Mean-Reversion in REITs Discount to NAV &; Risk Premium

REITs discount to NAV is a puzzling regularity. The sharp increase in volatility of REITs prices over the past few years has spurred a relatively new concern amongst academics, managers and investors about the consequences of, and causes of, property risk premium on discount to NAV. The two interrelated questions arising from the recent increase in volatility of REITs prices are: Is the increased volatility responsible for the observed widening in discount to NAV? What does the observed private and public risk premium tell us about discount to NAV? We attempt to address these questions by analysing risk premiums in private and public real estate markets. The analysis is conducted in the most recent years of high stock price volatility. Our analysis reveals two major results: a tendency for discount to NAV to revert to the long term mean value of 20% and, more significantly, a lower risk premium in equivalent yields in private market than in public market. These results suggest that investors in public market have a different conception of property risk and complexity of lease options than what is conveyed by private property valuation.     

股票停牌、涨跌停与ETF定价效率——基于上证50ETF日度数据的实证研究

本文应用中国股市2007年至2011年的数据,研究了上证50ETF市场价格和基金净值的相关关系,以及折溢价水平及其影响因素。基于ETF的申购赎回和交易机制,在成分股涨跌停板和停牌期间,由于ETF二级市场价格具有价格发现功能,ETF市场价格可能较大偏离(形式上的)ETF净值,造成ETF的异常折溢价,而此类异常折溢价并不是真正的套利机会。另外,上证50ETF的市场价格与基金净值存在显著同步变动的关系;在涨跌停板和停牌期间之外,上证50ETF的折溢价水平低于套利所需的交易成本。本文研究表明,上证50ETF具有较高的定价效率。     

Net Asset Value Discounts for Asian-Pacific Real Estate Companies: Long-Run Relationships and Short-Term Dynamics

This study investigates the time series behavior of real estate company net asset value discount/premium (NAVDISC) in eight Asian-Pacific securitized real estate markets from 1995 to 2003. We postulate that if there is a stable NAVDISC for real estate companies in the long-run, then there should be a long-run cointegrating relation between their stock prices (Ps) and net asset values (NAVs). Employing panel data cointegration econometrics that comprises three approaches; panel unit root test, heterogeneous panel cointegration test and dynamic panel error-correction modeling (ECM), we find that long run NAVDISCs persist in individual Asian-Pacific securitized real estate markets and the regional market. All the NAVDISCs exhibit mean reversion and that the respective disequilibrium errors fluctuate around the mean values. Moreover, NAV is an important factor that statistically explains the price variations in real estate stock prices regardless of their speed of mean-reversion in the NAV discount /premium.     

The irreversibility premium

When investment is irreversible, theory suggests that firms will be “reluctant to invest.” This reluctance creates a wedge between the discount rate guiding investment decisions and the standard Jorgensonian user cost (adjusted for risk). We use the intertemporal tradeoff between benefits and costs of changing the capital stock to estimate this wedge, which we label the irreversibility premium. Estimates are based on panel data for the period 1980-2001. The large dataset allows us to estimate the effects of limited resale markets, low depreciation rates, high uncertainty, and negative industry-wide shocks on the irreversibility premium. Our estimates provide a readily interpretable measure of the importance of irreversibility and document that the irreversibility premium is both economically and statistically significant.     

How Informative Is Floating NAV When Securities Trade Infrequently?

We examine if a floating net asset value (NAV) increases the transparency of risk for investors. Using closed‐income fixed income funds we find little evidence that a floating NAV helps investors better understand the value and risk of a fund when a fund's assets trade infrequently. This potentially informs the debate regarding the adoption of a floating NAV in the money market industry. Our results suggest that it is unlikely that the benefits of floating NAV will outweigh the costs.     

Transaction Frequency and Commercial Property

Metrics using repeat sale data assume that frequently and infrequently sold properties are similar in capital expenditures, maintenance and other characteristics. Value-added investors concentrate on repositioning properties which requires capital investment and managerial skills. Returns using repeat sales likely overstate appreciation by misattributing this investment. Present results show that frequently and infrequently traded properties represent different property populations. The first sale of a repeat transaction sells at a significant discount compared to single sale properties while the second sale transacts at a premium. The results suggest that repeat sale indices may overstate price appreciation and represent returns for a different, relatively small cohort of properties when compared to the large number of properties that transact only once during a specific time period.     

