市场经济体制下的信用制度及其运行机制——国外信用制度介绍和比较

在一个国家现代经济生活中，信用制度是必不可少的。它是整个市场经济运行的基础。在国外，社会信用制度管理体系主要包括以下几方面：征信数据及评估，法律和法规和确立和健全，政府和专业协会的监督和管理，教育和研究。信用管理行业分为以产品为主和以服务为主两大分支。     

计量经济学应用研究的可信性革命

可信性是计量经济学应用研究的重要问题,其核心在于实现经济理论、统计学、数学在实证研究中的科学结合。本文基于国际计量经济学界对可信性问题的三次大讨论取得的重要进展,厘清了计量经济学探索客观经济世界过程的本质特征;进而针对应用研究中存在的滥用和错用现象,从计量经济模型的随机性设定、经济变量之间的因果关系识别以及模型的统计适切性评价等三个方面阐述计量经济学应用研究的可靠性来源。我国计量经济学的应用研究面临进一步提高可信性的重要问题,需要全面吸收和借鉴国际计量经济学界对于可信性问题的成果,改变研究模式和教学模式。     

劳动分工与信誉之间的关系

在人类文明发展的长河中,信誉成一个倒抛物线的规律出现。一方面,随着人类交往范围的不断增大,人们守信誉的愿望越来越弱;另一方面,随着分工的不断细化,人们守信誉的动力越来越强。两者的结合就形成了人类的信誉曲线。在完全没有社会分工的情况下,人们之间没有信誉可言,过着一种完全自给自足的生活;在社会成员处于完全分工状态下,人们之间的信誉状况将最好;而在社会成员不完全分工状态下,人们之间的信誉状况在两者之间变化,好坏与劳动分工的程度、是否接近于重复博弈的条件有关。     

Two Crises: Inflationary Inertia and Credibility

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 and the Chilean crisis of 1982 to assess to what extent exchange-rate-based stabilisation programmes are successful in reducing – or even eliminating – inflationary inertia. The paper provides a brief overview of the Chilean and Mexican reform and stabilisation programmes. A theoretical model that emphasises the role of credibility is developed to analyse the effects of exchange-rate based stabilisation programmes on inflationary inertia. According to the model, less than credible stabilisations will not eliminate inertia and will generate major real exchange rate overvaluation. Detailed data are used to test the hypothesis     

公信力与传媒竞争

公信力是传媒的核心竞争力,导致部分新闻传媒公信力降低的原因主要有欺骗受众的虚假新闻、毒害受众的低俗新闻和侵扰受众的“有偿新闻”等等。根据中国新闻传媒公信力的现状,打造和提升传媒的公信力应从以下几方面着手:增强传媒的责任意识,切实提高传媒的可信度;加强道德修养,提高传媒品位;彰显社会良知,树立传媒的权威形象。     

信用与法律

市场失信的实质是法律的失范，信用的基础是法制，信用制度的建立与法制制度的建立是一个相互促进的演进过程，同时与法制演进的方式联系在一起。要确立适应市场经济的信用体系必须改变巳有变法模式，变控制-命令变法模式为合作式规制模式。     

The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott*

Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland–Prescott seminal paper. In order to address the Lucas Critique, modeling is now based on micro‐foundations treating agents as rational utility optimizers. Bayesian estimation has produced models which are more data‐consistent than those based simply on calibration. With micro‐foundations and new linear‐quadratic techniques, normative policy based on welfare analysis is now possible. In the open economy, policy involves a “game” with policymakers and private institutions or private individuals as players. This paper attempts to reassess the Kydland–Prescott contribution in the light of these developments.     

商业诚信:从经济理性与预期效益角度考察

随着经济改革的深入，社会信用秩序混乱的状况日益引起人们的关注，诚信的缺失已成为一个严重的社会问题，它严重的影响着社会稀缺性资源合理配置的效率，使得社会交易成本不断提高，本认为，在理性人假设和信息不对称条件下，个体的诚信缺失是在既定偏好，既定制度约束下的个人理性选择的结果，章过用预期效用理论在理性人假设的条件下对失信行为进行收益－成本分析，并依此提出了提高失信成本从而抑制失信行为的具体思路。     

Losing children and mental well-being: evidence from China

This article explores the impact of losing a child, especially losing all children (including losing the only child), on the mental health, happiness and loneliness of parents. The Chinese government has implemented strict restrictions on the number of births for each family since the 1970s, resulting in the creation of millions of only-child families. Using the 2011 baseline data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we find that the bereavement of a child is associated with lower levels of mental health and happiness and higher levels of loneliness for the parents, even after we adjust for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The effects are significantly stronger for losing all the children. Results have strong implications for the population-control, elderly-care and mental-care policies especially in China and developing countries, where the social security system is not yet sound.     

