高管薪酬激励、内部控制有效性与公司业绩——来自沪深A股上市公司的经验证据

采用2010—2014年沪深A股非金融保险类上市公司的数据对上市公司高管薪酬激励、内部控制有效性与公司业绩的关系进行实证检验,研究结果显示：高管薪酬激励程度越高,内部控制有效性越好;内部控制有效性、高管薪酬激励与公司业绩都存在显著的正相关关系;内部控制有效性是高管激励程度对公司业绩影响的中介变量,三者之间存在显著的局部中介效应,以控股权不同进行分组检验也证明了这一效应的存在。因此,上市公司在制定高管薪酬激励计划时应当考虑内部控制对薪酬激励效果的影响,为达到激励高管进而提升公司业绩的目的,需要建立与高管薪酬激励相配套的机制,完善上市公司内部控制制度。     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC MULTI‐MARKET COMPETITION

Under the assumption that a public firm provides goods or services to two markets and that a private firm provides goods or services to one market only, this study examines whether public firms should be privatized. It also investigates how the production quantity of a private firm changes when its degree of privatization increases. We find that when the market share of a duopoly market is large (small), partial privatization (nationalization) is socially preferable. We also find that the quantity produced by the private firm does not always increase along with the degree of privatization.     

Does CEO compensation matter in boosting firm performance? Evidence from listed French firms

The paper investigates the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on firm performance from a sample of 155 listed French companies on SBF 120, over 2009–2018. Findings suggest that an increase in CEO compensation seems to improve the accounting‐based firm performance, nevertheless it hurts the firm stock market value. More pronounced results are reported when we control for sector compensation interactions. We argue that attractive compensation may improve the executive services in achieving shareholders' objectives, but investors seem to not appreciate a CEO compensation increase. Based on the agency theory, it might be argued that investors fear possible executive opportunistic behavior encouraging them to enjoy overcompensation .     

Incentives Management During Privatization: An Agency Perspective

abstract    This paper explains, through a field study and from an agency perspective, how monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms change to support the interests of a privatized firm's new ownership. In this case, privatization led to important changes in the board of directors and to more formal performance evaluation and compensation systems for top managers, as profitability and financial control gained relevancy with the firm ownership change. Our results show that differences in incentives management before and after privatization are due to different agency relations in the two periods. We also argue that in a privatization framework the relation between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms is complex, not simply substitutive as agency theory would predict, and this finding allows us to refine and extend agency theory for this specific context.     

从国内外企业高管薪酬对比看国企高管薪酬激励机制

从建国以来,我国的高管薪酬经历了一个漫长的发展历程,逐渐与世界接轨,但是国有企业作为一个特殊的主体,其薪酬结构还存在一定的问题。本文通过对美国、日本等国家高管薪酬机构的介绍,对比分析中国国企高管薪酬激励现状,根据国外的启示阐述了国企高管薪酬设计的原则与要点。     

Is there an inverse U-shaped relationship between pay and performance?

Given the increasing concerns about the escalation in executive compensation, this study aims to provide new insights into the link between executive pay and firm performance by empirically testing for an inverse U-shaped relationship. For this purpose, we re-examine the relation using a nonlinear model. Our results show a significant inverse U-shaped relationship between executive pay and firm performance. The finding provides support for both optimal contracting and managerial power theories with the former dominating at low level of firm performance and the latter dominating at high level of firm performance.     

Top Management Compensation and Shareholder Returns: Unravelling Different Models of the Relationship

In order to further examine the relationship between executive pay and company performance, this paper investigates the linkage between two separate components of executive compensation (i.e. cash compensation and stock options) and market return performance, among a selected sample of US pharmaceutical company CEOs and COOs. In the surveyed sample, changes in cash compensation were found to exhibit a between-firm relationship with lagged market returns, while Δ stock option grants displayed a within-firm relationship. The former result suggests a commonality in practices across all firms, while the latter denotes idiosyncratic firm-specific practices. These contrasts represent different degrees of the agency problem in the contracts for cash compensation as compared to the stock option components. Levels of cash compensation were affected primarily by firm size. Market returns were not instrumental influences on the levels of both compensation components     

A strategic human resource perspective of firm competitive behavior

Embedded within firms are unique stores of intangible human assets that likely influence the way firms compete. We argue that the human and social capital of a firm, particularly at the upper echelon and board of director (BOD) levels, contribute to the firm's awareness of the competitive environment and its motivation and ability to undertake numerous, complex, and forceful competitive actions. We also suggest that the firm's executive compensation systems moderate the effects of these intangible human assets on firm competitive behavior. By examining how human capital, intra-firm social capital, and executive compensation influence firm competitive behavior, we advance a strategic HRM perspective of firm competitive behavior and outline several implications for future research.     

Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics,non‐linearity and asymmetry

The relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is a field of intense theoretical and empirical research. The purpose of this study is to gain additional insights into the nature of this relationship by examining empirically the relatively unexplored areas of its dynamics of adjustment, as well as its non‐linearity. The findings of this study show strong evidence in support of the view that (a) executive compensation is characterized by a dynamic process of adjustment, and (b) the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is non‐linear and asymmetric. Additionally, the structure of asymmetry is found to be dependent on the measure of performance. Convexity characterizes the asymmetry of the relationship between executive compensation and market returns, while concavity distinguishes the asymmetry of the relationship between executive compensation and accounting returns. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation-based stock trading by corporate executive and aggregate management ownership of the firm: Some additional evidence

Managers place a low value on equity-based compensation because it exposes them to the risk of the firm. Such undervaluation and the need to achieve diversification may force a manager to sell his own stock of the firm in response to equity-based awards. In this paper we examine whether such stock selling by an executive depends on the aggregate level of management ownership of the firm. We argue that stock selling occurs at a high level of aggregate ownership where an executive has a low probability of being replaced. Our findings support this “management ownership” argument of compensation-based stock trading. One implication is that the board's effort to minimize agency conflicts becomes less effective once aggregate ownership increases to a certain threshold level. (JEL G30, G32) This research was carried out with the support of the Western New England College research fund.     

Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

This paper examines the impact of various executive compensation types on the postmerger risk taking by firm's executives. We find that executive pay influences firm risk differently depending on compensation type and risk measure. Specifically, we find that rewarding executives with cash compensation reduces the total postmerger risk of acquirers. However, managers are motivated to increase systematic risk when they are rewarded with stock‐based incentives. Besides, based on the argument that managerial compensation portfolio might impact systematic and unsystematic risks differently, our findings show no evidence of the impact of executive pay on unsystematic risk.     

企业数字化转型与高管薪酬契约有效性

以2008—2020年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究对象,实证检验企业数字化转型对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果显示,企业数字化转型显著降低了高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,并增加了企业高管的超额薪酬。机制检验发现,企业数字化转型赋予了管理层集中的决策自主权,弱化了外部对管理层经营管理行为的监督力度,增强了管理层利用其高度集中的权力影响董事会薪酬契约制定的能力,获得了更多与企业业绩不匹配的私有收益,从而降低了高管薪酬契约有效性。异质性分析发现,在内部控制质量或信息披露质量较高的企业,企业进行数字化转型对高管薪酬契约有效性的负面效应会得到抑制。研究结论为全面认识企业数字化转型的经济后果提供了经验证据,同时也为数字化转型公司高管薪酬契约的制定提供了一定的参考。     

管理层薪酬激励能提高信息披露质量吗？

以深交所2008-2013年间A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层薪酬激励对信息披露质量的影响。研究发现,上市公司信息披露质量随管理层薪酬激励程度的增加先升后降,呈倒U型关系,且这一现象在非国有企业中表现更为显著。结果表明,薪酬激励可以有效缓解股东与管理层之间的利益冲突,但也可能导致管理层为获得更多报酬而利用其信息优势进行选择性披露,进而影响信息披露质量。     

高管薪酬信息披露的经济后果研究

高管薪酬信息披露有助于提升公司薪酬契约透明度及治理效率,但同时增加了公司的信息披露成本.因此,高管薪酬信息披露对于公司的经济后果研究是一个值得探讨的话题.通过高管薪酬信息披露对薪酬水平、薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,观测我国高管薪酬信息披露的后果,并进一步观测不同产权性质公司间的影响差异.结果表明:信息披露政策抑制了高管薪酬水...     

Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms

Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Family ownership,corporate governance,and top executive compensation

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation: does it pay to be green?

The relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various organizational variables (i.e., size, length of tenure of the CEO, board composition and firm performance) has been explored in academic research. However, the relationship between CEO compensation and the firm's reputation based on the firm's commitment to the community and the environment has been relatively unexamined in the academic research. This study's purpose is to empirically examine this relationship using the Fortune Reputation Index as revised by Brown and Perry (1995) . Using a sample of 186 firms in 1990 and 188 firms in 1991, the relationships between CEO compensation and organization size, financial performance and environmental reputation are examined. The results of the study demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm environmental reputation, firm size and firm financial performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Is expatriation good for my career? The impact of expatriate assignments on perceived and actual career outcomes

This study examines the impact of expatriate assignments on career growth and the external marketability of US employees of a large professional services firm. We use survey and archival data to compare expatriates currently overseas, repatriates, and domestic US employees on compensation, recent promotions, and external recruiting contacts. We then examine how actual pay, promotions, and external recruiting influences anticipated salary growth within the firm and external employment opportunities. We find that despite little or no impact on their current careers, employees with overseas work experience perceived greater internal and external opportunities than domestic US employees. Implications for managers and researchers are discussed.     

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF MANAGEMENT SALARY DIFFERENTIALS

Abstract This paper reviews the practical value of a number of quantitative models of management pay structures at the level of the firm. The aim is to identify the practical, operational value of these models to salary administrators. Models developed in the last twenty years by Roberts (1956), Peason (1967), Simon (1957), Lydall (1959), Thorelli (1965) and Paterson (1972) are reviewed and their practical weaknesses highlighted. It is concluded that models of this nature are of considerable conceptual value in relating some of the economic and organizational factors involved in management pay. Most quantitative models appear to have mainly academic value. However, the paper demonstrates how an approach using a mixed Pearson and Paterson model can be applied in a practical fashion to yield useful salary administration guidelines. The Pearson model is based on a Pareto distribution of managerial salaries within the firm, while Paterson's model provides definitions of authority levels associated with management jobs. The combined Pearson/Paterson approach provides the administrator with a helpful framework which allows comparison of his firm's salary structure with those of companies in similar industries as well as measurement of changes within his salary structure over a selected time period.     

CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision

Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short‐term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity‐based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.