Forecasting the returns on UK investment trusts: a comparison

The well known fact that investment trusts (closed-end mutual funds in the USA) trade at a discount means that the return to an investor depends not only on the change in net asset value (NAV), but also on changes in the discount over the holding period. Using daily data, this paper models the relationship between UK investment trust prices and NAV's using cointegration methodology then shows that the forecasts based on the, error correction mechanism (ECM) compare poorly with those from vector autoregressions. And then incorporates a number of modifications to the ECM in an attempt to improve the forecasts. In particular, modelling volatility persistance and allow for asymmetric resonses in the ECM.     

A Liquidity-Based Theory of Closed-End Funds

This paper develops a rational, liquidity-based model of closed-endfunds (CEFs) that provides an economic motivation for the existenceof this organizational form: They offer a means for investorsto buy illiquid securities, without facing the potential costsassociated with direct trading and without the externalitiesimposed by an open-end fund structure. Our theory predicts thepatterns observed in CEF initial public offerings (IPOs) andthe observed behavior of the CEF discount, which results froma trade-off between the liquidity benefits of investing in theCEF and the fees charged by the fund's managers. In particular,the model explains why IPOs occur in waves in certain sectorsat a time, why funds are issued at a premium to net asset value(NAV), and why they later usually trade at a discount. We alsoconduct an empirical investigation, which, overall, providesmore support for a liquidity-based model than for an alternativesentiment-based explanation.     

Depreciation-Related Capital Gains,Differential Tax Rates,and the Market Value of Real Estate Investment Trusts

We develop a model for valuing U.S. real estate investment trusts (REITs) that considers the tax liability impounded in REITs’ property portfolios. This liability is a function of the portfolio’s accumulated depreciation and is driven by different tax rates applied to individual components of the total gain from property sales. These two components are the capital gain resulting from the sale of property at a price higher than its cost and the gain due to the recapture of depreciation taken during the use of the property. Our measure of value is the REIT’s net asset liquidation value (NALV). The metric of REIT value currently used by analysts is a REIT’s net asset value (NAV), but a REIT’s NAV will always be greater than the NALV and therefore overestimate market value, all else equal. Finally, using observed market prices for REITs, we provide evidence that NALVs give superior estimates of REIT market prices than do NAVs.     

Motivation and Performance of Seasoned Offerings by Closed-End Funds

We examine the motivation and performance of closed‐end funds that engage in seasoned public or rights offerings. We find that closed‐end funds are more motivated to engage in seasoned offerings when their shares exhibit a relatively high premium (compared to their corresponding NAV) and have a high degree of liquidity. We also find a significant negative valuation effect on average in response to seasoned offerings by closed‐end funds. Our cross‐sectional analysis reveals that the valuation effect at the time of the seasoned offering is more unfavorable for funds that have relatively high expense ratios and are relatively large. Furthermore, we find that the closed‐end funds experience significant negative valuation effects over the three‐year period subsequent to the seasoned offering, implying poor post‐offering performance.     

Closed‐End Fund Discounts and Expected Investment Performance

This article provides empirical support for the theory that closed‐end fund discounts reflect expected investment performance. Evidence is presented to explain how equity closed‐end fund initial public offerings (IPOs) can sell at a premium when existing funds sell at a discount and why the initial IPO premiums decay after the IPO. Relative premium decay data are presented. Tests on (1) the relation between relative premium changes and investment performance following IPOs, (2) relative premium mean‐reversion following management changes, and (3) net redemptions following closed‐end fund open‐endings for funds trading at pre‐open‐ending announcement discounts individually support and collectively strongly support the theory.     

What's your real cost of capital?

