The effect of the minimum wage on employment and hours

This study examines the effect of minimum wage increases on teen hours of work and employment using both state- and individual-level panel data in the US. The state-level results indicate that minimum wage increases may lower employment rates but do not adversely affect hours among either working teens or all teens. The individual-level results do not indicate that minimum wage increases have a significant negative effect on hours worked by low-wage teens who are likely to be affected by a minimum wage increase. The results suggest that low-wage teens are less likely to remain employed, relative to high-wage teens, when the minimum wage is raised. However, this adverse effect disappears when these low-wage teens are compared to other low-wage teens during periods when the minimum wage did not increase.     

The effects of multiple minimum wages throughout the labor market: The case of Costa Rica

This paper investigates the effects of legal minimum wages on employment and hours worked among workers covered by minimum wage legislation as well as those for whom it does not apply (the uncovered sector) in Costa Rica. This country's large uncovered sector and complex minimum wage policy, which has for decades set numerous wages throughout the wage distribution, provide a stimulating counterpoint to the U.S. framework for the analysis of the impact of minimum wages. Using 1988–2000 micro data, we find that a 10% increase in minimum wages lowers employment in the covered sector by 1.09% and decreases the average number of hours worked of those who remain in the covered sector by about 0.6%. We do not find a significant impact on hours worked in the uncovered sector. Finally, we show that despite the wide range of minimum wages, the largest impact on the employment of covered sector workers is in the lower half of the skill distribution.     

What is the most flexible component of wage bill adjustment? Evidence from Belgium

This paper decomposes wage bill changes at the firm level into components due to wage changes, and components due to flows of employment. It relies on an administrative matched employer–employee dataset of individual earnings merged with firms' annual accounts for Belgium over the period 1997–2001. The results are in line with what one would expect in a downward wage rigidity environment. On average, wage bill contractions result essentially from employment cuts in spite of wage increases. Wage growth of job stayers is moderated but positive; and wages of entrants compared with those of incumbents are no lower. The labour force cuts are achieved through both reduced entries and increased exits, due to more layoffs, especially in smaller firms, and wider use of early retirement, especially in manufacturing. In addition, the paper points out the role of overtime hours, temporary unemployment and interim workers in adapting hours worked to economic circumstances.     

Parenthood and the earnings of married men and women

We use longitudinal data to examine the relationship between parenthood, wages, and hours worked for married men and women. We find evidence of negative selection into parenthood, substantial child-related reallocations of time within the household, and heterogeneity in the effects of children on household behavior. In households in which the wife experiences an interruption in employment, mothers' wages and hours worked fall, while fathers' hours and wages increase. In households in which the mother remains continuously attached to the labor force, however, there is no evidence of a wage decline for mothers, and the hours worked by fathers decrease substantially.     

Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work

This paper discusses the effect of tax progression on wage setting and employment in a unionised labour market. Recent contributions to this field argue that tax progression paradoxically enhances employment if wage setting is subject to collective bargaining. In this literature, individual hours of work are usually assumed to be exogenously given. We show that the positive employment effect of tax progression can be generalized to a model with a positive labour supply elasticity of individual workers. However, the wage-moderating effect of tax progression does not unambiguously carry over to a world where the union may fix both wages and individual hours of work. In this framework, the union reacts to tax progression by cutting individual working time. The wage rate, however, may decrease or increase. If the wage rate increases, the number of employed workers may decline despite the reduction in hours of work.     

On-the-Job Learning and the Effects of Insider Power

Suppose insiders use their market power to push up their wages, while entrants receive their reservation wages. How will employment and productivity be affected? In addressing this question, we focus on the role of on-the-job learning. We show that on-the-job learning makes insider wage hikes less detrimental to average employment (over booms and recessions), and may even cause employment to be stimulated. Furthermore, such learning can make insider wage hikes more detrimental to average productivity.     

Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

Earnings inequality narrows for young workers despite a widening wage structure

Inequality of wage rates has widened in the United States. But inequality of earnings also depends on the distribution of hour's worked. If the distribution of hours contracts sufficiently, earnings inequality may narrow despite a widening wage structure. The present study examines recent trends in inequality for young workers and, consistent with the preceding scenario, finds that rising inequality of wage rates has been overwhelmed by declining inequality of hours worked. As a consequence, earnings inequality of young workers declined during the 1980s.     

The Turnover‐Reducing Effects of the Minimum Wage may Harm the Economy

This article surveys the literature on the effects of the minimum wage and argues that the observed reduction in turnover rates is not necessarily desirable. If a curvilinear relationship exists between firm productivity and turnover, the effects of the minimum wage on reducing turnover may create a distance between the actual turnover rate and the optimal rate. Consequently, even if we accept the proposition that minimum wages have little impact on employment, they may reduce productivity or job growth in sectors not directly affected by the minimum wage.     

What Do Wages Add to the Health‐Employment Nexus? Evidence from Older European Workers

The role of wages in the health‐employment nexus can be important for designing employment policies aimed at older workers with health limitations. We, therefore, estimate the direct effect of health on employment and hours worked and its indirect effect that is mediated through wages using individual‐level panel data from SHARE. The endogeneity of self‐reported health is controlled for by instrumenting it with severe health conditions in a correlated random effects model. For men, we find that the direct effects of health deterioration, as measured by a reduction in health from the 75th to the 50th percentile of the health distribution, are about a 20% point lower employment probability and about 171 fewer hours worked per year. The indirect health effects through wages work in the opposite directions as health positively affects wages and wages negatively affect employment and hours worked. The total effects of this health deterioration amount to a 12% point lower employment probability and 95 fewer hours worked per year. In particular our finding of a large direct health effect on employment suggests an instrumental role for policy aimed at accommodating workers with health limitations to keep them employed at older ages.     

Do labor market institutions matter for business cycles?

Using panel data of 19 OECD countries observed over 40 years and data on specific labor market reform episodes we conclude that labor market institutions matter for business cycle fluctuations. Spearman partial rank correlations reveal that more flexible institutions are associated with lower business cycle volatility. Turning to the analysis of reform episodes, wage bargaining reforms increase the correlation of the real wage with labor productivity and the volatility of unemployment. Employment protection reforms increase the volatility of employment and decrease the correlation of the real wage with labor productivity. Reforms reducing replacement rates make labor productivity more procyclical.     

Working hours in Chinese enterprises: evidence from matched employer–employee data

The purpose of this article is to explore the factors that are correlated with hours worked in China. A distinguishing feature of the study is that we used representative‐matched employer and employee data. Hence, in addition to the usual worker characteristics examined in conventional economic models of labour supply, we also took into account the influence of firm characteristics and policies on the number of hours worked. The results suggested that in addition to the hourly wage rate, labour supply characteristics and human capital characteristics of the individual, firm‐level differences are important in explaining variation in weekly hours worked in Chinese firms. In particular, our results suggested that there is a norm of longer working hours in firms that employ a high proportion of female and migrant workers, that hours worked are less in firms which pay overtime and that hours worked are less in firms in which labour disputes have disrupted production. The policy implications of Chinese firms reducing hours worked were discussed.     

Wage Determination: Reconciling Theory and Practice

Abstract . The marginal productivity theory of wages and employment has proved, over the years, to be a useful basis for analyzing wage and employment relationships. But in the real world wage rates and the size of the work force appear to be set by other considerations. The article reviews efforts by economists to take these into account. Evidence of the ability of management to manipulate wages is presented. An attempt is made to reconcile practice and theory by taking into account sociological and psychological variables and harmonizing them with the economic variables.     

