The Influence of a Neighbouring Market on Product Qualities and Prices

This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation in which there is a primary market with two firms and a secondary market with no firms. Consumers in the secondary market incur a cost when purchasing the product from the primary market. The firms sequentially choose product quality and then simultaneously choose prices. Firm 1 always chooses the maximum quality, while firm 2's quality and the prices depend on the cost. Also, the cost determines which firm(s), if either, serves the secondary market. It is shown that the firms and the consumers of each market prefer different levels of costs.     

Environmental Product Differentiation and Environmental Awareness

In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers (green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it. Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the positive market effect.      

Pricing to Firm: an Analysis of Firm‐ and Product‐level Import Prices*

We use Hungarian Customs data on product‐level imports of manufacturing firms to document that the import price of a particular product varies substantially across buying firms. We relate the level of import prices to firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, and market power. We develop a theory of “pricing to firm” (PTF), where markups depend on the technology and competitive environment of the buyer. The predictions of the model are confirmed by the data: import prices are higher for firms with greater market power, and for more essential intermediate inputs (with a high share in material costs). We take account of the endogeneity of the buyer’s market power with respect to higher import prices and unobserved cost heterogeneity within product categories. The magnitude of PTF is big: the standard deviation of price predicted by PTF is 21.5%.     

Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Goods have Network Effects

Abstract. The objective of our approach is to develop a model that captures horizontal product differentiation under environmental awareness with price competition whereby environmentally friendly products are costlier to produce. As an example, we refer to automobile producers offering cars with a gasoline-powered engine and one with a natural gas-powered engine. The network of petrol stations provides the complementary good. We use a two-stage game in prices and characteristics to analyse the market structure. In order to find out whether a private decision on the type of engine coincides with a socially optimal product differentiation, we determine the position of the two types of engine by a welfare-maximizing authority.     

A hybrid equilibrium in segmented markets: the three-firm case

In this paper, we characterize two hybrid equilibria for the three-firm case in segmented markets in which consumers not only value the product itself but also the environment within which the consumption takes place. In equilibrium, the firm with the larger population of loyal consumers chooses the monopoly price while the remaining two firms play a mixed strategy. In the duopoly case, the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies and no firm focuses only on its loyal consumers.     

PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS HOMING

We consider two-sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single-home, multi-home, or exit the market. We find that the competitive bottleneck allocation in which consumers single-home and firms multi-home is always an equilibrium. In addition, we find equilibria with multi-homing and single-homing on each side of the market. However, unlike the standard pricing result where the side that multi-homes faces higher prices, we find that lower prices coincide with multi-homing: agents find multi-homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. We also show that endogenous homing can induce straddle pricing which deters price undercutting between platforms.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly With Network Compatibility Effects

We consider the efficiency of price and quantity competition in a network products market, where we observe product compatibility with network externalities (hereafter, network compatibility effects). In particular, if network compatibility effects between firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the Cournot equilibrium is more efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of larger consumer, producer and total surpluses. Then, we consider an endogenous choice of the strategic variables, price and quantity. If the degree of network compatibility effects of the rival firm is larger (smaller) than the degree of product substitutability, then choosing prices (quantities) is a dominant strategy for the firm. Thus, if the network compatibility effects of both firms are larger (smaller), the Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium arises. Furthermore, if the network compatibility effects between the firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the firm with a larger (smaller) network compatibility effect than a certain level of product substitutability chooses quantities (prices). In this case, the Cournot–Bertrand equilibrium arises, which is less (more) efficient than the Cournot equilibrium in terms of consumer (producer) surplus.     

Price competition in a differentiated products duopoly under network effects

We examine price competition under product-specific network effects, in a duopoly where the products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. We emphasize the role of consumers’ expectations formation. When expectations are not influenced by prices, the market may be shared but shares must be equal unless product qualities differ or one firm, possibly even the low-quality one, may capture the entire market. When expectations are influenced by prices, which would be the case when there is commitment, competition becomes more intense and the high-quality firm tends to capture a larger market share. Under strong network effects there is a continuum of equilibria and the higher the prices, the smaller the difference between those prices can be. Requiring continuity of expectations, however, delivers a unique equilibrium where one firm captures the entire market.     

When should firms choose a risky new technology? An oligopolistic analysis

How to choose technology type in a competitive environment is an important and challenging problem, which has received little attention from scholars. To fill this gap, this paper builds a game-theoretic model to examine whether a firm should choose to adopt a risky new technology or to adopt a safe new technology to reduce its marginal cost. I find that the result that each firm should always choose the risky technology in a duopoly may be invalid when more firms enter the market. In this scenario, some firms should adopt the safe technology for relatively high product substitutability because the advantage of employing the risky technology is threatened by the business stealing externality, finally forming heterogeneous equilibria in which both types of technologies are present. Furthermore, I show that the heterogeneous technology choice equilibria are more likely to arise when increasing number of firms enter the market, and that in these equilibria more firms always choose the risky technology than the safe technology. This study conveys relevant economic insights for competitive firms confronted with a dilemma between taking risks in pursuit of greater technology rewards and taking no risks for conservative technology returns.     

The relationship among enterprise clustering,prices, and productivity in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector

We use census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing firms to analyze how enterprise clustering in local markets covaries with firm‐level output prices and physical productivity. We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between the density of firms that produce a given product in a given location and the local price of that product. We also find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the density of firms that produce a given product in a location and the physical productivity of same‐product firms in the location. These results are consistent with the notion that increased clustering of firms generates higher competitive pressure and positive externalities. Across firms that produce different products, we find no statistically significant relationship between enterprise clustering and firm‐level output prices and productivity. We also find no clustering effects across towns. Our results suggest that while clustering can impact firm performance, the advantages are narrow in scope.     

