Measurement Errors and Information Content of Segment Reporting

This paper assesses the measurement errors inherent in segment reporting. Measurement errors are gauged by comparing the correlation of segment results with their industry to the corresponding correlation for single line-of-business firms operating in the same industry. The findings show that the measurement errors in segment information, particularly earnings, are larger than those in the financial information reported by single line-of-business firms. The cross-sectional variation in the measurement errors can be traced to cost/revenue allocations, management intervention in segment reporting, and the operational structure of multi-segment firms. Market tests indicate that the information content of segment information is inversely related to the estimated measurement errors. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

递延所得税费用的简单化理解

新<企业会计准则>要求所得税采用资产负债表债务法进行核算,在这种情况下,正确理解递延所得税资产和递延所得税负债两个科目,有利于理解递延所得税费用及所得税会计的核算.     

试析所得税费用(收益)与本期会计利润(亏损)的关系

在本期损益表内确认的所得税费用(收益)除了可根据本期应交(可抵扣)所得税加(减)递延所得税负债(资产)的发生额来确定(除非本期和递延所得税是由在相同或另一个不同的期间直接在所有者权益中确认的交易或事项产生,或由购买式企业合并产生)之外,还可以本期会计利润(亏损)为基础来确定。但所得税费用(收益)并非在任何情况下都简单地等于本期会计利润(亏损)乘以适用税率之积,有时需要经过一定的调整,而经调整的所得税费用(收益)与本期会计利润     

Financial Reporting Practices of China's Listed Firms

The long‐term success of financial markets depends on the widespread availability of reasonably detailed and reliable financial information. Individual investors depend critically upon companies' regulatory filings and voluntary disclosures to assess their long‐run risks, payoffs, and, ultimately, their intrinsic values. However, a recent string of accounting frauds involving Chinese firms listed on overseas markets has drawn attention to the accounting and governance risks associated with investing in Chinese firms. This article provides a brief overview of the information environment of Chinese capital markets and the primary forces that affect the incentives of Chinese listed companies to provide timely and accurate financial reports. The evidence reviewed here indicates that the adoption of world‐class standards and regulation, although necessary, is not sufficient to generate incentives for transparency. The long‐term health of China's capital markets will also depend upon other reforms that are designed to accomplish the following: (1) improve the protection of investor rights through an effective, independent judiciary court system that promotes civil lawsuits, and through credible regulatory enforcement; (2) strengthen market development activity, especially with respect to foreign investors; and (3) limit political rent‐seeking behavior and deter politicized business decisions, especially in China's state‐owned enterprises. Together, such reforms have the potential to improve corporate governance in China and better align the incentives of the state and majority shareholders with those of minority shareholders, while increasing the ability of accounting to serve a contracting function and the demand for timely information for valuation purposes.     

An Analysis of Incentives for Australian Firms to Apply for Reporting Excellence Awards

An award for reporting excellence is presented annually to Australian reporting entities. This paper investigates whether firms that apply for the award are systematically different from firms that elect not to apply. The paper also investigates the benefits which may flow from winning an award for reporting excellence. The results of the paper are consistent with the proposition that such an award may be used by a firm as a means of reducing wealth transfers related to the political process.     

Bidder Gains and Losses of Firms Involved in Many Acquisitions

Abstract:  We examine shareholders' wealth effects (both in the short- and the long-run) of UK frequent bidders acquiring public, private, and/or subsidiary targets with alternative methods of payment between 1987 and 2004. We find that, in the short-run, bidders break even when acquiring public targets and gain significantly when buying private and subsidiary targets. This result is robust after controlling for relative size, bidder's book-to-market ratio, target origin, and industry diversification. Our long-run evidence, however, reveals that acquirers experience, significant wealth losses regardless of the target type acquired, indicating that markets may initially overreact to the acquisition announcement. As a result, we argue that contrary to Fuller et al. (2002) who suggest that acquiring private and subsidiary firms creates value for bidding firms, a reliable conclusion on bidders' shareholders wealth effects cannot be based solely on a short-run event study.     

Intellectual Capital Reporting Practices of the Top Australian Firms

Using content analysis of annual reports of the top 20 firms (by market capitalisation) listed on the Australian stock exchange in 2004, this paper describes the state of intellectual capital reporting practices in Australia. The paper also compares the results with a previous Australian study by Guthrie and Petty (2000) and reconfirms that reporting of intellectual capital is yet to be done within a consistent framework. Although most of the reporting was done through qualitative, rather than quantitative, statements, an encouraging shift towards quantitative reporting is evident.     

The Information Economics Approach to Financial Reporting

This paper provides a non-technical overview of the literature on the economics of information and its implications for financial reporting. This paper attempts to spell out the unity of approach which underlies all information economics models and focuses on the main implications of the literature for accounting policy makers. The central section of the paper identifies precise conditions under which the provision of public information can lead to an improvement in social welfare. An understanding of these conditions is essential for policy makers if they are to take into account the economic effects of their decisions. The final section highlights three important unresolved issues and identifies promising directions for further research.     

