Buffer joint ventures

While strategic alliances and joint ventures have become important organizational forms promising a variety of efficiency benefits for the economy, a body of research has been building showing that alliances between competitors can have significant anticompetitive consequences. This paper explores a particular kind of arrangement, here called a “buffer joint venture”, in which parent firms create an entity selling products located between their own locations in product or geographic space. Depending upon the governance structure of the joint venture and the timing of price-setting by the joint venture and its parents, the buffer joint venture may reduce competition between the parents leading to higher prices and profits and lower social welfare. By altering the per-period profits from collusion and deviation payoffs, a buffer joint venture can also affect the stability of collusion between parents in a repeated game context.     

Board representation in international joint ventures

Research summary : Relatively little attention has been paid to boards in international joint ventures (IJVs), and the composition of these boards in particular. We examine the determinants of foreign partners' representation on IJV boards in order to advance our knowledge of this facet of IJV governance. We argue that a foreign partner's representation on the IJV board is related to its equity contribution. However, we hypothesize that this relationship is moderated by IJV and host country characteristics that affect the importance of the internal and external roles IJV boards serve. These results provide insights into the conditions under which a partner might wish to secure greater board representation for its level of equity, or utilize less board representation than might be suggested by its equity level alone. Managerial summary : The functioning and composition of corporate boards have long been seen as critical to managers and shareholders alike. In contrast, the boards of IJVs have been relatively neglected. We advance our knowledge of this important facet of IJV governance. Specifically, we highlight the importance of two roles (i.e., an internal and external role) that IJV boards and directors fulfill. We find that the importance of these internal and external roles of boards determines whether a foreign partner might wish to secure greater board representation for its level of equity, or utilize less board representation than might be suggested by its equity level alone. Our results provide novel insights that can help managers structure their IJV boards. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board involvement in international joint ventures

The last two decades have witnessed substantial scholarly interest in corporate boards, yet little research has been devoted to boards of international joint ventures (IJVs). We combine the corporate governance and alliance governance literatures in order to study this important ex post governance mechanism for IJVs. We identify a fundamental tension inherent in IJVs, which arises from the unique features of this organizational form and influences the level of involvement by their boards. International joint ventures are hybrid organizational forms that can require administrative control to facilitate monitoring and coordinated adaptation in the presence of exchange hazards. At the same time, the fact that IJVs operate in different host countries can make it efficient to delegate authority to local management for certain collaborations. In investigating the determinants of IJV board involvement, we therefore examine characteristics of IJVs that reflect this underlying tension. We conclude that board involvement reflects efficiency considerations in individual ventures, and the administrative control provided by boards is an important dimension of IJV governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intended and unintended termination of international joint ventures

This study proposes that international joint ventures (IJVs) are terminated either when the initial purposes of the formation of the IJV have been achieved (intended termination), or when unanticipated contingencies that emerge in the external, internal, or inter‐partner conditions after the establishment of the IJV impede the continuation of its operation (unintended termination). Our study examines the factors that affect intended and unintended termination and the longevity of IJVs. The findings show that approximately 90 percent of all IJV terminations are unintended and 10 percent intended, and that the frequency of intended termination and unintended termination varies noticeably depending on the initial purposes of formation. This suggests that the termination of IJVs is significantly contingent on their formation. The findings also show that the longevity of IJVs varies according to the initial purposes of formation, the initial conditions under which the IJV is formed, and the types of unanticipated contingencies that it encounters. The key theoretical issues and practical implications of the distinction between the intended and unintended termination of IJVs are also discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures

A joint venture among competitors to produce output alters the parents' competitive incentives. Any joint venture involves both joint financial interest and control over the production levels of the venture entity and the parent firms. The competitive incentives of the parents and rival firms depend on the exact financial interest and control arrangements made. This paper analyzes a number of alternative arrangements within the standard non-cooperative oligopoly model and devises a Modified Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (MHHI) to quantify their relative competitive incentives. Independent entry by a single parent and a full merger of the parents may be viewed as particular financial interest and control arrangements. The use of this methodology for policy analysis of proposed ventures is illustrated with the facts of the recent GM-Toyota joint venture.     

A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures

This paper presents a transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures. It distinguishes between ‘scale’ and ‘link’ JVs. Scale JVs arise when parents seek to internalize a failing market, but indivisibilities due to scale or scope economies make full ownership of the relevant assets inefficient. Link JVs result from the simultaneous failing of the markets for the services of two or more assets whenever these assets are firm-specific public goods, and acquisition of the firm holding them would entail significant management costs.     

