Tournaments with gaps

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents. Under unlimited liability, the principal strictly benefits from a gap by partially insuring the agents and thereby reducing labor costs. If the agents are protected by limited liability, the principal sticks to the standard tournament.     

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AWARENESS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS,AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We explore the significance of general equilibrium feedback effects for wage‐bargaining. We examine a two‐sector economy and show that if agents only consider labor demand effects low real wages and low unemployment are the consequences. With an intermediate view, i.e., when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are perceived simultaneously, we once again obtain a situation with low wages and unemployment. The results may explain why unemployment is high in some European countries.     

Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies

We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations, and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection. The severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs, which is working for wages. This links credit, product and labor markets. A rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem. These multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria. If it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones. However, if screening is possible, e.g., if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans, then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes.     

Compensating Wage Differentials for Schooling Risk in Denmark*

In this paper we analyse the association between wage differentials and risk using detailed information on length and type of education as seen in Danish administrative registers. Our contribution to the literature is that we distinguish between transitory (time‐series) and permanent (cross‐sectional) income shocks, and estimate the compensation for both sorts of risk. We find that wage risk in a given education cell is associated with higher wages, while skewness is associated with lower wages. As a robustness check, we see that ad hoc risk measures based on earnings‐mobility indicators confirm these findings.     

Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium

This paper studies how promotion tournaments motivate workers to accumulate human capital when wages are constrained by outside labor markets. Patient firms can retain some control over tournament prizes through a relational contract, but if the firms are competitive, full efficiency does not obtain in equilibrium even for discount factors arbitrarily close to one. Full efficiency, however, may be feasible in firms with superior technologies; thus, technological efficiency breeds incentive efficiency. The paper also shows that a wage floor leads to insufficient human capital investment in competitive firms, but could lead to excessive investment in technologically superior firms.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.     

Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size–Wage Relation

This paper provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed size–wage effect and inter-industry wage differences. It develops a model in which incentives for workers to accumulate general human capital are provided by corporate tournaments, where workers with the highest level of general human capital win promotions. Given that the prizes in such tournaments are determined by outside market conditions, the investment and the equilibrium wages depend on firm and industry characteristics. The model implies that workers in bigger firms and in more technology intensive and profitable firms and industries acquire more human capital and receive higher wages and benefits.     

Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality

We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop-out rates and there will be a persistent differences in wages between groups according to the starting states of their networks.     

Can Minimum Wages Raise Workers’ Incomes in the Long Run?

Using an intertemporal model of saving and capital accumulation with two types of agents we demonstrate that it is impossible for any binding minimum wage to increase the after‐tax incomes of workers if the production function is Cobb–Douglas with constant returns to scale, or if there are no differences in ability among workers. Moreover, it is impossible to increase the incomes of employed workers through minimum wage legislation, even under decreasing returns to scale and heterogeneity of ability among workers, unless the support provided to unemployed workers is far below what they would earn in the absence of minimum wages.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Networks of knowledge among unionized firms

Abstract.  We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.     

EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION INSIDE FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF WORKER COOPERATIVES

There is evidence that worker cooperatives provide a greater stabilization of employment compared to capital‐managed firms. While the reasons of this behaviour can be ascribed to their property and governance structure, less is known of the tools to put it into practice. I discuss two possible ways to guarantee employment insurance: by letting wages fluctuate, or by accumulating reinvested profits into an income stabilizing fund that copes with downturns without firing and without reducing wages. In this second case, I find out that asset locks play a wage smoothing role. This may explain the large share of profits that are reinvested in this indivisible and not appropriable fund. I provide evidence for this mechanism by means of original data at the firm level and of first‐hand collected survey data at the individual level on risk perception in a sample of Italian cooperatives.     

‘CHOOSE TO BE OPTIMISTIC,IT FEELS BETTER?’ EVIDENCE OF OPTIMISM ON EMPLOYMENT UTILITY

Individual's expected wages exceed predicted market wages. Rational expectations imply the divergence should be zero. If individuals over‐estimate the return from their attributes and view the paid‐employment return distribution too favourably, then conditional on market wages, subsequent employment utility is likely to be low through disappointment.     

Growth with many agents and wages paid ex ante

In this paper, we consider a one-sector model of economic growth with several infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents, who are endowed with diverse discount factors as well as preferences over consumption. In line with the classical Ramsey model, agents are not allowed to borrow against future income. Unlike the traditional assumption of ex post wage payment, wages are paid ex ante in our model. We first explain the difference between the assumptions of wages being paid ex ante and wages being paid ex post in the framework of a simple illustrative two-class model. Our main result shows that in contrast to the many-agent Ramsey model with ex post wage payment, the capital stock sequence converges to the steady state stock irrespective of production technology employed by the firms. Further, all impatient agents own zero capital stock, whereas the most patient agent owns the entire capital stock from some time onward. Thus, we have shown that a slight modification in the timing of wage payment in growth models can lead to significant changes in the stability properties of equilibrium dynamics.     

Income Taxation, Endogenous Factor Prices and Production Efficiency

In an analysis of a two‐type income tax model with endogenous wages, this paper shows that production efficiency is violated in the optimum with (i) non‐linear and (ii) linear income taxation if and only if a distortionary tax schedule is implemented. These findings complement earlier results of the literature. In passing, it is also shown that optima with non‐linear redistributive income taxation cannot be identified with the redistributive regime if the assumption of endogenous wages is taken seriously.     

Forms of Opportunism Between Principals and Agents

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia, such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined. Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged.     

WORKER INVESTMENTS IN SAFETY,WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS,AND COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS

The theory of compensating wage differentials (CWDs) assumes that firms supply and workers demand workplace safety, predicting a positive relationship between accident risk and wages. This article allows for safety provision by workers, which predicts a countervailing negative relationship between individual risk and wages: Firms pay higher wages for higher safety‐related productivity. Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel data and data on fatal and nonfatal accidents, our precise CWDs imply a value of a statistical injury of $45.4 thousand and a value of a statistical life of $6.3 million. In line with our model, individual risk and wages are negatively correlated.     

Does Outsourcing Always Benefit Skilled Labor?

This paper builds a dynamic product cycle model with three kinds of labor inputs—scientists, white‐collar workers, and blue‐collar workers—and producer heterogeneity to find an explanation for why outsourcing did not cause wage inequality in the 1970s. According to the theoretical model, outsourcing decreases the wages of white‐collar workers and the relative wages of white‐collar workers to blue‐collar workers in the outsourcing home country if outsourcing industries are blue‐collar worker intensive compared with non‐outsourcing industries. Scientists who conduct research and development always benefit from outsourcing.     

Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship

In the “Knightian” theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as occupational self-selection. Moral hazard prevents full insurance; increases in an agent's wealth then entail increases in risk borne. Thus, even under decreasing risk aversion, there are robust instances in which workers are wealthier than entrepreneurs. This empirically implausible result suggests that risk-based explanations for entrepreneurship are inadequate.     

Contest architecture

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists.