Auditors’ going concern reporting accuracy during and after the global financial crisis

Motivated by concerns that one of the reasons for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is poor quality auditing, this study examines the accuracy of going concern modifications for a sample of United States (U.S.) companies in the pre-GFC (2005–2006), GFC (2007–2008), and post-GFC (2009–2010) periods. The results show that the type I misclassification is lower during the GFC but not different in the post-GFC period compared with the pre-GFC period. The type II misclassification is not significantly different in the GFC and post-GFC periods compared with the pre-GFC period. Additionally, the results suggest that non-Big 4 auditors, compared with Big 4 auditors, have become more conservative on clients’ going concern problems in the post-GFC period, which reduces their type II misclassification.     

Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting quality?

As a result of the global financial crisis (GFC), several audit clients were able to negotiate lower audit fees for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the PCAOB has expressed concern that lower audit fees might lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality and financial reporting quality. This study examines the relation between audit fee cuts and banks’ financial reporting quality. Specifically, we focus on earnings management via loan loss provisions (LLP), the relation between current period LLP and future loan charge-offs, i.e., LLP validity, and the timely recognition of loan losses. For banks audited by Big 4 auditors, we find that income-increasing abnormal LLP are decreasing in audit fee cuts and LLP validity is increasing in audit fee cuts. For banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors, LLP validity is higher for banks that received a fee cut of more than 25% relative to other banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We do not observe an association between timely loan loss recognition and cuts in audit fees except for banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors and exempt from internal control audits where a fee cut of more than 25% is associated with less timely loan loss recognition. Overall, the findings suggest that Big 4 auditors constrained earnings management via LLP in banks that received cuts in audit fees. Our findings have important implications for regulators, investors, and others.     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.     

Non-audit Service Fees and Audit Quality: The Impact of Auditor Specialization

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on audit quality is conditional on auditor industry specialization. Industry specialist auditors are more likely than nonspecialists to be concerned about reputation losses and litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of non‐audit services. We find evidence that audit quality measured by increased propensity to issue going‐concern opinion, increased propensity to miss analysts' forecasts, as well as higher earnings‐response coefficients increases with the level of non‐audit services acquired from industry specialist auditors compared to nonspecialist auditors.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

An empirical analysis of audit fee price competition after the Korean 1999 Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act

This study examines the audit service market in Korea after the 1999 Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act to determine if increased competition has led to audit fee discounting. Until 19 December 2001, when the Korean government enacted The Financial Supervisory Regulations, researchers could not address questions related to price competition in the Korean audit market due to data limitations. The new regulations allow researchers to examine audit effort for the first time because both audit hours and audit fees are now recommended disclosures. We use audit fee data of Korean companies for the 6-year period 1999–2004, and find evidence that total audit fees paid have been increasing but audit fees per hour have been decreasing. We also find that Big 5 auditing firms’ fees per hour are significantly lower than non-Big 5 auditing firms and are decreasing across time. These price pressures should be of concern to regulators and investors because prior research has demonstrated that price competition leads to discounting, which can result in unrealistically low audit fees and poor audit quality. Finally, as in previous research, we also find discounting of initial audit engagements in the Korean market.     

Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.     

PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality

With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), audit firm oversight shifted away from self-regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected auditors, we find that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower audit quality when the reports are seriously deficient (weaker results for deficient reports). More specifically, we find clients of triennially inspected auditors that receive a deficient or seriously deficient report are associated with significantly higher abnormal current accruals and clients of auditors that receive a seriously deficient report are associated with a greater propensity to restate. Our evidence is subject to the caveat that PCAOB reports for triennially inspected auditors do not capture the going concern aspect of audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the results are conflicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality during the period inspected for annually inspected auditors.     