Parent contribution and organizational control in international joint ventures

Organizational control scholars have recently noted how control use is not singular in organizations, but rather, different types of control are used to achieve different purposes. In international joint ventures (IJVs), we suggest that output, process, and social control are exercised by both foreign and local parent firms. We then hypothesize that a parent firm's usage of these three control types is influenced by its resource contributions. Using a sample of IJVs in China, we find that property‐based contribution is linked with output and process control, and knowledge‐based contribution is related to process and social control. The results also show differences in control practices between foreign and local parent firms. The findings provide important implications for the design and implementation of control systems in IJVs.     

Contract,cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures

This study examines how contract, cooperation, and performance are associated with one another within international joint ventures (IJVs). We argue that contract and cooperation are not substitutes but complements in relation to IJV performance. An IJV contract provides an institutional framework guiding the course of cooperation, while cooperation overcomes the adaptive limits of contracts. Our analysis of 293 IJVs in a dynamic market demonstrates that previous cooperation bolsters contractual adaptability, which in turn nurtures current cooperation between the same partners. We find that contract completeness and cooperation drive IJV performance both independently and interactively. When contracts are more complete, cooperation contributes more to performance. Contract and cooperation differ in their quadratic effects such that the contribution of contract completeness to performance declines as completeness increases but the contribution of cooperation remains linear. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internal corporate joint ventures: Development processes and performance outcomes

Joint venture activity and internal corporate venturing represent two administrative innovations receiving increased attention in strategic management research. This study investigates a new hybrid form of administrative innovation: internal corporate joint ventures, which combine the equity involvement typically found in joint ventures with the internal staffing of a semiautonomous unit typical of internal corporate ventures. Drawing on both a process model and a variance model, the structuring, development and performance of 53 such ventures in an industry-specific setting is examined.     

The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures

Antitrust authorities should consider the trade-off between enhanced efficiency and reduced competition in cases of partial ownership. This paper examines the competitive effects side of that trade-off in the context of a modified Cournot model. We show that, in markets where entry is difficult, partial ownership arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than otherwise, even if the ownership shares are relatively small. These effects arise solely because these arrangements link the fortunes of actual or potential competitors, producing a positive correlation among their profits. In this sense, the effects are purely structural: they arise not because of increased opportunities for collusion or changes in the concentration of control, but because the linking of profits reduces each firm's incentive to compete. Since these links internalize free rider problems associated with policing collusion and investing in entry deterrence, however, they could also enhance cartel stability and profitability.     

Good match matters: Knowledge co-creation in international joint ventures

Partners not only transfer knowledge to each other but also can jointly create new ideas and practices. This research examines knowledge co-creation (KCC) in international joint ventures (IJVs). Drawing on matching theory, we propose that partners' compatibility is positively related to KCC, whereas complementarity has a curvilinear relationship with KCC. Furthermore, according to institutional theory, the effect of KCC on performance is contingent upon the institutional environment. Specifically, information verifiability—an under-researched but important institutional factor—strengthens the positive influence of KCC on performance. We collected survey data from 372 senior and middle managers in China-based IJVs, and the results largely support our hypotheses. This research sheds new light on B2B collaboration and we conclude with its theoretical and managerial implications.     

On lemons and indigestibility: resource assembly through joint ventures

We revisit the relationship between two theoretical perspectives on joint ventures—the asymmetric information view and the indigestibility view. The former emphasizes the ex ante valuation challenges firms confront in combining resources, while the latter attends to ex post transaction costs arising from the extraction and integration of indivisible resources. We argue that these two views are complementary, rather than competing, in explaining the usefulness of joint ventures. We also suggest that the perspectives are overlapping inasmuch as resource indivisibility contributes to asymmetric information. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imitative innovation and international joint ventures: a dynamic analysis

In this paper we deal with some dynamic issues of international joint venture in the context of a developing country. We provide a rationale for international joint venture formation, as well as its subsequent instability, where instability is interpreted as payoff readjustments between the partners in the venture. Although the joint venture is formed in response to government restrictions on foreign equity holdings in the first period, its subsequent instability is caused by both the change in government policy, as well as the outcome of imitative technological innovation undertaken by the host partner. It is also shown that uncertainty about the government policy in the second period plays an important role in the formation of joint venture in the first period.     

