首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
This paper studies the appropriateness of a public or private orientation of pension systems in the light of the recent financial crisis, which has underscored the difficulties and contradictions associated with each system. The different institutional arrangements, in which public or private pension systems are embedded, are key components when assessing their responses to the crisis. Particularly, private pension systems are intertwined with financial markets, while social insurance-based pension systems are linked to the labour market mechanisms. This paper compares the British and French pension systems, as “archetypes” of private-oriented and public-oriented systems, respectively, the first relying on the market and private pension schemes, and the second on mandatory social insurance. This paper shows that the crisis has upheld the founding principles of the public (French) and private (British) pension systems to maintain the existing institutional configurations. At the same time, both systems have strengthened the role played by means-tested benefits and minimum pensions for low-income groups to offset the weaknesses of one or the other system, as emphasised by the crisis.  相似文献   

2.
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.  相似文献   

3.
We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits.  相似文献   

4.
This paper departs from previous literature by considering a mixed oligopoly with two countries each with public and private firms competing in a single market. This differs from the traditional framework of examining a single domestic market in which foreign and domestic firms compete and is motivated, in part, by international airline markets but serves to characterise many markets. The resulting equilibrium emphasises that the strategic interaction of the two public firms usually serves to reduce welfare. Thus, the usual reason to imagine a public firm in a mixed oligopoly, to enhance welfare, is lost when such firms compete in the interest of their respective countries.  相似文献   

5.
This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).  相似文献   

6.
This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.  相似文献   

7.
This article addresses two research questions, firstly to test the hypothesis that organisational and technological changes are more likely to occur in the traded goods sector, in the private sector relative to the public sector and in more competitive product markets. Secondly, to examine whether trade unions have a positive or negative effect on the implementation of different types of workplace reforms, and organisational and technological changes. The analysis supports the hypothesis that workplaces in the traded goods sector are more likely to implement organisational and technological changes. It also indicates that workplaces in the private sector are more likely to implement certain types of reforms, whereas workplaces in the public sector are more likely to implement others. However, this study does not provide conclusive evidence that competitive pressure in product markets increases the probability that a firm will implement each workplace reform mentioned in this study. The evidence on unions provides tentative support to the view that more unionised workplaces are less likely to implement the reforms in question.  相似文献   

8.
Market economists are thought to wield tremendous power—not only over financial markets but over governments that stray from the ‘market way’. Still, there is mystery about what economists think, and how they form their judgements. This article reports results from a survey of over 50 financial market economists from leading financial institutions in Australia conducted in December 2003 and January 2004. It provides insight into the opinions of economists who impact on markets and policy, especially through media commentary. The article identifies their economic and social views, comparing them with the Australian public. We then examine how professional views of economists differ from their personal views. Differences in professional and private views—especially over the role of government and labour markets—are an opportunity to ponder how judgements are formed and used. We offer tentative answers to the question: do these professionals—highly paid for their opinions—occasionally self‐censor?  相似文献   

9.
We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is possible for both market power and private information to lead to lower total costs than competition, but generally the differences between the three market structures will be small. We also conduct an optimal scale analysis of nitrogen pollution from waste water treatment plants (WWTP) into North Carolina's Neuse River System. An economic model of damages and abatement costs is integrated with a hydro-ecological model of nitrogen flow through the Neuse. We determine the optimal number of trading zones and allocate the WWTP into these zones. Under the most likely regulatory scenario, we find cost savings of 1.55 million dollars per year under the optimal market design relative to the typical 303(d) regulation in which the WWTP are not allowed to trade.  相似文献   

10.
This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.  相似文献   

11.
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the work of Douglass North and Karl Polanyi regarding financial institutions associated in market economies. Both implicitly acknowledge the synergy between public and private financial markets, which can serve to solidify an alliance between wealth holders and the state, potentially at the expense of “sociery” at large. This alliance may stimulate growth, according to North, as well as impose the strain of the market, according to Polanyi. Taken together, these insights undercut the classical story of the neutral role of money, as well as the notion of a clear distinction between public and private, politics and markets.  相似文献   

