创新网络中企业自主知识产权交互对创新绩效的影响

共享经济环境下区域性创新网络的形成,推动了网络中不同企业节点的协同发展。伴随着企业的市场发展需求,依据知识产权保护进行知识搜索和产权交互成为企业间协同创新的重要内容。基于企业间竞合理念,从创新网络中企业节点间互动机制视角出发,探讨企业自主知识产权交互、实际吸收能力、知识产权风险与企业创新绩效之间的关系。研究表明：企业自主知识产权交互与创新绩效之间呈显著倒U型关系;实际吸收能力对企业创新绩效产生直接显著作用,并且部分中介企业自主知识产权交互与创新绩效之间的关系;另外,知识产权风险能够正向显著调节企业自主知识产权交互与实际吸收能力之间的关系。研究结论有利于进一步强化创新网络企业间自主知识产权交互和实际吸收能力,并在有效规避知识产权风险的同时促进企业创新绩效提升。     

Violence,access, and competition in the market for protection

We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the performance of a market for protection. As the central feature of our treatment comparisons, we vary the access that “peasants” have to violence-empowered “elites”. The focus of the experiment is to observe how elites enforce and operate their protective services to peasants, and to observe the degree to which elites engage in wealth-destroying violence in competition amongst each other for wealth-generating peasants. We find that greater access to peasants strikingly increases violence among the elites, but with limited access the elites markedly extract more tribute from the peasants. Our findings are particularly relevant to the discussion of violence in developing countries.     

Educated Bandits: Endogenous Property Rights and Intra‐Elite Distribution of Human Capital

This article presents a simple model of endogenous institutions linking property rights to the distribution of human capital between political and economic elite groups. In the absence of institutional constraints, the commitment problem of the political elites is intensified, because their human capital can turn out to be a double‐edged sword raising their efficiency in predation as well as in production. In general, the more human capital the political elites have, the stronger the institutional concessions they are ready to offer to attarct investment. Provided that predation depends sufficiently on human capital, the political elites can credibly commit to respect property rights by specializing in fields that are relevant for the priavte sector. Brain drain can undermine the transition to stable property rights even when the political elites are well‐educated. Comparative narratives from Malaysia and Zimbabwe are presented to motivate the theoretical discussion.     

外资在华技术创新溢出是否促进内资企业技术进步——基于门槛效应的经验分析

利用2010—2019年中国A股上市公司数据,构建面板门槛模型,探讨外资在华技术创新溢出对内资企业技术进步的门槛效应。结果表明,外资在华技术创新溢出自身存在单门槛效应,对内资企业技术进步的影响呈倒U型关系;以行业外资竞争、内资模仿同构和区域知识产权保护为门槛变量发现,仅当外资竞争水平较低、内资模仿同构程度较低以及区域知识产权保护力度较大时,外资在华技术创新溢出才能促进内资企业技术进步,且其阈值效应存在行业和企业产权异质性。     

Institutions matter,but which ones?

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.     

Expropriation risk and competition within the military

How can agents in the military, who control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model, even if agents within the military could expropriate all output costlessly, it is attractive to protect producers from predating military units. This marginal defensive advantage and consequently defence is an effective way to potentially eliminate is because there is a other military units, reducing competition and leading to higher future payoffs. Our model predicts that greater internal competition within the military lowers the risk of expropriation and that this effect is strongest for countries with low institutional and economic development. Testing this prediction empirically, we find a robust negative relationship between competition within the military and expropriation risk. In line with our model this effect is strongest for countries at lower stages of institutional and economic development, and it weakens as the latter improve. These results indicate that there may be a short-run component to property rights institutions that varies with the degree of competition among agents who control the means of coercion.     

Regime security and taxation in autocracies: Who is taxed and how?

We study taxation by autocratic rulers. Using a detailed dataset on government finances in 105 autocracies from 1950 to 2004, we find that despotic autocrats, who are defined as personally concentrating all decision-making power and as not relying on elites for regime support, tend, with a middle class absent, to use lower personal income taxes in face of a threat of rebellion from the population-at-large and to use higher land and property taxes to financially repress elites. When the threat to the regime is from elites, taxation is the converse, with the tax burden on elites is relaxed. Our empirical results show how autocratic rulers choose forms of taxation with awareness of elites and the population-at-large as groups that can threaten regime security.     

