金字塔股权结构与公司价值研究评述及展望

本文回顾了公司股权结构研究的新方向:金字塔股权结构与公司价值的中外研究成果与现状.重点分析了中国公司金字塔股权结构的特点与西方研究的家族集团金字塔股权结构的区别.明确了中国大部分公司作为最终控股股东、现金流量权与控制权不分离的情况下,开展金字塔股权结构研究的方向与展望.     

金字塔股权结构与公司治理——基于终极产权视角

本文运用终极产权论对中国上市公司的控股主体重新进行定义,基于对中国上市公司金字塔所有权结构的分析,研究金字塔结构下终极所有权与控制权对公司治理研究的意义。     

民营上市公司的金字塔股权结构及其风险问题

金字塔股权结构目前在我国民营上市公司中广泛存在。本文分析了民营上市公司的金字塔股权结构广泛存在的原因以及这种结构下蕴藏的风险,并提出了相关建议。     

金字塔股权结构:抑制国有上市公司资产注入中利益输送的重要机制

本文介绍了金字塔结构在国有上市公司中强化终极控制人权力、为大股东"支持"提供便利、抑制政府干预等积极作用,并从金字塔股权结构减少劣质资产注入、降低盈余管理程度两方面对其抑制国有上市公司资产注入中利益输送的机理进行了相关分析,以期丰富有关金字塔股权结构和资产注入的研究.     

谈民营上市公司的金字塔股权结构及其风险问题

金字塔股权结构目前在我国民营上市公司中广泛存在。本文分析了民营上市公司的金字塔股权结构广泛存在的原因以及这种结构下蕴藏的风险,并提出了相关建议。     

谈民营上市公司的金字塔股权结构及其风险问题

金字塔股权结构目前在我国民营上市公司中广泛存在.本文分析了民营上市公司的全字塔股权结构广泛存在的原因以及这种结构下蕴藏的风险,并提出了相关建议.     

金字塔股权结构下控股动机对企业价值的影响

金字塔股权结构下,终极控股股东利用控制权侵害中小股东及公司利益,进而影响企业价值的事件层出不穷,对于此问题的研究也是财务理论界研究的热点之一。文章在已有研究的基础上,建立两个基于控制权私利的模型。金字塔股权结构下在终极控股股东所有权与控制权分离的前提下,分析终极控股股东的控股动机及其对企业价值的影响。     

浅谈贵州省上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系

本文基于公司治理的基本理论,对贵州上市公司的股权结构与公司价值的关系进行了探讨,希望能有助于完善贵州省上市公司的股权治理结构,促进贵州上市公司及资本市场的健康发展。     

金字塔股权结构相关问题研究

金字塔股权结构已成为公司治理问题研究的热点问题,文章论述了金字塔股权结构研究的背景、金字塔股权结构的理论基础、金字塔股权结构形成的影响因素等,对深入认识金字塔股权结构具有一定的意义。     

金字塔股权结构视角下多元化经营与国企绩效

本文结合我国国有企业实施混合所有制改革的现实背景,研究了国有企业在金字塔股权结构下多元化经营与企业绩效的关系.分析表明,在我国的混合所有制改革中,金字塔股权结构能够发挥重要的作用,金字塔结构与多元化程度正相关,多元化经营可以提高国企的经营绩效,相关多元化表现更加显著.本文的研究不仅为多元化经营与国企绩效的关系提供了一个崭新的视角,而且对国有企业的混改具有一定的政策指导意义.     

中国上市公司的股权结构：成因与影响

股权结构对公司绩效、治理模式具有重要的影响。影响一国公司股权结构的因素是多方面的,但证券市场监管水平的差异和对中小投资者的法律保护程度差异是主要的因素。当前中国上市公司股权结构、证券监管及法律环境造成了公司治理及绩效中的诸多问题,特别是控股股东对外部投资者利益的侵害。本文对这些问题进行了研究和探讨,并提出了相应的改善措施。     

股权结构对上市公司绩效的影响

文章总结了国外的研究成果,说明股权结构是通过影响公司治理机制来影响公司的业绩,并分析了中国上市公司股权结构的缺陷与成因,以及中国上市公司治理机制的缺陷,同时提出了改善治理绩效的对策。     

Management ownership and corporate value

Existing literature on the relation between management ownership and firm value has provided competing hypotheses and conflicting evidence. Using samples of Fortune 500-sized firms in 1976, 1980 and 1984, we find that corporate value measured by Tobin's q is a function of management ownership. Specifically, the q rises when management ownership is between 0% and 5-7%, and falls as the ownership increases to 10-12%. Beyond this range, we find that the q continues to fall in the 1976 sample, and starts to rise in the 1980 and 1984 samples. The evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a nonmonotonic relation between management ownership and corporate value.     

