(Why) Do Central Banks Care about Their Profits?

We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.     

Bank efficiency and foreign ownership: Do good institutions matter?

This paper contributes to the literature on foreign ownership and bank efficiency by examining whether the efficiency of foreign banks depends on the institutional quality of the host country and on institutional differences between the home and host country. Using stochastic frontier analysis for a sample of 2095 commercial banks in 105 countries for the years 1998–2003, we find that foreign ownership negatively affects bank efficiency. However, in countries with good governance this negative effect is less pronounced. We also find that higher quality of the institutions in the home country and higher similarity between home and host country institutional quality reduce foreign bank inefficiency.     

Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation

This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations on the bank's fundamentals do not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank-specific information will be revealed, or when they learn that precise bank-specific information will not be revealed. The results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs. It also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs.     

Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank specific variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics. The model is estimated with annual data for an unbalanced panel of the 78 largest private banks in the world headquartered in 12 industrial countries over the period between 1992 and 2005. The results indicate that bank capital ratios are significantly affected in the hypothesized directions by most of the bank-specific variables. Several of the country characteristic and policy variables are also significant with the predicted sign: banks maintain higher capital ratios in home countries in which the bank sector is relatively smaller and in countries that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures.     

Do Not‐For‐Profits Need Their Own Conceptual Framework?

This paper raises the issue of whether not‐for‐profit (NFP) oganisations require a conceptual framework that acknowledges their mission imperative and enables them to discharge their broader accountability. Relying on publicly available documentation and literature, it suggests the current Conceptual Frameworks for the for‐profit and public sectors are inadequate in meeting the accountability needs of NFPs. A NFP‐specific conceptual framework would allow the demonstration of broader NFP‐specific accountability and the formulation of NFP‐appropriate reporting practice, including the provision of financial and non‐financial reporting. The paper thus theoretically challenges existing financial reporting arrangements and invites debate on their future direction.     

Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals

Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers’ preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks’ influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.     

How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector

Do past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.     

Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets

Based on a new daily data set for 20 emerging markets over the period 1992–2006, we examine the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock markets, and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes. We find that the replacement of a central bank governor negatively affects financial markets on the announcement day, which is in line with the hypothesis that newly appointed central bank governors suffer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning of their tenure. We also find some evidence that changes in perceived central bank independence affect markets.     

Bank Ownership and Lending: Does Bank Ownership Matter?

Using the Central and Eastern European (CEE) bank-level data covering 2004–12, this article examines the differences in foreign-owned banks’ loan growth and its determinants in comparison with privately-owned domestic banks. The results indicate the greatest differences in the context of bank capital and liquidity. Bank capital remains an important loan growth determinant only for domestic private banks during the non-crisis periods and bank liquidity is of greater importance to domestic private banks during the crisis periods. This highlights local regulatory authorities’ limited ability to harness loan growth and excessive risk-taking during the non-crisis periods and points at the benefits of multinational banking groups’ internal capital markets during the crisis periods.     

Bank risk in uncertain times: Do credit rationing and revenue diversification matter?

We show that bank risk rises, particularly for larger banks and those with greater interest-sensitive liabilities, during times of economic policy uncertainty through two economic channels: “credit rationing” and “revenue diversification.” The credit rationing channel shows that economic policy uncertainty increases aggregate loan spreads, exacerbating both adverse selection and moral hazard problems leading to higher bank risk. The revenue diversification channel suggests that as economic policy uncertainty reduces bank profits from traditional interest-based products, banks diversify into other non-traditional activities, thereby increasing their instability. Overall, our findings highlight the impact of economic policy uncertainty on exacerbating bank risk.     

Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings? Results from a Study of 72 Countries

Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998–2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature.     