The Labour Market Effects of Increases in Social Insurance Premium: Evidence from Japan

Exploiting heterogeneous variations in labour cost increases due to Japan's 2003 social insurance premium reform as a natural experiment, we estimate the impacts of the increased social insurance premiums on employment, working hours and payroll costs. Using the difference‐in‐differences method with establishment fixed effects, we find that firms reduce the number of employees and increase average annual earnings from longer working hours in response to an exogenous increase in labour costs without productivity gains. Firms manage to pay for this increase in the average wage paid to the remaining workers by reducing the number of employees to keep total payroll costs unchanged. In contrast, since social insurance premiums are shared equally between employees and employers, firms pay the remaining half premiums that they are imposed with. Sub‐sample analyses show that firms adhering to a labour hoarding policy did fire many workers taking advantage of the 2003 reform. This may indicate that the reform provided a good excuse to cut employment in firms that had been forced to comply with a labour hoarding policy even in an over‐employment situation, which is more likely in sectors and countries where dismissals are rigorously regulated.     

Union wages,hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements

Small monopoly trade unions decide upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work subject to firm's demand for union members. Since the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by excess unemployment, we study the employment and welfare effects when trade unions try to coordinate their policies. Firstly, we consider a joint agreement about marginal wage moderation, where trade unions remain free to choose the hours of work non-cooperatively. Secondly, we analyze in which way a joint change in the hours of work affects employment and welfare if trade unions are free to choose the wage rate.     

The ambiguous effect of minimum wages on hours

In a competitive model we ease the assumption that efficiency units of labour are the product of hours and workers. We show that a minimum wage may either increase or decrease hours per worker and the change will have the opposite sign to the slope of the equilibrium hours hourly wage locus. Similarly, total hours worked may rise or fall. We illustrate the results throughout with a Cobb-Douglas example.     

Habit formation and wage determination

We analyse the implications of habit formation relating to wages in a multiperiod efficiency‐wage model. If employees have such preferences, their existence provides firms with incentives to raise wages and reduce employment over time. Greater intensity does not necessarily have the same consequences, because wage adjustments counteract the initial level impact. The firm's response additionally depends on the wage dependency of dismissal costs, because such costs make an increasing wage profile over time more attractive and mitigate the effects of greater intensity of habit formation. We further show that short‐lived productivity shocks have long‐lasting wage and employment consequences. Moreover, habit concerns by firm owners reduce wages.     

Accounting for wage and employment changes in the US from 1968–2000: A dynamic model of labor market equilibrium

In this article, we present a unified treatment of and explanation for the evolution of wages and employment in the US over the last 30 years. Specifically, we account for the pattern of changes in wage inequality, for the increased relative wage and employment of women, for the emergence of the college wage premium and for the shift in employment from the goods to the service-producing sector. The underlying theory we adopt is neoclassical, a two-sector competitive labor market economy in which the supply of and demand for labor of heterogeneous skill determines spot market skill rental prices. The empirical approach is structural. The model embeds many of the features that have been posited in the literature to have contributed to the changing US wage and employment structure including skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarity, changes in relative product-market prices, changes in the productivity of labor in home production and demographics such as changing cohort size and fertility.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

Bargaining Over Housework

A bstract .   This paper investigates the limited increase in housework provided by husbands in response to higher earnings and labor force participation by their wives. An explanation is provided that integrates the time availability, relative resources, and gender ideology perspectives that traditionally have been used to explain housework decisions. The outcome is the result of a bargaining process in which two concerns are identified as limiting the response of primary wage earning spouses to the employment of secondary wage earning spouses. First, the secondary wage earners' employment may in part be motivated by a concern about the durability of their marriage rather than their family's welfare. Second, a balancing of the inconveniences and the net earnings of the additional employment may be viewed as making only a limited contribution to the family's welfare. Empirical results of an analysis of the individual household tasks imply that both gender ideology and the spouses' earnings are important in determining the hours that each spouse devotes to household tasks. When making decisions about the amount of housework to perform, both spouses respond to changes in relative earnings, but the response of husbands, who are usually the primary wage earners, is smaller than that of wives, who tend to be the secondary wage earners.