市场经济下税源和税负的价值内涵

经济决定税收表现在经济发展的速度和规模决定着税源增长的速度和规模，税收反作用于经济表现在税收负担的总体水平是否适度，结构是否合理会对经济发展产生积极或消极的影响。可见，研究税收与经济的关系实质上就是研究税源和税负问题。市场经济条件下税收参与分配的是社会产品的价值，研究市场经济下的税源和税负问题，首先必须弄清税源和税负的价值内涵。     

事务所应用信息化管理系统探讨

我们所从2005年10月底启动实施的内部管理信息化方案,目前系统已进入正常运行并持续改进的阶段。下面结合我们的实践谈谈信息化管理系统在事务所有效应用的问题,与大家一起探讨。一、对事务所内部管理借助信息技术的考虑1.事务所不论大小,管理始终是关乎其能否可持续发展的重要课题。这几年,我们一直在努力摸索与改进内部管理方式方法,以提高管理效率。借助信息化技术实现内部协同管理需要,正是我们经过探索认识到应关注的重点并视之为提升管理层次的所在。近几年我们所发展较快的同时,内部管理问题日渐凸现。如信息传递不及时,沟通难度加大…     

Environmental Tax Competition in the Presence of Multinational Firms

We study the design of environmental policy in a two country model with an imperfectly competitive polluting industry. We show that when the firms are multinational, non-cooperative policy design leads to too severe emission taxation regardless of the mode of competition. The reason is twofold. First, when firms are multinational, changes in environmental policy do not influence the market shares of the firms. Second, when designing their policies, national governments ignore profits accruing to foreign shareholders of multinational firms.     

Optimal Tax Deductions for Net Losses Under Private Insurance With an Upper Limit

Kaplow (1992b) shows that governments should not provide a tax deduction for net losses when a private insurance contract is available. However, his findings rest on the assumption that the private insurance is proportional coverage. We find that Kaplow's conclusions may not hold when the private insurance contract contains an upper limit. The findings of our article show that Kaplow's conclusions are sensitive to the assumption that the insurance contract is available in the private market.     

The Information Content of Bank Examinations

We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements.     

The Information Content of NAV Estimates

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper investigates whether analysts’ estimates of firm fundamental value transmit unique information to security markets. Previous work...     

Optimal Release of Information By Firms

This paper provides a positive theory of voluntary disclosure by firms. Previous theoretical work on disclosure of new information by firms has demonstrated that releasing public information will often make all shareholders worse off, due to an adverse risk-sharing effect. This paper uses a general equilibrium model with endogenous information collection to demonstrate that there exists a policy of disclosure of information which makes all shareholders better off than a policy of no disclosure. The welfare improvement occurs because of explicit information cost savings and improved risk sharing. This provides a positive theory of precommitment to disclosure, because it will be unanimously voted for by stockholders and will also represent the policy that will maximize value ex ante. In addition, it provides a “missing link” in financial signalling models. Apart from the effects on information production analyzed in this paper, most existing financial signalling models are inconsistent with a firm taking actions which facilitate future signalling because release of the signal makes all investors worse off.     

国际税收情报的证据效力

国际税收情报是缔约国的主管机关相互交换的税收信息。它对于加强国际税收征管,减少税收逃避行为具有非常重要的作用。但是,在现实执法过程中,国际税收情报如何具体运用,是否是证据,是否具有证据效力,是否可以直接作为定案的依据等问题尚没有明确的法律规定。本文就国际税收情报的证据效力问题进行初步的分析和探讨,认为税务机关应当正确认识国家税收情报的性质,一方面应重视其提供的信息和线索,另一方面又不能直接把国际税收情报作为定案的证据。     

The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs

Contrary to the implications of many payout theories, we find that announcements of open‐market share repurchase programs are not followed by an increase in operating performance. However, we find that repurchasing firms experience a significant reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital relative to non‐repurchasing firms. Further, consistent with the free cash‐flow hypothesis, we find that the market reaction to share repurchase announcements is more positive among those firms that are more likely to overinvest. Finally, we find evidence to indicate that investors underreact to repurchase announcements because they initially underestimate the decline in cost of capital.     

Acquisitions and the Information Environment of Firms

This paper investigates how acquisitions affect analyst following of firms. Analyst following increases as a result of a merger. However, all of that increase can be attributed to the changes in firm-specific characteristics resulting from the merger. Changes in analyst following around mergers are positively related to changes in firm size, expenditures on R&D, and the ratio of book to the market value of equity. Finally, the relatedness of merger appears to be an important determinant of analyst following of firms engaged in acquisitions.     

税收征管中的信息不对称研究

信息不对称尤其是纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称给税收征管带来很大的危害。结合我国的实际情况,解决此问题的有效手段包括:加大检查和惩罚力度;畅通信息渠道;改善信用制度。     

Information Losses in a Dynamic Model of Credit

This paper examines dynamic information losses associated with loan terminations. We assume that the aggregated returns of current borrowers contain information about the mean returns to future borrowers. In a competitive loan market, the value of this information is not fully internalized by individual borrowers and lenders, and loan decisions fail to be first best. Introducing heterogeneous borrowers, who know their own risk characteristics better than lenders, safer borrowers are less willing to borrow when risk premia rise. As they cease borrowing, the information generated in credit markets becomes noisier and this tends to increase risk premia. The model produces alternating and persistent periods of “tight” and “loose” credit.