DIVISIONS OF LABOUR, SPECIALIZATION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract. This paper uses a model of endogenous theft and endogenous network division of labour to formalize some of the main principles of the economics of the state and to explore related issues concerning why new constitutional rules emerge and evolve. The model suggests that fiscal competition between states facilitates important circular effects, which propel improvements in economic welfare and promote economic growth. In particular, improvements in institutional efficiency expand the demand for transactions, which in turn increases the need for further third‐party protection of property rights. We illustrate our results using the growth of the state system in Western Europe.     

Property rights,entrepreneurship and coordination

The notion of plan coordination enjoys a central place in the analysis of institutions and competitive market processes. The conventional wisdom is that institutions and policies vary in the extent to which they promote competition and how quickly and completely they bring individuals’ plans into closer coordination with one another. Kirzner has provided the most fully elaborated statement on the use of coordination as a positive analytical device for explaining market dynamics and as a normative criterion for evaluating economic policies. We identify the core propositions in his analysis that elucidate how economic coordination depends upon that most fundamental of market institutions – the system of private property rights. We also probe into Kirzner's claims about inherent limitations in our ability to compare the coordinative potential of alternative property rights systems. We unpack the consequences of these core propositions using the economic theory of property rights. We also examine Kirzner's assertion that dynamic competition – including Schumpeterian innovation – is necessarily coordinative in its market effects. We find that his argument rests on the implicit assumption that property rights remain constant during the process of market adjustment. We provide a case study of the advent of commercial aviation as a potential counterexample to his claims.     

Governance Reforms and Growth: Some Ideas from Economic Theory

Ideas from the theory of incentives and organization are deployed to examine how some aspects of economic governance—primarily protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and oversight regulation—can be improved for achieving better economic growth and development. Some suggestions for reform of governance institutions in developing countries are offered.     

The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures

This paper addresses whether the welfare analysis of the agreements and rules of a professional sports league should depend on the organisational form chosen by the league's participants. Courts have analysed sports leagues both as associations of horizontal competitors and as single entities. The former approach suggests much less tolerance for rules that affect competition. Drawing on the distinction between ex ante and ex post competition that has been found useful in the economic analysis of intellectual property rights, the authors suggest a middle road in the horizontal competitors versus single entity characterisations of professional sports leagues.     

增长的政治经济逻辑：政府分权与激励的视角

政府分权是实现我国增长的重要制度安排。本文以中央与地方政府、地方政府与微观主体分权为逻辑起点,以制度-结构-行为-绩效为分析框架,从激励与约束的视角研究地方政府行为。研究认为,在分权激励下,地方会展开“中国式的政府竞争”,并过多的保护资本,而忽视劳动力、土地、环境等要素的产权。非均衡的产权制度在经济发展前期能够实现公众与地方政府的共容利益。随外在约束条件的不断变化,在原有的激励模式下,“包容性增长”被“排斥性增长”所替代。在缺乏公众的约束下,地方政府带来激励偏差会加大。因此,作对地方政府的激励是转变经济发展方式的关键。     

知识产权保护的技术创新效应——基于技术交易市场视角和省级面板数据的实证分析

文章利用1997-2008年省级面板数据,以技术市场成交额占当地GDP的比重来衡量地区知识产权保护水平,采用系统广义矩估计和门槛回归方法实证分析了知识产权保护对技术创新的影响。研究结果表明,加强知识产权保护能够显著促进技术创新;知识产权保护与研发物质资本和人力资本投入之间分别具有互补性和替代性;我国大部分地区已经跨越了知识产权保护水平的门槛值,加强知识产权保护不会阻碍技术创新。因此,要提高我国的自主创新能力,进一步加强知识产权保护不容懈怠。     

产权管制放松与制度绩效变迁——来自广东经济非均衡转轨的证据

过去大量的研究强调政策、区域、禀赋等对广东经济转轨绩效的影响,论文从产权管制放松的角度出发,构建了一个简单的博弈论模型,旨在分析广东政府放松对资源配置权利的管制对经济转轨产生的制度效应。研究发现,广东各级地方政府放松对资源配置权利的管制,大幅节约了租金耗散,并衍生出更多给予经济个体发挥比较优势的获利空间,扩展了市场范围,从而促进了地区经济均衡转轨。论文对于理解广东经济转轨问题提供了一个新的视角和框架,它尤其有助于揭示产权管制放松与经济绩效变迁二者之间的内在机理和制度逻辑。     