Do uninformed traders move prices? Evidence from the Bank of Japan's ETF purchasing program

Using the Bank of Japan (BoJ) ETF purchasing program as an exogenous shock to stock demand, we find that stocks with a higher BoJ demand experience higher positive abnormal returns on BoJ ETF purchase dates, which only partially revert in the long term. Our findings support the hypothesis that stocks have a downward-sloping demand curve, implying that uninformed traders can cause a permanent shift in price.     

Does Competition Affect Bank Risk?

Although policymakers often discuss trade-offs between bank competition and stability, past research provides differing theoretical perspectives and empirical results on the impact of competition on risk. We employ a new approach for identifying exogenous changes in the competitive pressures facing individual banks and discover that an intensification of competition materially boosts bank risk. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that competition reduces banks’ profits, pricing power, and charter values and increases banks’ provision of nontraditional, riskier banking services and lending to riskier firms.     

Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?

In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks that allows us to explore the impact of interbank lending when exposures are long term and interbank borrowers are small banks. The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks.     

Do Business Borrowers Benefit from Bank Bailouts?: The Effects of TARP on Loan Contract Terms

We investigate benefits to business borrowers from bank bailouts, specifically the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Applying difference‐in‐difference methodology to loan‐level data, we find more favorable borrower contract terms in five dimensions, spread, amount, maturity, collateral, and covenants, suggesting increased credit supply at the intensive margin by bailed‐out banks. Findings are robust to dealing with endogeneity and other issues. Riskier borrowers benefit more, consistent with moral hazard exploitation. Small and unlisted borrowers benefit less, suggesting fewer benefits for financially constrained firms. Benefits accrue to both relationship and nonrelationship borrowers. Results contribute to the research and policy debates on bank bailouts.     

How Do Stock Markets in the US and Europe Price Efficiency Gains from Bank M&As?

This paper examines whether the stock markets price changes in operating efficiency as a result of bank mergers and if the premiums paid by the acquiring banks also reflect these changes. The sample covers mergers and acquisitions consummated in the US and Europe during the period of 1997 to 2003. Changes in cost and profit efficiency are calculated using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method 1 year prior and 3 years following the merger announcement. Evidence suggests a significant relation between the announcement-period abnormal returns and the post-merger profit efficiency changes. Results also indicate that bank managers are likely to pay a higher premium for those M&A transactions that can bring about greater efficiency gains, particularly on the profit side. Further, although acquirer shareholders in the US and Europe appear to react differently to the announcement of a bank merger, our results for target shareholders suggest that regional differences might be less important than the degree of capital market development in explaining wealth effects.     

Bank mergers: What should policymakers do?

These remarks discuss why the “cluster” of financial services and local banking markets are still relevant for antitrust analysis in banking. A key portion of the Federal Reserve’s Order approving the NationsBank–Barnett merger is interpreted, and the extent to which antitrust is a practical constraint on the development of a nationwide banking structure is commented upon.     

Do Declines in Bank Health Affect Borrowers’ Voluntary Disclosures? Evidence from International Propagation of Banking Shocks

I examine whether declines in banks’ financial health affect their borrowers’ disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining bank health, change their public disclosures of forward‐looking information. Using the emerging‐market financial crises in the late 1990s as shocks to the health of certain U.S. banks, I find that affected banks’ U.S. borrowers increase both the quantity and informativeness of their management forecasts following these shocks compared to borrowers of unaffected banks. The results are similar using conference calls or the length of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section as alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. Overall, these results provide new insights into the impact of availability of relationship lending on firms’ disclosure choices.     

How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?

We test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests itself through monitoring banks’ level of risk as well as through influencing banks’ management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.     

Do Macroforecasters Herd?

We show that typical tests of whether forecasters herd will falsely indicate herding behavior for a variety of types of behavior and forecasting environments that give rise to disagreement among forecasters. We establish that forecasters will appear to herd if differences between them reflect noise as opposed to private information, or if they arise from informational rigidities. Noise can have a behavioral interpretation and if so will depend on the behavioral model under consideration. An application of the herding tests to U.S. quarterly survey forecasts of inflation and output growth data 1981–2013 does not support herding behavior.