Liquidity and firm value in an emerging market: Nonlinearity,political connections and corporate ownership

This study re-examines the relationship between liquidity and firm value in the emerging stock market of Malaysia, exploring the issues of nonlinearity and moderating variables. Using data for all non-financial firms traded on Bursa Malaysia over the sample period of 2000–2015, the results from the baseline quadratic model suggest stocks must be traded higher than the threshold liquidity level before reaping the benefit of larger firm value. Our key finding of a nonlinear relationship remains robust to alternative liquidity measures and estimation methods, as well as passing a series of endogeneity checks. Using an ideal candidate of lot size reduction for Malaysian stocks in May 2003 as exogenous liquidity shock, we establish the causal effect from liquidity to firm value. Further interaction analyses uncover three important moderating variables in the liquidity-firm value relationship, in which the value impact demands a more liquid market for Malaysian public firms with political connections, higher foreign nominee ownership and higher foreign institutional ownership.     

Foreign ownership,human capital,and the structure of wages in Japan

We examine the differences in the structure of wages between domestic and foreign-owned establishments in Japan. We use high-quality datasets from the Japanese government and construct a large employer–employee matched database consisting of 1 million workers in 1998. Our results confirm that foreign-owned establishments in Japan pay higher wages. We estimate that one percentage increase in foreign-ownership share of equity raises wages by 0.3%. We surmise that this foreign-ownership wage premium can be explained, at least in part, by compensating wage differentials. Workers in foreign-owned establishments are not protected by lifetime employment. They receive higher compensation for being exposed to higher risk and forfeiting their employment security. We also find that in foreign-owned establishments, wages are determined more by general skills, and less by firm-specific skills. These effects become more pronounced among establishments with a higher share of foreign ownership. The gender wage gap is considerably smaller among foreign establishments. Given the lack of long-term prospects for women in the Japanese labor market, foreign-owned establishments may be one source of ‘brain drain’ for highly skilled women there.     

对中国上市公司治理模式的思考

20世纪90年代以来,公司治理研究推崇英美模式,而由美国引发的经济危机使中国企业开始反思英美模式的不足,并寻求适合自身特点的治理模式。本文首先回顾了公司治理研究的进程,然后比较说明不同治理模式的优劣,最后指出在当前经济危机形势下中国公司治理面临的问题,并提出改进建议。     

The role of ownership structure in integrated reporting policies

Integrated reporting (IR) is used to demonstrate a firm's capacity to create value in the short, medium, and long term. It can better represent existing relationships between the company and its stakeholders, with a particular focus on investors. Attention to IR has grown considerably in recent years. However, studies on the determinants of IR quality are still limited. This study aims to bridge this literature gap by being the first study to analyse the role of ownership structure in IR context. To this end, it uses agency theory and is based on a sample of 152 international companies that have adopted IR. The results indicate a positive effect of institutional ownership and a negative effect of ownership concentration, managerial ownership and state ownership on the quality of integrated reports. These results are also consistent with the level of alignment of integrated reports with the <IR> framework. To our knowledge, this is the first study that analyses the role of ownership structure in the IR policies.     

Does ownership structure matter when CPA deciding types of audit opinions

Ownership structure is one of the most important and basic corporate governance characteristics. Thus, does the ownership structure of a firm have an effect on the type of audit opinion it receives from CPA？ This paper uses a sample including 1246 non-financial listed companies from China A-share market in 2003. Empirical results show： for listed firms, external auditor＇s propensity to qualify is lower with lower proportion of public shares, or with higher concentration of shares at a marginal significant level. However, the proportions of state-owned shares and institutional shares have no significant effects on audit opinions. A possible explanation is that the ownership structure influences risk awareness and negotiation power of audit firms, influences negotiation power of clients, and then ultimately influences auditors＇ reporting decision and audit opinions. The potential policy implication is： a more dispersed ownership structure and/or a higher proportion of public shares are preferable for higher audit reporting conservatism and audit quality in China.     

Agency costs,corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis

This paper examines the impact of governance and ownership variables on agency costs for a panel of large UK quoted companies. We use three measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales-to-total assets, the interaction of free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. We employ a range of techniques to analyse the data: fixed-effects, instrumental variables, and Tobit regressions. We find that the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally, affected agency costs. This suggests a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value maximisation. We also find that having a nomination committee increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board ownership also helps to reduce agency costs. We also find that debt reduces agency costs. Our results raise questions about the usefulness of the information sent to shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework.     

A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece

This study attempts to investigate whether corporate performance is affected by the ownership structure, using data from companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1996–1998. Given such an objective, the basic hypothesis examined, is that corporate performance as measured by Tobin's Q ratio is a function of ownership and other control variables. Our econometric approach relies on the use of a combination of time series and cross section data (panel‐data analysis), a procedure that avoids many statistical problems. After examining the role of each identifiable shareholder, we find a positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate performance. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.