Welfare State and Welfare Society

This paper updates and extends my earlier work on how the middle class fares throughout the world based on the microdata sets that comprise the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Wave #6 LIS data, recently released and centered around 2004, provides an opportunity to assess what has happened to the size of the middle class around the world in the early 2000s. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, there was no noticeable decline in the middle class during the early 2000s. The paper provides further evidence that the size of the middle class in each nation depends mainly on government tax and spending policies. In particular, it shows the key role played by family allowances and paid family leave in supporting a national middle class.     

Decentralized Governance,Constitution Formation,and Redistribution

What determines the relative strength of central and regional governments? Why do centers engage in more or less geographically based economic redistribution? And why do some centers redistribute from urban to rural areas while others do the opposite? This research answers these questions with reference to decentralized politics at key constitutional moments. Much contemporary research underscores the importance of the intergovernmental balance of power – be it in taxing authority or decision making autonomy – on economic outcomes. Many features of that balance are rooted in bargains struck at the time of constitution writing. Here, I suggest that the key ingredients in such bargains are the number of conflicting geographically salient factor endowments, the distribution of inter-regional inequality, and the degree of intra-state inequality within rural and urban regions. The greater the level of factoral conflict, the more elites who engage in constitutional negotiations are likely to constrain the central government by providing for substantial regional veto authority. Higher levels of inter-regional inequality heighten demands for inter-regional redistribution. Given some level of regional demand for central redistribution, whether its net effect is in favor of urban or rural regions will depend on the coalitional implications of inequality within regions. I examine the argument in light of the U.S., Argentine, and Indian processes of constitution formation.     

Income Distribution and the Demand Constraint

This paper argues thatthe interaction between inequality and the demand patterns forgoods is a potential source of persistent inequality. Incomedistribution, in the presence of non-homothetic preferences,affects the demand for goods and, due to differences in factorintensities across sectors, it alters the return to factors ofproduction and the initial distribution of income. Low inequalityleads to high demand for medium skilled intensive goods, providinga bridge over which low skill dynasties may transition to thehigh-skilled sector in the long run. Under high inequality however,the initial lack of demand for medium skilled labor breachesthis bridge from poverty to prosperity and inequality persists.     

分税制改革以来我国税制的公平功能分析

税收的公平功能是我国社会各界所关注的热点。我国以间接税为主、直接税为辅的税制结构使得整体税制表现出累退性,进一步扩大了居民收入差距。个人所得税公平功能的缺失以及各税种具体设计上的不足也是我国税制累退的重要原因。1994年以来,我国整体税制的公平功能虽呈改善趋势,但程度并不明显。为增强税制公平功能,建议降低增值税税率,扩大消费税征收范围,强化个税征管,改革个税征收模式,并提高直接税在税制中的地位。     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:
Grzegorz W., Kolodko, Post-Communist Transition: The Thorny Road
Andrzej, Kozminski and George, Yip, Strategies for Central and Eastern Europe
Vojmir, Franicevic and Milica, Uvalic, Equality, Participation, Transition Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat
Jan, Adam, Social Cost of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-Socialist Countries; The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary
Irwin, Collier; Herwig, Roggemann; Oliver, Scholz and Horst, Tomann, Welfare States in Transition: East and West     

Education for the masses? The interaction between wealth,educational and political inequalities

This paper presents a simple model of distribution dynamics, in which the distributions of wealth, education and political power are circularly endogenous. Different levels of education translate into different income and wealth levels. Political power may (or may not) vary with wealth, and in turn affects decisions on the level of public expenditure on education. Since the market for education credit is imperfect, some people might need to rely on public schooling, the quality of which depends on those expenditure levels. As a result, educational opportunities differ along the wealth distribution. The dynamic system displays multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by a vicious circle of interaction between educational, wealth and political inequalities. These particular equilibria, which are more unequal, are also shown to be inefficient in terms of aggregate output levels. Switching equilibria may be achieved through redistribution of political power.
JEL classification: D31, D63.     

Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Evidence from American Data

While most cross-country studies find a negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth, studies that use panel data suggest the presence of a positive relationship between inequality and growth. This paper uses a cross-state panel for the United States to assess the relationship between inequality and growth. Using both standard fixed effects and GMM estimations, this paper does not find evidence of a positive relationship between inequality and growth but finds some evidence in support of a negative relationship between inequality and growth. The paper, however, shows that the relationship between inequality and growth is not robust and that small differences in the method used to measure inequality can result in large differences in the estimated relationship between inequality and growth.     

Decomposition of bivariate inequality indices by attributes

We provide, for the class of relative bidimensional inequality indices, a decomposition of inequality into two univariate Atkinson–Kolm–Sen indices and a third statistic which depends on the joint distribution of resources.     

Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.     

Differences in Work Hours and Hours Preferences by Race in the U.S.

Significant differences exist in actual and preferred work hours by race. Specifically, black males work 20 percent fewer annual hours than white males. The differences between black and white women are small. Black workers are significantly more likely than white workers to prefer additional work and fewer are satisfied with their current hours of work. I use the hours-inequality hypothesis of Bell and Freeman (1995,1997) to evaluate the extent to which race differences in work hours and hours preferences are related to race differences in incentives. I demonstrate that whereas white workers work longer hours in response to overall wage variation in their relevant labor market cell, black workers react to the wage variation among black workers but not to the variation overall. The fact that labor market incentives are different for otherwise similar black and white workers is difficult to reconcile with standard competitive theory.