12.
In this paper we use a survey of 281 Czech, Hungarian and Polish newly-established small private firms in order to shed some light on the constraints these firms face in the credit market. The results of our survey show that imperfections in capital markets in Central European economies do not seem to actually inhibit the growth of new private firms. Credit markets do exist for de novo private firms in the three Central European transition economies studied, and they provide quite a large amount of financing from an early stage of the existence of firms. Financial intermediation works reasonably well as far as de novo private firms are concerned: loss-making de novo firms have a lower probability of getting credit than profitable ones. Banks protect themselves against the risk of a deteriorating pool of borrowers by requiring collateral for their loans. We do not find convincing evidence concerning the existence of adverse selection. Loss-making firms are not ready to pay higher interest rates than profitable firms and are not more likely to ask for credit than profitable firms.  相似文献   

13.
Using an overlapping generations model, we show that the impact of private financing of education on growth depends on credit market development, being positive when credit markets are adequately developed but negative if sufficiently low levels of credit market development occur alongside relatively high private financing intensities. Employing cross-country data, we find that reduced-form growth relationships are statistically significant and robust under various controls and samples. We also lay out conditions under which economies with missing credit markets are dynamically efficient and outperform, in terms of growth, economies with complete credit markets. The latter may explain large cross-country differences in savings and growth, while facilitating the evaluation of policies on financing education.  相似文献   

14.
本文基于中国特有的融资环境,考察内部控制在增发融资中的作用以及受到政府监管的影响。本文对于2008—2011年提出增发申请的上市公司进行研究发现,由于公开增发比定向增发受到的监管更加严格,选择公开增发申请的公司偏少,但是其内部控制质量普遍高于选择定向增发申请的公司。然而,高质量的内部控制并没有提高公开增发申请的证监会审核通过率,而是提高了定向增发申请的审核通过率。并且,在增发申请方式的选择上,内部控制质量高的公司倾向于选择公开增发的方式。最后,高质量的内部控制提高了定向增发后的经营业绩。这表明,尽管受到政府监管的差异化影响,内部控制在公司增发融资中仍然扮演着积极的作用。  相似文献   

15.
We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means‐test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost‐effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their cost–benefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost‐effectiveness equilibrium than the means‐test equilibrium.  相似文献   

16.
The dramatic government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September, 2008 was motivated in part by a desire to ensure a continued flow of credit to the mortgage market. This study examines a closely related issue: the extent to which GSE activity crowds out mortgage purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. Evidence of substantial crowd out suggests that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, whereas the absence of crowd out implies that GSE loan purchases enhance liquidity.Using 1994–2008 HMDA data for conventional, conforming sized loans, three distinct periods with regard to GSE crowd out are apparent. From 1994 to 2003, the share of loans sold to the secondary market increased from 60 to over 90%, private sector and GSE market shares of loan purchases were roughly similar for most market segments, and IV estimates indicate relatively little GSE crowd out of private secondary market purchases. From 2004 to 2006, private loan purchases boomed and dominated those of the GSEs, while IV estimates indicate crowd out jumped to 50% at the peak of the boom. This is especially true in the market for home purchase as opposed to refinance loans. With the crash in housing and mortgage markets in 2007, private sector intermediaries pulled back, the GSEs regained market share, and evidence of GSE crowd out disappeared in both the home purchase loan and refinance markets. These patterns suggest that the degree of GSE crowd out varies with market conditions and that the federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac likely served to enhance liquidity to the mortgage market during the 2007–2009 financial crisis.  相似文献   

17.
The private pension structure in the United States, once dominated by defined benefit (DB) plans, is currently divided between defined contribution (DC) and DB plans. Wealth accumulation in DC plans depends on a participant's contribution behavior and on financial market returns, while accumulation in DB plans is sensitive to a participant's labor market experience and to plan parameters. This paper simulates the distribution of retirement wealth under representative DB and DC plans. It uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore how asset returns, earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the variation in retirement wealth outcomes. We simulate DC plan accumulation by randomly assigning individuals a share of wages that they and their employer contribute to the plan. We consider several possible asset allocation strategies, with asset returns drawn from the historical return distribution. Our DB plan simulations draw earnings histories from the HRS, and randomly assign each individual a pension plan drawn from a sample of large private and public defined benefit plans. The simulations yield distributions of both DC and DB wealth at retirement. Average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceed average accruals under private sector DB plans, although DC plans are also more likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with more generous public sector DB plans is less definitive, because public sector DB plans are more generous on average than their private sector DB counterparts.  相似文献   

18.
Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).  相似文献   

19.
We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.  相似文献   

20.
Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号