International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

我国外贸技术溢出效应的国别差异分析

技术溢出是发展中国家追赶发达国家的重要路径,溢出的渠道包括国际贸易、FDI、R＆D合作、国外R＆D投资等。我们运用经拓展后的Coe＆Helpman的贸易溢出计量模型,试图将我国从商品贸易以及FDI中所获得的技术溢出纳入同一模型中加以综合分析,并对贸易带来的技术溢出效应进行国别差异分析,以判断不同类型国家对我国吸收技术溢出效应的影响。并在此基础上,提出了相应的政策建议。     

Trade-related R&D Spillovers in Vietnamese Manufacturing

ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine how Vietnamese manufacturing could benefit from R&D investment locally and from OECD countries through trade during a period marked with major trade liberalisations. Using the industry-level data during 2000–2009, it finds that the foreign R&D has accounted for the most part of the R&D spillovers in the sector, with a larger proportion earning from the other foreign industries’ R&D. The domestic industries’ own R&D has improved the sector’s total factor productivity, but in a relatively smaller magnitude compared to the foreign sources. In examining the localised effects of R&D spillovers in Vietnamese manufacturing, the results reiterate the important roles of trade-embedded foreign R&D spillovers from Japan, the US, South Korea, and Germany in the sector’s total factor productivity growth. These findings altogether give support to foreign technology diffusion as a major conduit for growth prospects in Vietnamese manufactures.     

Measurement of Technology Spillovers

This paper builds an externality-based model with physical and R&D capital, proves the linearity of technology functions, and derives two measures of spillovers from the relative differences between social and private rates of return. China’s regional empiric studies exhibit a reverse direction of spillovers between foreign invested firms and local economy and provide an estimation of the spillover measures of between 13% and 18%.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions. Further it is assumed that in such cases they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as spillover effects increase until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached.     

High Technology Employment,Wages And University R&D Spillovers: Evidence From Us Cities

Using 4 years of data from 36 American cities and 6 high technology groupings we present thc first estimates of University R&D spillover effects on ctnployrnent at this level of disag-gregation, while controlling for wages, prior innovations, state fixed efrccts, and saniple selectivity hias. We find robust evidence that lagged and disaggrcgated university R&D is a significant determinant of city high technology employment and some evidence for employment effects of innovation.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

R&D, Human Capital and International Technology Spillovers: A Cross-country Analysis

This paper is based on recent developments in the theory of innovation-driven growth that emphasize both the importance of R&D efforts — domestic as well as foreign — for explaining national productivity, and the complementarity between R&D and human capital investments. Estimates of specifications, in growth terms and in level terms, on a cross-section of OECD countries from the early 1960s to the early 1990s lend strong support to this thesis. The data show a significant influence of both domestic and foreign R&D. Moreover, there is clearly a net positive impact of human capital. The level and growth rate of human capital are shown to affect productivity growth and there is evidence of interaction with the catch-up process.
JEL classification: O 33; O 47     

Revisiting measure of R&D spillovers: empirical evidence on OECD countries and industries

Using data for 17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over 29 years for 28 industries, this paper estimates industry-wise research and development (R&D) spillovers from the largest R&D investors and the most R&D-intensive industries that contribute 80% of global R&D. In doing so, it tests several assumptions made in the literature, and data rejecting them, proposes a methodology on R&D return estimation devoid of these assumptions. Results show that R&D has substantial spillovers, justifying R&D support policy. Each dollar of R&D generates about 29 cents in spillovers domestically and 4 cents in foreign countries. However, both intra- and inter-industry spillovers vary by industries, implying that the policy of supporting each R&D dollar uniformly across industries is suboptimal. Contrary to industry heterogeneity, the R&D spillovers from an industry do not vary substantially across countries, suggesting that optimal R&D policy across OECD countries might be uniform. An industry-by-industry technology matrix shows that sometimes an idea generates a greater impact on other industries than where it is generated.     

International R&D Spillovers,Absorptive Capacity and Relative Backwardness: A Panel Smooth Transition Regression Model

We investigate how a country's absorptive capacity and relative backwardness affect the impact of international R&D spillovers on domestic Total Factor Productivity (TFP). To account for nonlinearities, we adopt a Panel Smooth Transition Regression approach, where a country's TFP elasticity to the foreign R&D stock is allowed to change smoothly across various identified extreme values, and the change is related to observable transition variables: human capital (capturing the country's absorptive capacity) and relative backwardness. The results suggest that absorptive capacity is positively associated with international R&D spillovers. In contrast with previous results, relative backwardness is instead found to have a negative and significant impact on international knowledge spillovers.     

International technological spillovers from ICT‐producing manufacturing industries: a panel data analysis

This paper examines the effect of the international diffusion of technological capacity from ICT sectors on the total factor productivity in developed countries. Special attention is paid to the construction of a more recent and homogeneous industry‐level data set using unit value ratios and a hedonic price index. A cointegration analysis is performed on this annual panel data for 10 manufacturing sectors in six OECD countries over the period 1979–2001.

On the basis of our results, we may conclude that a country receives more international technology spillovers in its manufacturing industries the closer its relations with more technologically advanced nations are and the more open it is to imports. Meanwhile, information and communication technologies developed abroad increase the total factor productivity of each of the manufacturing sectors of a country, and this effect is enhanced where ICT goods are imported from nations with advanced technology of this kind.     

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new,emerging technologies

Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging technologies more than R&D on other technologies? In this paper, I analyze whether innovation externalities caused only by knowledge spillovers differ between technologies of different maturity. I show that R&D should not be subsidized equally across industries when the knowledge stocks differ. This is because knowledge spillovers depend on the size of the knowledge stock and the elasticity of scale in R&D production. R&D in the emerging technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is smaller than one. However, R&D in the mature technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is larger than one.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements

This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement (the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As a response to the climate agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes OPEC's profits. Within a numerical model we find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game in which each player chooses when to fix his decision variables. It is shown that in equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and OPEC chooses to be the follower. It is demonstrated, however, that for both agents the order of move is of minor (numerical) importance. Hence, the players have limited incentives for strategic behaviour.     

Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets

We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries.

We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers.     

R&D Efficiency Gains Due to Cooperation

A theoretical and widely-quoted finding is that levels of cooperative R&D exceed noncooperative R&D levels when technological spillovers are relatively large, while the opposite holds for relatively small technological spillovers. We qualify this result by showing that for relatively small technological spillovers the comparison is not driven by the extent of technological spillover, but by the increase in technological spillover due to cooperation in R&D. In particular, an agreement to cooperate in R&D always raises R&D efforts if the post-cooperative technological spillover rate is high enough.