Bartering technology for local resources in exogamic Sino-foreign joint ventures

Five hypotheses were formulated regarding the exogamic nature of Sino-foreign joint ventures and two propositions regarding incentives for technology transfers and protection against imitation. Research relied on a questionnaire-based investigation in 67 joint ventures and case studies in various industries. Three lessons were drawn. (1) Each partner contributes with a differentiated set of idiosyncratic and non-substitutable set of resources; technology is the core contribution of foreign companies no matter which aspect is examined. There is an almost perfect symmetry between the pooled resources and the learning objectives of each partner. (2) Chinese respondents give a strong competitive value to technology transfers. (3) Beyond traditional technical and legal protection, foreign companies slow down imitation with three strategies: taking advantage of time lag; keeping the most creative value added stages at home; playing, not on the technology itself, but on inherent financial or commercial obstacles.     

A structural model on the impact of prediscovery licensing and research joint ventures on innovation and product market efficiency

Using a novel database on prediscovery licensing agreements (one type of R&D cooperation) as well as detailed firm-level and semiconductor market-specific information, we estimate the impact of prediscovery licensing agreements (PDLAs) on innovation and product market efficiency. Our results show that PDLAs reduce innovative activity in the semiconductor industry by 10 percent, or 4089 patents, throughout the 1989–1999 period. On the contrary, research joint ventures (a different type of R&D cooperation) increase innovative activity. Based on a structural model, we provide evidence that PDLAs increase production costs and semiconductor prices by 1 percent, which results in customers paying an additional $1.1 billion for semiconductors per year. Beyond the common concern that R&D cooperations facilitate coordination activities in product markets via price fixing, our study highlights that PDLAs can be used as an instrument to coordinate R&D activities, which can reduce innovation activity and increase costs and prices.     

Absorptive capacity,learning, and performance in international joint ventures

This paper proposes and tests a model of IJV learning and performance that segments absorptive capacity into the three components originally proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). First, trust between an IJV's parents and the IJV's relative absorptive capacity with its foreign parent are suggested to influence its ability to understand new knowledge held by foreign parents. Second, an IJV's learning structures and processes are proposed to influence its ability to assimilate new knowledge from those parents. Third, the IJV's strategy and training competence are suggested to shape its ability to apply the assimilated knowledge. Revisiting the Hungarian IJVs studied by Lyles and Salk (1996) 3 years later, we find support for the knowledge understanding and application predictions, and partial support for the knowledge assimilation prediction. Unexpectedly, our results suggest that trust and management support from foreign parents are associated with IJV performance but not learning. Our model and results offer a new perspective on IJV learning and performance as well as initial insights into how those relationships change over time. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and performance consequences of learning success in international joint ventures

This study examined a sample of organizations involved in international joint ventures, (IJVs) in Malaysia. Drawing upon the resource based view of the firm this paper investigates the antecedents and performance consequences of learning success of foreign partners in IJVs. Data was analysed using two-stage least squares regression (2SLS). Results suggest that a learning orientation, IJV partner mutual dependency and management control, have a positive effect upon the learning success. Results also suggest that organizations with higher levels of learning orientation and learning success have higher levels of business performance. The findings imply that foreign partners in IJVs that are successful in achieving their learning goals, and improving their knowledge, will be winners in terms of improving their business performance.     

Effect of equity ownership on the survival of international joint ventures

This note extends transaction cost analysis of international joint ventures (IJVs) to include explicitly the effect of equity. It challenges the common practice of treating all foreign investments with between 5 percent and 95 percent equity as IJVs. A fine‐grained analysis of the role of foreign equity ownership on the survival of 12,984 overseas subsidiaries confirms a declining, nonlinear, and asymmetrical relationship between equity and mortality in overseas subsidiaries. While investments involving small ownership levels (<20%) have very high mortality rates, those with high ownership levels (>80%) have mortality rates comparable to that of wholly owned subsidiaries. Implications for research, practice, and policy are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pre-emptive patenting,joint ventures,and the persistence of oligopoly

Gilbert and Newbery (1982) have examined pre-emptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. The present paper considers pre-emptive patenting when there are several incumbent firms, rather than just one. It is shown why the incumbent oligopolists, behaving non-cooperatively, might fail to deter entry. This suggests that a joint venture in R and D might be a useful entry-deterring device insofar as it pools the incumbents' incentives to prevent entry. This is indeed the case for ‘small’ innovations, but for ‘large’ innovations the formation of a joint venture weakens the incumbents' incentive to innovate by removing the competitive stimulus between them.