Existence of a Condorcet Winner When Voters Have Other‐Regarding Preferences

In standard political economy models, voters are “self‐interested” that is, care only about “own” utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have “other‐regarding preferences” (ORP), that is, in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit “envy” and “altruism,” in addition to the standard concern for “own utility.” We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.     

Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model*

This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy‐making authority at the time. A rule‐of‐succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict—class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences—are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision‐making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules‐of‐succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation.     

DOES RELIGIOSITY AFFECT SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL COMPROMISE?

Does religiosity affect adherents' attitude toward political compromise? To address this question and overcome the potential simultaneity of religious activity and political attitudes, we exploit exogenous variation in the start date of the Selichot (“Forgiveness”), a period in which many Jews, including nonadherents, take part in an intense prayer schedule. Using a two‐wave survey, we find that an increase in the salience of religiosity leads to the adoption of more hard‐line positions against a land‐for‐peace compromise. Examining several potential mechanisms for this attitudinal shift, our evidence points to the impact of the intensified prayer period on adherents' tolerance for risk.     

Consumers’ preferences for a local food product: a real choice experiment

This paper analyses consumers’ preferences for a local food in Spain and assesses their willingness to pay (WTP) using a real choice experiment to mitigate possible hypothetical bias. In particular, preferences for fresh lamb meat were investigated and two attributes evaluated, “locally grown” and the type of lamb meat. Data came from an experiment conducted in Spain during 2009. An error component random Parameter model with correlated errors was used to estimate the effect of the attributes on consumers’ utility and derive their WTP. Results suggest that consumers positively value both attributes and are willing to pay a premium of 9 % price increase for the “locally grown” lamb meat (“Ojinegra from Teruel”) and 13 % price increase for the “Ternasco” lamb meat. If we assume a market where only “Ternasco” lamb meat without indication of the local origin is sold, and then a new “Ternasco” lamb is introduced in the market with the “Ojinegra from Teruel” label, this new local lamb meat would capture 18 % of the market if the package is assumed to be sold at 3.5 \(\hbox {C}\!\!\!\!\!=\) and a 10 % market share if the package is assumed to be sold at 4 \(\hbox {C}\!\!\!\!\!=\) .     

REVEALED POLITICAL POWER

When is a polity biased? Consider an “outsider” who observes policy data but observes neither citizens’ preferences nor the underlying distribution of political power. He views political power as if it were derived from wealth‐weighted voting, where the weights determine the wealth bias. Positive weights favor the rich whereas negative ones favor the poor. We show that any policy data is rationalized by any wealth‐weighted system. However, policy and polling observations together imply explicit bounds on the set of rationalizing biases. Accumulated data narrows this band. The inferential model is consistent with models of political competition for campaign contributions.     

Household willingness to pay and income pooling: A comment

We demonstrate some problems with Munro 2005 (“Household willingness to pay equals individual willingness to pay if and only if the household income pools”, Economics Letters 88, 227-230). Furthermore, we reconsider income pooling in a slightly changed framework and prove: Income pooling implies that household willingness to pay is equal to minimal individual willingness to pay. The converse is not true.     

Eliciting the core of a supermodular capacity

Summary. The paper utilizes duality theory to derive an exact representation of the core of a supermodular capacity for finite-state-space Choquet expected utility preferences. Using the dual representation we develop an algorithm that uses information on willingness to pay and willingness to sell to elicit a supermodular capacity in a finite number of iterations.Received: 21 February 2003, Revised: 26 May 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81. Correspondence to: Robert G. ChambersThe authors thank J. Quiggin and an anonymous referee for comments that improved the paper.     

Decentralization via Federal and Unitary Referenda

This paper studies a model where the power to set policy (a choice of project) may be assigned to central or regional government via either a federal or unitary referendum. The benefit of central provision is an economy of scale, while the cost is political inefficiency. The relationship between federal and unitary referenda is characterized in the asymptotic case as the number of regions becomes large, under the assumption that the median project benefit in any region is a random draw from a fixed distribution, G. Under some symmetry assumptions, the relationship depends only on the shape of G, not on how willingness to pay is distributed within regions. The relationship to Cremer and Palfrey's “principle of aggregation” is established. Asymptotic results on the efficiency of the two referenda are also proved.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

Bargaining and Boldness

We study a multiperson bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of Shaked's game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown. If preferences are “smooth,” then as the risk of breakdown vanishes, the limiting outcome is one in which bargainers are equally marginally bold; where a bargainer's marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a marginal improvement in his position. Under smoothness, any (ordinal-)Nash solution is an equally marginally bold outcome. However, unlike the concept of the (ordinal-)Nash solution, a unique equally marginally bold outcome exists in natural cases—in particular, if all bargainers have risk-averse preferences of the rank-dependent expected utility type. For these preferences, the equally marginally bold outcome maximizes a “bargaining power”-adjusted (asymmetric) Nash product where the degree of asymmetry is determined by the disparity in the marginal valuation of certainty among bargainers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D81.     

Willingness to Pay and Sensitivity to Time Framing: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application on Car Safety

Stated preference (SP) surveys attempt to obtain monetary values for non-market goods that reflect individuals’ “true” preferences. Numerous empirical studies suggest that monetary values from SP studies are sensitive to survey design and so may not reflect respondents’ true preferences. This study examines the effect of time framing on respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for car safety. We explore how WTP per unit risk reduction depends on the time period over which respondents pay and face reduced risk in a theoretical model and by using data from a Swedish contingent valuation survey. Our theoretical model predicts the effect to be nontrivial in many scenarios used in empirical applications. In our empirical analysis we examine the sensitivity of WTP to an annual and a monthly scenario. Our theoretical model predicts the effect from the time framing to be negligible, but the empirical estimates from the annual scenario are about 70 % higher than estimates from the monthly scenario.     