The economic debate on power: a Marxist critique

In the economic debate on power, seemingly opposite positions have been presented. Contractualists have claimed that power relations do not exist in capitalism, and radicals have maintained that they are ubiquitous. In the middle, transaction costs and property rights economists have argued that power relations exist only within the firm. The underlying conception, however, is the same: power is an interpersonal relation caused by imperfections in the decision-making context and is incompatible with Walrasian competition. The difference among these theories involves their viewpoints on the concrete spread of imperfections in reality. The thesis of this paper is that this narrow conception of power is a consequence of neoclassical methodology. Following Marx, I analyze power as a social relation, and I discuss three problematic aspects of the neoclassical conception: its individualistic methodology, the assumption of universal rather than historical categories, and an ontology that conflates production and circulation.     

网络联结、知识产权保护与创新绩效

基于社会网络分析法，以2011—2016年创业板上市公司为对象，用独立董事间的连锁关系反映样本企业社会网络弱联结关系,用地理及行业关系反映社会网络强联结关系，以此检验不同网络联结强度对企业创新绩效的影响。结果显示，社会网络强联结和弱联结均能促进企业创新。在此基础上，利用5个指标构建我国省际知识产权保护水平指数，验证了知识产权保护对于网络联结强度和创新绩效存在一定调节效用。结论为企业创新发展提供了新视角。     

数据要素市场培育：法律难题、域外经验与中国方案

数字经济时代,数据继土地、劳动力、资本、技术之后成为第五大生产要素。目前我国数据权属确定的法律制度不够完善,数据要素市场交易的法律制度尚未建立,数据要素市场监管的法律制度不够健全,这都制约了我国数据要素市场发展。为了培育数据要素市场,应以数据生产者与数据处理者为划分标准,建立“数据生产者（扩展权利)—数据处理者（有限产权)”的数据产权制度;以“降低制度成本—减少交易成本”的思路完善数据要素市场交易相关规则;以“事前预防与事后规制相结合”的方式完善数据要素市场监管法律制度。     

知识产权保护能促进经济增长吗？--基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析

在Ginarte-Park方法的基础上,考虑到处于司法转型期的发展中国家的执法力度和立法强度,建立知识产权保护强度指标体系,将中国30个省、自治区、直辖市知识产权保护水平量化。接着运用面板数据分析方法,以人均实际GDP对数为被解释变量,以知识产权保护强度为解释变量,通过实证分析验证了我国加强知识产权保护与经济增长的关系,证明了中国的知识产权保护水平与经济增长之间的显著正相关关系。然后对东中西部地区分别进行实证分析,绘制了异常经济增长与知识产权保护强度的散点图,来作为稳健性检验的一部分。并通过对变量的相关系数矩阵图的分析,初步探讨了知识产权保护促进经济增长的具体路径。结果表明,在控制了时间效应后,知识产权保护强度能够解释省份个体效应的37.4%。     

Economic Competition,Policy Interdependence,and Labour Rights

Extant scholarship treats national policies concerning labour rights as a function of economic factors and yet neglects influences of policies among economically competing states. Relying on the policy interdependence theory, this study argues that labour rights policy in a state is dependent on its economic competitors’ labour policy decisions. It specifically maintains that the intensifying competition for foreign direct investment and exports as well as against imports channels negative externalities of deteriorating labour protection in competing states which drives expansive downward policy mimicking and leads to a global decline in labour rights – a race to the bottom. Utilising spatial econometric technique to analyse a new data on labour rights for the period 1994–2009, it finds that labour rights practices are interdependent among economic competitors and experience global deteriorations; whereas labour rights laws remain largely independent due to high policy and reputational costs of lowering them and show more fluctuations.     

中国省际知识产权保护空间关联网络研究

运用主成分分析法测算2007-2017年中国省际知识产权保护强度,借助引力模型识别中国省际知识产权保护空间关联关系,在此基础上通过社会网络分析方法对中国省际知识产权保护空间关联网络进行深入分析。结果发现：首先,中国省际知识产权保护强度呈现显著的地区差异,且各省份间知识产权保护强度并非独立存在;其次,中国省际知识产权保护空间关联呈现出典型的网络结构形态,网络连通性较好且不存在明显等级性,但空间关联关系紧密程度有待加强;再次,不同省份由于经济发展水平和地理位置等不同在空间关联网络中表现迥异;最后,中国省际知识产权保护空间关联网络不可分割,不同板块在知识产权保护方面相互依赖,营造了一个信息互通的良好平台。