and firm value: evidence from the UK market

The paper evaluates the effect of corporate risk management activities on firm value, using a sample of large UK non-financial firms. Following recent changes in financial reporting standards, we are able to collect detailed information on risk management activities from audited financial reports. This enables us to gain a better understanding of risk management practices and to investigate value implications of different types of hedging. Overall 86.88% of the firms in the sample use derivatives to manage at least one type of price risk. The hedging premium is statistically and economically significant for foreign currency derivative users, while we provide weak evidence that interest rate hedging increases firm value. The extent of hedging and the hedging horizon have an impact on the hedging premium, whereas operational risk management activities do not significantly influence the market value of the firm.     

CORPORATE HEDGING AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE

Although theory suggests that corporate hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, empirical studies show overall mixed support for rationales of hedging with derivatives. Although various empirical challenges and limitations advise some caution with regard to the interpretation of the existing evidence, the results are consistent with derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial strategy that considers the type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk management tools, and the operating environment of the firm. Moreover, corporations rely heavily on pass‐through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt to manage financial risk.     

Convex costs and the hedging paradox

Financial theory suggests that hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, including direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and convex tax exposure. The influence of these costs, which are high when profits are low and low or negligible when profits are large, on the extent of firm hedging has not been consistently addressed in the finance literature. In Brown and Toft's (2002) model, more convex costs imply that a firm will decrease the extent of hedging. At the same time, one version of Smith and Stulz's (1985) tax hypothesis implies that a given firm is expected to increase the extent of hedging under a more convex tax exposure. I address this ambiguity in the literature by showing that, in incomplete markets, value-maximizing firms that stand to gain the most from hedging may in fact hedge less than otherwise identical firms with less to gain from hedging. This hedging paradox can partly account for the lack of conclusive evidence to suggest that convex costs can influence both a firm's decision to hedge and the extent of the firm's hedging. Finally, I introduce a new interpretation of empirical relations between potential hedging gains and the extent of hedging.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

What lies beneath: Foreign exchange rate exposure,hedging and cash flows

This paper presents results from an in-depth analysis of the foreign exchange rate exposure of a large nonfinancial firm based on proprietary internal data including cash flows, derivatives and foreign currency debt, as well as external capital market data. While the operations of the multinational firm have significant exposure to foreign exchange rate risk due to foreign currency-based activities and international competition, corporate hedging mitigates this gross exposure. The analysis illustrates that the insignificance of foreign exchange rate exposures of comprehensive performance measures such as total cash flow can be explained by hedging at the firm level. Thus, the residual net exposure is economically and statistically small, even if the operating cash flows of the firm are significantly exposed to exchange rate risk. The results of the paper suggest that managers of nonfinancial firms with operations exposed to foreign exchange rate risk take savvy actions to reduce exposure to a level too low to allow its detection empirically.     

Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act

The literature on distressed firms has focused on these firms’ investment, capital structure, and labor decisions. This paper investigates a novel aspect of firm behavior in distress: how financial health affects a firm?s lobbying and, consequently, its relationship with the government. We exploit the shock to nonfinancial firms during the 2008 financial crisis and the availability of the stimulus package in the first quarter of 2009. We find that firms with weaker financial health, as measured by credit default swap spreads, lobbied more. We also show that the amount spent on lobbying was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving stimulus funds.     

Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence

This paper extends the current theoretical models of corporate risk-management in the presence of financial distress costs and tests the model's predictions using a comprehensive data set. I show that the shareholders optimally engage in ex-post (i.e., after the debt issuance) risk-management activities even without a pre-commitment to do so. The model predicts a positive (negative) relation between leverage and hedging for moderately (highly) leveraged firms. Consistent with the theory, empirically I find a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. Further, the effect of leverage on hedging is higher for firms in highly concentrated industries.     

The effectiveness of currency-hedging techniques over multiple return horizons for foreign-denominated debt issuers

In this study we use a unique dataset to examine the effectiveness of hedging techniques in reducing currency risk across different time horizons. Our primary results indicate that issuers of foreign-denominated debt (FDD) effectively use foreign exchange derivatives (FXD) and geographic sales-to-asset alignment to reduce currency exposure. We measure currency exposure, over multiple return horizons, as the sensitivity of firm’s stock returns to changes in the exchange rate while controlling for market’s return. In particular, we find that the use of foreign exchange derivatives is effective in the short-term horizon and the geographic sales-to-asset alignment is effective in the intermediate and longer-term horizons. When we control for foreign sales and for firm size, the primary results are robust. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the time period when the use foreign exchange derivatives and the geographic sales-to-asset alignment is most effective for issuers of foreign-denominated debt.     

Foreign exchange and lost opportunity in the US Department of Defense

This paper examines US Department of Defense (DoD) foreign exchange rate exposure in light of the government’s prohibition against foreign currency hedging. Using data from the United States Air Force and Monte Carlo simulation, we evaluate whether the use of forward foreign exchange contracts or currency options might reduce the financial impact of currency fluctuation. The results strongly indicate that these alternatives outperform the current method for dealing with foreign currency exposure in the DoD. Using forward contracts, expected cost reductions are on the order of 3.5% of current outlays. For options, expected cost reductions increase to 6.4% thereby defining an upper bound of 2.9% on acceptable option premium levels.     