The Inflation Game: Targets,Practices and the Social Production of Monetary Credibility

In recent years, central banks have continued to preach inflation targeting even as they have pursued a wide range of unorthodox inflation-management policies. As the disconnect between discourse and practice grows, there is a growing risk of a serious credibility gap. This article seeks to shed some light on these dilemmas by looking backwards, focusing on the ‘Great Inflation’ in Britain in the 1970s and early 1980s and the successive failures of Labour’s incomes policy and the Conservatives’ monetarist experiment. These historical experiences suggest that for inflation policy to work it needs to be both understood as and made credible—which means that key actors need to not only learn that this is how the inflation game works, but also put into place a whole range of supporting practices that reflect and reproduce this conviction. In spite of the many claims by economists and central bankers to the contrary, quantitative targets do not in fact anchor inflationary expectations – social practices instead play that crucial anchoring role. At the same time, these cases both underline the particular dilemmas associated with a reliance on hard quantitative targets in times of social instability – lessons that do not bode well for our present moment.     

The Regime-Dependent Determination of Credibility: A New Look at European Interest Rate Differentials

Abstract. With persistence in macroeconomic variables two aspects of exchange rate credibility emerge whose relative importance varies over time. Both aspects have opposite implications for the relation between fundamentals and credibility. Hence, the effect of policy measures on interest rate differentials becomes ambiguous. In this paper a Markov-switching VAR that allows for parameter shifts across regimes is employed to test the hypothesis of regime-dependent determination of credibility for major EMS currencies. Regime-dependent impulse response functions reveal substantial differences in the response of spreads to macroeconomic shocks across regimes.     

From Rhythm and Blues to Broadway: Using Music to Teach Economics

Although supporting this approach, the author discusses shortcomings and extensions of the original article in this journal.     

税收流失的博弈分析

从财政交易制度框架内看,税收流失其实是一种交易成本。纳税人与税务当局的非合作博弈,不存在纯战略纳什均衡,但存在混合战略纳什均衡,即税务机关和纳税人分别以一定的概率随机选择稽查和逃税,同时,税收流失也表现为征税中存在的纳税与人政府、政府与纳税人以及政府、税务机关与税务人员三种委托代理问题。因此,依法治税的激励结构设计至少应包括四个方面：保证财政交易制度中的支出面与税收收入基本对称：优化税制;税务机关激励纳税人讲实话的制度安排,对税务人员的激励。     

Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and inferred from the policy outcome. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This moderates the bank's policy and induces the bank to follow a policy closer to the socially optimal one. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial but frequently worse for the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating influence on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium.     

The economics of hyperstagflation: Stabilization policy in post 1973 Chile

This paper examines the stabilization policy of post 1973 Chile and attempts to explain the coexistence for four years of rates of inflation averaging well over 200 percent/year with a demand deficient depression comparable in its severity to the Depression of the '30s. The analysis is conducted in the framework of ‘disequilibrium’ models. It concludes that the origins, severity and duration of such ‘hyperstagflation’ lie in the stabilization policy's neglect of inflationary expectations, especially in the product market, thus forcing the labor market to absorb the brunt of a disequilibrium whose origins lay in the product market.     

诚信的经济学分析

本文从经济学的角度来分析诚信的问题。笔者分别从交易费用、道德风险问题和博弈三个不同的视角,分析了诚信是如何来影响经济绩效的,以及诚信对信息不对称的市场经济运行的作用。同时得出了一个重要结论:即使交易双方守信不违约的情况下,诚信的交易费用也是存在的,诚信度的大小决定了这种交易成本的大小。正是各种交易成本对经济绩效产生了重要的影响。最后提出了建设无形制度的观点。     

Credibility and endogenous societal discounting

We consider a dynamic moral hazard economy inhabited by a planner and a population of privately informed agents. We assume that the planner and the agents share the same discount factor, but that the planner cannot commit. We show that optimal allocations in such settings solve the problems of committed planners who discount the future less heavily than agents. Thus, we provide micro-foundations for dynamic moral hazard models that assume a societal discount factor in excess of the private one. We extend the analysis to allocations that are reconsideration-proof in the sense of Kocherlakota [Kocherlakota, N., 1996. Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency. Games and Economic Behavior 15, 33–54]. We show that these allocations solve the choice problem of a committed planner with a unit discount factor.