TIME TO MARKET AND IMPATIENT CUSTOMERS

We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they produce differentiated goods and compete on prices. We find two subgame perfect equilibria: one in which the high‐quality firm holds its leadership in quality, and another in which the low‐quality firm leapfrogs its rival. When the initial level of differentiation is high enough, the low‐quality firm always launches first. Finally, we extend this model to analyse commercial piracy. We obtain that pirates are highly unlikely to launch the illegal copy first because they would bear a higher penalty and a higher risk of being detected.     

DOUBLE‐SIDED ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET AND THE ROLE OF THE INSURANCE MARKET*

I investigate the interrelation between a product market and an insurance market when adverse‐selection problems exist both in consumers and in firms. Firms offer warranties for product failures. Consumers may further purchase first‐party insurance for the residual risks of product failures. Given that the insurance market exists, two types of equilibria are possible: (a) Different firm types offer different pooling warranties attracting both good and bad consumer types or (b) good firms attract only bad consumers and bad firms attract both types of consumers. I discuss the existence and the efficiency implication of the insurance market.     

Supermarket Choice and Supermarket Competition in Market Equilibrium

Multi-store firms are common in the retailing industry. Theory suggests that cross-elasticities between stores of the same firm enhance market power. To evaluate the importance of this effect in the U.K. supermarket industry, we estimate a model of consumer choice and expenditure using three data sources: profit margins for each chain, a survey of consumer choices and a data-set of store characteristics. To permit plausible substitution patterns, the utility model interacts consumer and store characteristics. We measure market power by calculating the effect of merger and demerger on Nash equilibrium prices. Demerger reduces the prices of the largest firms by between 2 and  3.8%  depending on local concentration; mergers between the largest firms lead to price increases up to  7.4%  .     

CHOICE OF PRODUCT TYPE BY STRATEGICALLY INTERDEPENDENT FIRMS

The paper analyses the degree of product differentiation between sigle product firms in alternative market equilibria. The equilibria are stable in the sense of Nash, and both non-cooperative and tacitly collusive market outcomesare identified. The basic model follows the 'address' aproach to product differentiation, and the firms' strategic variables are choice of product type and price charged. When all firms are non-cooperative, product gaps between firms are equal; but tacit collusion results in product gap variation between firms in Nash equilibrium. In all cases, profits for any firm are assumed to be proportional to the multiple of the product gaps between that firm and each of its two closest rivals.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

Price competition and quality differentiation with multiproduct firms

This paper examines a two-stage competition where firms simultaneously choose the number of products and qualities in the first stage, and then compete in prices. It is shown that a monopolist must sell a single product. In addition, in any equilibrium of multiproduct duopoly, there are segmented patterns of quality differentiation. Entangled configurations never emerge because each firm has an incentive to reduce the number of products facing direct competition with its rival. This result contrasts sharply with the equilibrium of non-segmented quality differentiation when firms compete in quantities. Furthermore, we find that the high-quality firm never offers more products than the low-quality firm, and quality differentiation between firms is greater than that within a firm.     

Price competition when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity

It has long been recognized that the pleasure of consuming a good may be affected by the consumption choice of other consumers. In some cases, social pressures may lead to conformity; in some others, individuals may feel the need of exclusiveness under the form of vanity. Such externalities have proven to be important in several markets. However, the market implication of these externalities are still unclear. To investigate them, we propose to combine the consumption externality model and the spatial duopoly model. When conformity is present but not too strong, both firms remain in business but price competition is fiercer and results in lower prices. The market share of the large firm increases with the population size; as the population keeps rising, the large firm may serve the entire market and set a price that has the nature of a limit price. When conformity is strong enough, different equilibria may exist. In most of these equilibria, a single firm captures the whole market. At the other extreme, when vanity is at work, price competition is relaxed.     

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

THE IMPACT OF FOOD PRICE SHOCK ON HETEROGENEOUS CREDIT CONSTRAINED FIRMS

ABSTRACT 1 : The paper analyzes how rising food and energy prices affect heterogeneous firm access to inputs and production under credit market imperfections. We estimate a firm credit constraint equation using a unique firm level panel data and find that, on average, small individual firms (IF) are more credit constrained than large corporate firms (CF). Using the estimated parameters, we simulate the effect of the recent food price shock on the world markets. Our results suggest that in the presence of credit market imperfections, the less credit constrained CF benefit relatively more from food price increase than IF, as they are able to expand their production more flexibly. These findings have important policy implications for countries with significant market imperfections. In the case of the food price shock, not only consumers but also producers, which on average are more credit constrained than producers in developed countries, may lose their market shares and hence their income in the long run.     

On the relationship between intermediate input imports and export quality in China

This paper studies the connection between intermediate input imports and firms’ export quality using firm‐level data from 2000 to 2007. Our regression results show that intermediate input imports promote manufacturing firms’ export quality through ‘variety effects’ and ‘innovation effects’, though the effects are significantly different among firms with different characteristics, and the magnitude of these effects differs across import sources and the quality of imported intermediate inputs themselves. Moreover, we find that a good institutional environment is conducive to the strengthening of the positive influence of intermediate input imports on export quality. Furthermore, the dynamic decomposition demonstrates that the reallocation effect is the key force through which imported inputs boost industrial aggregate quality growth. Taken together, these results suggest that product upgrading facilitated by quality embedded in imported intermediate inputs, a good institutional environment and market share reallocation help Chinese firms to improve the quality of their export products.