Marginal Ethos and the Just Price

The century-long decline in the amount of time spent working for income has been reversed over the last twenty-five years. By one account, this reversal is primarily traceable to a rise in the power fo employers who find more work hours per employee to be in their interest. By another account, that I argue to be the more convincing, the major cause of the change is the growing sophisticated of advertising and marketing which has stimulated demand and led to voluntarydecisions to work more. Education is presented as an example of the effects that rising “marketization” has on a product's nature. Decreased hours of study and grade inflation are offered as two examples of the crowding out of production for oneself at the expense of production for sale in the market. While no attempt is made to draw clear normative conclusions regarding educational trends, the paper concludes with a normative assessment of the trend toward greater time spent in the workplace. I argue that the historically recent rise of “workaholism” suggests that for at least a portion of the workforce, market forces have created preferences to work more that are ranked lower than what they replace; that the overworked American is too often one in the grip of an unpreferred preference regarding work.     

A fair share: Burden-sharing preferences in the United States and China

Using a sequential discrete choice experiment, we investigate preferences for distributing the economic burden of reducing CO₂ emissions in the two largest CO₂-emitting countries: the United States and China. We asked respondents about their preferences for four burden-sharing rules to reduce CO₂ emissions according to their country's relative (1) historical emissions, (2) income level, (3) emissions per capita, and (4) current emissions. We found that respondents overall favored the rule that was least costly for their country. In addition, the willingness to pay was much higher in China, suggesting that how mitigation costs are shared across countries is more important for Chinese than for Americans. To some extent the willingness to pay varies with socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes. For example, university-educated respondents in the United States are willing to pay more for the rule that is the least costly for their own country, compared with those with a lower education level. At the same time, the ranking of the two most preferred rules are generally robust across all socioeconomic groups within each country.     

WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY FOR SPORTING SUCCESS OF FOOTBALL BUNDESLIGA TEAMS

This study shows that fans and people living in the region of 28 Football Bundesliga teams from all three divisions are willing to support their team financially. Survey respondents were asked for their willingness‐to‐pay to avoid a negative outcome (e.g., relegation) and to achieve a positive outcome (e.g., promotion). Fan bonds are applied as an alternative payment vehicle within the contingent valuation method. The results show that different factors affect the decision to support the team and the actual amount of willingness‐to‐pay—for attendees and nonattendees. Public goods are particularly relevant for reporting a positive willingness‐to‐pay. (JEL Z23, L83, H41)     

Children’s Snacks,their Ads and Consumer Sovereignty

Abstract

The concept of sovereign consumer preferences is challenged from three sides: child consumers, unhealthy food and advertising. The two theoretical concepts of merit goods and libertarian paternalism are implemented in order to classify situations in which full consumer sovereignty does not apply. An empirical analysis of ads for children’s snacks reveals the libertarian paternalist perspective as helpful for understanding the demand for and justification of ‘soft’ governmental intervention in the case of the advertised snacks, whilst the ads for these snacks may well be demerit goods. The banning or heavy taxation of these ads is therefore advocated.     

VALUATION OF WILDLIFE: REVISING SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SCOPE TESTS

In this article, we build on previous valuation studies to contribute to the understanding of preferences toward conservation of endangered species elicited via willingness to pay. In particular, we assess the effect of the existence of biological substitutes of local endangered species. We also incorporate biological concepts such as the minimum viable population level into the valuation scenario. Furthermore, the role of ethical and environmental beliefs and their relationship with preferences toward conservation levels are explored. Results are discussed and contrasted with previous studies . ( JEL Q2)     

Redistribution under general decision rules

We study the political economy of redistribution over a broad class of decision rules. We suggest a simple and elegant procedure to select a robust equilibrium from the multiplicity in the core. Equilibrium policy depends on the full income profile, and, importantly, the preferences of two decisive voters. We show that the effect of increasing inequality depends on the decision rule and the shape of the income distribution; redistribution will increase if both decisive voters are “relatively poor,” and decrease if at least one is sufficiently “rich.” Additionally, redistribution decreases as the polity adopts increasingly stringent super-majority rules.     

Intergenerational Correlations of Extreme Right‐Wing Party Preferences and Attitudes toward Immigration

In this paper, we analyze the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right‐wing preferences and attitudes toward immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right‐wing extremism are their parents' right‐wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes toward immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right‐wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right‐wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.     

DO PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCKS AFFECT FINANCIAL RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR? A STUDY OF U.S. VETERANS

Traditional economic theories assume that individuals are endowed with certain risk preferences that are unaltered by experiences. However, recent evidence indicates that macroeconomic shocks do have an effect on an individual's willingness to take financial risks. In the context of investment decisions, we examine empirically whether an individual's risk preferences are affected by other types of traumatic life experiences. Using a unique proprietary data set, we investigate whether personal traumatic experiences—such as the combat experiences of veterans—have long‐term effects on financial risk‐taking behavior. We find that having experienced combat decreases the probability of investing in risky assets. Key policy implications are noted. (JEL G11, D14)