The Financing of Regulatory Agencies

This paper examines the financing of monitoring agencies deriving the welfare-improving combinations of public revenue, industry fees, and penalties that should be used to finance quality regulations. The model shows that if some firms are not expected to comply with quality standards, penalties are optimal to cover the agencys regulatory exposure though these need to be augmented with other instruments as monitoring costs increase. If all firms are expected to comply with the quality standards, a per-firm fee is the optimal method of regulatory financing but needs to be augmented with a lump-sum tax as monitoring costs increase.Jel classification: H21, L51The authors extend their thanks to Editor Michael Crew and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are ours.     

机构侵害中小投资者违规监管博弈仿真

本文主要对股票市场中机构投资者侵害中小投资者利益这种违规行为的监管进行了博弈分析,并使用基于主体建模的动态仿真方法在Swarm仿真平台上建立了仿真模型,同时进行了仿真实验。研究指出,严厉的事前监管、完善的上市公司管理制度以及更高的监管者素质可以有效地杜绝机构投资者侵害违规行为的出现。本文通过运用经济仿真方法对股票市场具体违规行为监管问题进行研究,将股票市场监管、博弈论与经济仿真这三个研究领域结合在一起,拓展了对股票市场监管的研究手段,在经济学研究中做出了一定有益的探索。 更多还原     

Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation

In this paper, we focus on the determination of the optimal fine set by a regulator when a firm can litigate to avoid paying the fine and the monitoring agency has discretionary power to negotiate with the firm the size of the fine. The regulator needs to balance the positive effect of the fine's size on the degree of non–compliance and the possibility of litigation if the fine is too high. We find that the optimal fine is not necessarily set at its maximum level.     

发达国家的电信管制机构及其启示

电信管制机构改革直接影响管制效率,从而影响电信产业的改革与发展。本文探讨了发达国家电信管制机构的主要模式,分析了电信管制机构的发展趋势,提出了我国电信管制机构设置与运行中值得借鉴的经验和启示。     

The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs

The dynamics of regulation is analysed in a model where regulatory capture comes from the repeated interaction between an interest group and a regulatory agency. Regulatory institutions offer a framework for this dynamic process. They put constraints on the interest group's influence. The dynamics of regulation and its long-run outcome depend on the political principal's, the regulator's and the regulated form's time preferences and their information. Some foundations for the transaction costs of side-contracting used in the standard literature on collusion are provided. Those transaction costs are linked to the precise nature of regulatory institutions.     

中国垄断性产业现行管制机构的问题与制度缺损

本文以政企分离、政监分离为维度对中国垄断性产业现行管制机构进行分类,研究在特定体制下管制机构的基本特征及其问题,并从深层次分析现行管制机构的制度缺损,为设立与完善垄断性产业管制机构提供基本思路。     

大部门体制下自然垄断产业管制机构改革的深化

在大部门体制改革中,我国自然垄断产业管制机构改革得到了推动,为理顺自然垄断产业的政府管制奠定了基础。但为适应市场经济体制的发展,更好地满足公众对自然垄断产品或服务的需求,自然垄断产业的管制机构改革还需要深化,下一步改革的重点应是:继续推进管制机构的独立性,明确管制机构的职能设置及强化法律基础,健全管制的公众参与及问责机制。     

上市公司股权激励制度差异及影响因素——基于市场强制力与组织强制力的替代效应

本文从理论上阐明了企业的股权激励计划实质上是以市场强制力来替代组织强制力的一种制度安排。以2006—2009年实施了股权激励的国内上市公司为样本所进行的实证分析显示,高科技企业与传统行业企业的股权激励制度存在显著的差异,并且这种差异可以用市场强制力与组织强制力的替代效应来解释。多元回归的实证结果也证明了股权激励方案的主要影响因素之间符合我们预测的组织强制力与市场强制力的替代关系。     

Credence Goods,Efficient Labelling Policies,and Regulatory Enforcement

We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures. When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat effect”.      

Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement, 1981–1995

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) gives states the option to enforce federal occupational safety and health standards on their own instead of relying on the federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). This legislative provision provides an opportunity to analyze a homogenous set of regulatory standards enforced by heterogeneous agents engaged in interjurisdictional competition. This study finds important differences in the effectiveness of enforcement options measured by occupational mortality. State-administered OSHA programs are associated with fewer workplace fatalities than states regulated at the federal level. This finding is consistent with regulatory federalism and government-as-facilitator models of OSHA enforcement.     

旅行社:变革之中求发展

一、加入WTO为我国旅行社发展带来了机遇和发展空间１．服务贸易条款的签署，使中国旅游业与其他所有服务贸易签署国站在同一标准线上。特别是服务贸易协议中关于国民待遇的规定，使所有服务贸易签署国公民在中国与中国公民享受同等待遇，势必会使中国与其他服务贸易签署国之间的贸易量大大增加，出入境更加方便，使那些对中国心存疑虑却又希望到中国旅游的国际旅游者早日实现其旅游消费行为。加入WTO，意味着我国进一步融入世界经济体系。投资、贸易的自由化会使更多的商务客人来华，而商务客人是我国国际旅游市场的重要来源。目前全球…     

The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement

This paper examines the optimal fine for violations of environmental regulations, taking into account financial constraints facing regulated firms and the hierarchical structure of regulatory enforcement. Contrary to the existing literature, which suggests that maximal fines are sub-optimal, we find that the optimal fine is either the maximum amount the firm can afford to pay or zero (i.e., no regulation). The impact of a change in industry structure on the optimal fine, firm compliance and regulatory resource strategies is considered. We identify conditions under which the equilibrium level of regulatory resources decreases with an increase in the number of firms in the industry.     

Resource Allocation in Public Agencies: Experimental Evidence

Many organizations, including philanthropies and public agencies, require their employees to make resource allocation decisions that are intended to serve a broad social purpose or mission. In most cases, the criteria on the basis of which scarce funds are to be allocated are imprecisely specified, leaving agents with considerable discretionary power. This paper reports results from an experiment that explores the manner in which such power is exercised. Using a sample of public servants working in education, health, child care, and nutrition programs in Colombia, and a sample of potential and actual beneficiaries of such programs, we attempt to identify the set of recipient attributes that induce the most generous responses from officials. This is done using a design we call the “distributive dictator game,” which requires officials to rank recipients, with the understanding that a higher ranking corresponds to an increased likelihood of getting a voucher convertible into cash. We find that women (especially widows), individuals with many minor dependents, and refugees from political violence are generally favored. We also find significant interaction effects between ranker and recipient attributes, with rankings varying systematically by ranker age and gender.