An investigation of recent changes in going concern reporting decisions among Big N and non-Big N auditors

Corporate accounting failures and regulatory proceedings that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 increased the scrutiny of auditors. We investigate whether these events resulted in a change in auditor behavior with respect to going concern reporting. Generally speaking, we find that non-Big N auditors became more conservative while Big N auditors became more accurate. Specifically, non-Big N auditors issued more going concern opinions to both failing and non-failing clients post-2001, reducing their Type II misclassifications at the expense of increased Type I misclassifications. However, Big N auditors decreased their Type I misclassifications with no corresponding increase in Type II misclassifications. Thus, our findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny resulted in performance improvements in the area of going concern reporting primarily for larger auditors. For smaller auditors, improved going concern accuracy for subsequently bankrupt clients came at the cost of more going concern opinions being issued to subsequently non-failing clients.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Do supply shocks in the audit partner labor market affect auditor choice? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

We examine whether supply shocks in the audit partner labor market induce clients to switch audit partners. We argue that audit partners in their early careers (i.e., junior partners) charge low audit fees to attract clients, which induces client firms to switch from senior partners to junior partners when there are more junior partners available. Utilizing the Big4 localization policy, we find that Big4 clients are more likely to replace senior auditors with junior auditors to cut costs after the policy. Furthermore, the results are mainly driven by clients who are charged high fees. Our empirical evidence enriches the understanding of auditor choice determinants and informs the ongoing debates surrounding new regulations for Big4 firms in China.     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

Further evidence on mandatory partner rotation and audit pricing: a supply‐side perspective

This study examines effects of mandatory partner rotation (MPR) on audit fees of Australian‐listed companies. Using a fee changes approach, evidence of fee increases in year of the MPR driven by smaller offices of non‐Big 4 auditors is found, consistent with supply‐side resource constraint arguments. Broadly consistent findings are observed using a fee levels approach. Appointment of inexperienced partners to MPR engagements has no discernible effect on fees. Additional analysis of audit reporting lag indicates fee increases reflect additional audit effort as opposed to a pricing strategy. Overall, the evidence supports recent moves by policy‐makers to soften MPR requirements.     

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock‐return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going‐concern audit opinions (GCO).     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

Client importance and non-Big 5 auditors’ reporting decisions

In this paper, we examine the effect of the trade-off between economic dependence and reputation protection on the link between client size and the audit reporting decisions of non-Big 5 auditors. We find that non-Big 5 auditors, like Big 5 auditors, do not allow their larger clients greater leeway to manage earnings. In fact, there is some evidence that non-Big 5 auditors treat their larger clients more strictly. In addition, non-Big 5 auditors, like Big 5 auditors, are at least as likely to issue a going-concern report to their potentially financially distressed larger clients as they are to their otherwise smaller clients.     

Audit quality effects of the PCAOB's 2006 tax service restrictions

In 2004 and 2005, use of aggressive tax services provided by a company's auditor had become so broadly concerning that it was the focus of a PCAOB roundtable and discussed in a Congressional subcommittee investigation report (PCAOB, 2004 and US Senate, 2005). Although auditor provision of these and other nonaudit services to issuer audit clients was restricted in 2006, research on the effectiveness of these restrictions finds that they did not impact audit quality (Notbohm, Paterson and Valencia, 2015 and Lennox, 2016). We reexamine this issue with a focus on the audit quality effects for the engagements most impacted by the restrictions-Big 4 audit clients with pre-restriction tax service fees of at least $100,000 that fell by at least 75% following the restrictions. Using a difference-in-difference framework and two proxies for audit quality, we find evidence of the effectiveness of the PCAOB's 2006 restrictions among those clients. Additionally, we find these results are sensitive to the level of pre-restriction tax service fees, with the restatement (going concern) effect of the restrictions strengthening (weakening) in the pre-restriction tax service fee level. We also find that the effects of these restrictions are concentrated among clients of Big 4 auditors rather than clients of the 2nd tier or 3rd tier auditors. Results of additional analyses indicate that audit quality, as measured by the probability of restatement, was lower in the pre-restriction period for purchasers than for non-purchasers. Our results are robust to a barrage of sensitivity tests. Our findings contribute to the continued regulator discussion about the proper level and types of allowable tax nonaudit services.