Hedging,selective hedging,or speculation? Evidence of the use of derivatives by Brazilian firms during the financial crisis

This paper analyse the use of foreign exchange derivatives by non-financial publicly traded Brazilian companies from 2007 to 2009. Using balance-sheet data on firms’ positions in derivatives and their foreign exchange exposure, the paper verifies the existence of three groups of derivative users: hedgers, selective hedgers – companies that significantly changed the volume of derivatives used during this period, but used them in line with their currency exposure – and active speculators – companies that adopted positions that would have been inadvisable had the aim been to hedge their currency exposure. Selective hedgers and speculators have one similarity: both tried to obtain gains through the continuous process of domestic currency appreciation. Confirming the optimal hedging literature, the paper shows that several firm characteristics are able to explain the use of derivatives and hedging by firms but market timing in the derivative markets is explained solely by firms’ foreign exposure, corporate governance and the macroeconomic environment.     

Is value creation consistent with currency hedging?

This paper analyzes value creation through currency hedging in the Spanish market. The results show that the hedging with derivatives generated an average premium of 1.53% and that foreign currency debt generated 7.52%, with respect to company value approximated by Tobin's Q, while operational hedging does not affect company value. Moreover, in half of the observations corresponding to companies that hedged with derivatives, the value premium was between 0.08% and 0.99%. In the case of foreign currency debt, the range was between 1.79% and 10.37%. It demonstrates that the contribution of currency hedging to company value fluctuates considerable according to the volume of financial hedging. Thus, an empirical study of this aspect which only analyses the decision to hedge through dummy variables to define financial hedging, as empirical previous studies, can lead to biased results in terms of estimated premium amounts, because it assumes a homogenous treatment of companies regardless of hedging volumes.     

Sovereign defaults by currency denomination

This paper explores the drivers of sovereign default in 100 countries over the period 1996–2012. We build a new data set of sovereign defaults and find that default events for local and foreign currency bonds are equally likely. However, governments default under different economic and financial conditions depending on the currency in which bonds are issued. The explained variation in default probability rises from 43% to 62% when we account for differences in currency denomination. We also provide evidence that global factors and market sentiment, which are known to drive sovereign spreads, do not help explain the probability of sovereign default. Hence, these factors appear to affect the price of sovereign credit risk, although not the risk itself.     

The determinants of Norwegian exporters’ foreign exchange risk management

Abstract

This paper examines foreign exchange (FX) hedging by Norwegian exporting firms to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the hedging decision. The paper contributes to prior studies by, first, focusing on exporters to ensure that the companies in the sample have FX exposure, thereby allowing a more rigorous test of the theoretical determinants of hedging, and, secondly, in contrast to most previous studies that have focused on FX external hedging instruments, the use of both internal and external instruments is examined. Univariate, multivariate and multinominal analyses all provide evidence consistent with the firm value maximization hypotheses of underinvestment and risk aversion. Also, the following characteristics of firms—size, extent of internationalization and liquidity—are found to be related to the decision to hedge FX risk. However, the evidence on the links between the firm characteristics and the decision to hedge is not consistent across internal and external FX hedgers, and also varies for individual hedging instruments. Therefore it is argued that the empirical evidence on the theoretical determinants cannot be generalized to cover the full range of FX hedging strategies (which includes internal hedging instruments). Unlike empirical studies for other countries the evidence for Norwegian firms does not support the hypothesis that the avoidance of financial distress and the need to resort to external capital markets is a significant determinant of the hedging decision. Whilst the evidence suggests that country-specific factors may play a role in determining the use of FX hedging, it does not imply that the different policies adopted are necessarily inconsistent with the firm value maximization hypothesis.     

The effect of liquidity and solvency risk on the inclusion of bond covenants

Studies have analyzed the impact of firm and issue characteristics but not liquidity and solvency components of financial distress on the use of bond covenants. Using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from 2001 to 2012, we find that firm liquidity, measured by standardized Lambda, has a negative statistical and economic impact on the inclusion of all categories and sub-categories of restrictive bond covenants. Developed from financial statement information by Emery and Lyons (1991), Lambda is designed as a coverage ratio that, under certain distribution assumptions, maps into the probability of a firm being unable to pay its short-term bills. The strongest solvency proxy is the 10-year credit default swap (CDS) spread which is significant across the categories and sub-categories for investment and payment covenants, weakly significant for the subordinated debt sub-category of the subsequent financing covenant, but strongly significant for the control poison put sub-category of event covenants. This evidence supports a model that uses SLambda as a proxy for liquidity risk and the 10-year CDS spread as a proxy for solvency risk. The liquidity/covenant relationship is dampened when firms have access to commercial paper funding or bank loans. However, during the recent financial crisis liquidity event this liquidity/covenant relationship was enhanced especially for firms which were dependent on commercial paper during this time when the commercial paper market was deteriorating.