The determinants of director remuneration,executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms

This paper examines the impact of board governance mechanisms, namely board size, independence ratio, opacity of earnings disclosure, and ratio of genuinely independent nonexecutive directors to total board size on director remuneration, executive tenure and likelihood of individual executive salary disclosure in a unique and comprehensive sample of 69 North African IPO firms. I find evidence of the enhanced governance role of true independent nonexecutives in family as opposed to non-family firms in improving disclosure of individual salaries and moderating lengths of executive tenure. However while their role is only significant in the context of family firms the evidence suggests that their presence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. The evidence also ascribes a greater role for business angel as opposed to more formal private equity financing which is more applicable within the highly social networked economy of the Maghreb region.     

Governance and Funds Allocation in United States Medical Research Charities

We examine boards of directors of medical research charities and find that medical charities spend less on program activities and more on fund-raising when the executive director of the charity serves on the board of directors, especially when the board is small. Executive salaries are also higher at charities where management is represented on the board. Management and general expenses and fund balances are, however, unrelated either to the presence of an insider on the board or to the size of the board.     

The Small World of Corporate Boards

Abstract:  We demonstrate the importance of graph theory for understanding boards of directors. Specifically, we focus on the 'small world' phenomenon. Our empirical results show that a random graph model is remarkably good at explaining board structure and connectedness in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. Although there are small-world traits such as 'clustering' and 'short-paths' in the corporate world, they are no more pronounced than would be expected by chance in a statistically similar, but randomly assembled corporate universe. In short, boards of directors, especially in the United States, are no more 'clubby' than expected. Finally, our results show the existence of positive degree correlation: directors who sit on many boards do so in the company of other directors who sit on many boards. Board members whose services are in high demand, serve on boards with similar directors.     

略谈代表(执行)董事及其对第三人的责任

现代公司的权力由股东转移到董事会手中 ,而实际行使权力的主要是代表 (执行 )董事。其对公司有一定的控制力 ,就应当承担相应的义务。在代表 (执行 )董事造成公司损害同时也使第三人遭受损害时 ,要对第三人承担损害赔偿责任。我国公司法应该借鉴英美法系的做法 ,以完善我国的公司制度。     

Pandemic risk disclosure in integrated reports: after COVID-19 is hindsight 2020?

We examine whether, and to what extent companies disclosed pandemic risk and likely impact as part of their key risks or material matters immediately prior to 2020. The integrated/annual reports of 489 companies from six global regions were examined, finding that despite clear warnings from multiple fronts that highlighted the inevitability and imminence of a global pandemic, only 15.5 percent of companies disclosed anything related to pandemic risk. Of these, 71.1 percent were boilerplate in nature, providing minimal useful information to stakeholders. This study contributes to our understanding of integrated reporting, specifically regarding the adequacy of the disclosure of material risks.     

Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?

Abstract:   This paper examines whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board monitoring. We focus on two aspects of board monitoring: the role of outside board members and the audit committee. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making income‐increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. We also find that the chance of abnormal accruals being large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure that profit does not decline is significantly lower for firms with a high proportion of outside board members. In contrast, we find little evidence that outside directors influence income‐decreasing abnormal accruals when pre‐managed earnings are high. We find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects the extent of income‐increasing manipulations to meet or exceed these thresholds. Neither do audit committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre‐managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin. Our findings suggest that boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements, as predicted by agency theory.     

Stock markets’ reaction to COVID-19: Cases or fatalities?

In this paper, we examine the stock markets’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Using daily COVID-19 confirmed cases and deaths and stock market returns data from 64 countries over the period January 22, 2020 to April 17, 2020, we find that stock markets responded negatively to the growth in COVID-19 confirmed cases. That is, stock market returns declined as the number of confirmed cases increased. We further find that stock markets reacted more proactively to the growth in number of confirmed cases as compared to the growth in number of deaths. Our analysis also suggests negative market reaction was strong during early days of confirmed cases and then between 40 and 60 days after the initial confirmed cases. Overall, our results suggest that stock markets quickly respond to COVID-19 pandemic and this response varies over time depending on the stage of outbreak.     

Board structure and price informativeness

We develop and test the hypothesis that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate boards. We find a negative relation between price informativeness and board independence. This finding is robust to the inclusion of many firm-level controls, including firm fixed effects, and to the choice of the measure of price informativeness. Consistent with the hypothesis that price informativeness and board monitoring are substitutes, this relation is particularly strong for firms more exposed to both external and internal governance mechanisms and for firms in which firm-specific knowledge is relatively unimportant. Our results suggest that firms with more informative stock prices have less demanding board structures.     

Does corporate social responsibility protect shareholder value from the shock of COVID-19? Evidence from China

Our study examines whether and how increased engagement in social responsibility activities by a firm affects movements in its stock prices during the COVID-19 public health crisis, which is regarded as an exogenous shock to economic ties between focal firms and their customers, employees, and suppliers. We find that corporate social responsibility has an inverted U-shaped relationship with shareholder value. The nonlinear relationship is more dominant at firms with higher cash-flow constraints and weaker cost-adjustment capabilities. Our research also generates meaningful implications for business practices.