In valuing any investment project or corporate acquisition, executives must decide what discount rate to use in their estimates of future cash flows. The traditional approach is to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has remained fundamentally unchanged for 40 years. But the formula--in particular, its beta element--has long been a source of frustration. In fact, corporate executives and investment bankers routinely fudge their CAPM estimates, say the authors, because experience and intuition tell them the model produces inappropriate discount rates. CAPM has three main problems: First, beta is a measure of both a stock's correlation and its volatility; second, beta is based on historical data; and third, CAPM rates don't take into account the term of the investment. These factors together result in discount rates that defy common sense. As an alternative to CAPM and its beta element, the authors developed a forward-looking approach to calculating a company's cost of capital, the market-derived capital pricing model (MCPM). It does not incorporate any measure of historical stock-to-market correlation, relying instead on estimates of future volatility derived from the options market. This is helpful since investor expectations from the options market are built into a company's current stock price. Using GE as an example, the authors give step-by-step instructions for how to calculate discount rates with MCPM. They also offer evidence from a range of industries to show that MCPM's discount rates are more realistic--especially from the corporate investor's perspective--than are CAPM's.     

开放式基金的净值增长能力与证券市场收益的互动关系检验

随着证券投资基金规模的不断增大,基金已经成为我国证券市场上的重要机构投资者,其对证券市场的影响也日益深入。考察股票型开放式基金的净值增长能力及其与证券市场指数收益的互动关系,得出如下结论:(1)我国开放式基金的净值增长率高于市场收益;(2)在一个较长时期内,市场收益的变动是开放式基金净值增长率变动的格兰杰原因,但反过来并不成立;(3)开放式基金的净值增长能力和市场收益之间存在着一种长期的协整关系。     

资源类上市公司的价值评估方法探讨

现有“利润加储量”的评估方法应用于资源类公司仍在某些环节出现悖论。本文认为，资源类上市公司的价值构成应包括矿权重估溢价、正常开采投资收益及个别公司的超额利润。其中，采矿权重估溢价的潜在收益应是在矿权未市场化之前的资源类企业获得的特有收益，但其收益期和相应的折现期也因矿权的逐步市场化而受到采矿权有效期的限制。本文用简单模型估算了主要资源类上市公司的基本价值。     

Accounting‐based Risk Management and the Capital Asset Pricing Model: An Empirical Comparison

Accounting‐based risk management (ABRM) is a theoretically consistent and practical tool for calculating the cost of capital from underlying financial ratios. In this paper, a sample of ABRM‐generated discount factors is used to generate risk‐adjusted returns, which are compared to CAPM equivalent discount factors. In view of the debates about CAPM's validity, alternative models, the nature and scale of the equity risk premium, and the importance of discount rates in capital budgeting and asset valuation, ABRM's characteristics and resulting discount rates offer a potentially useful alternative. Results suggest that although average discount rates are comparable, their cross‐sectional distributions are dissimilar, so that investors in an average risky firm are overcompensated for systematic risk when using CAPM discount rates, because CAPM discount factors overestimate risk arising from fixed costs in most firms.     

Information Transfers across Same–Sector Funds When Closed–End Funds Issue Equity

This study examines the reaction of non–issuing, same–sector funds when a closed–end fund announces a seasoned equity offering. The non–issuing, same–sector funds have a significant, negative announcement–day abnormal return. The abnormal returns for U.S. debt funds are less negative than U.S. equity and international debt funds. The abnormal returns for international debt funds are more negative than international equity funds. Announcement–day abnormal returns are directly related to the announcement–day abnormal return of the issuing fund and the premium/discount of the issuing fund. Announcement–day abnormal returns are inversely related to the premium/discount of the non–issuing, same–sector funds.     

Discount-Rate Risk in Private Equity: Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions

Measures of private equity (PE) performance based on cash flows do not account for a discount-rate risk premium that is a component of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) alpha. We create secondary market PE indices and find that PE discount rates vary considerably. Net asset values are too smooth because they fail to reflect variation in discount rates. Although the CAPM alpha for our index is zero, the generalized public market equivalent based on cash flows is large and positive. We obtain similar results for a set of synthetic funds that invest in small cap stocks. Ignoring variation in PE discount rates can lead to a misallocation of capital.     

VALUATION AND RISK-ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATES

There is a continuing controversy as to whether the use of a constant risk adjusted discount rate in capital budgeting decisions implies that the risk of the cash flows increases over time. This paper shows that valuation using these discount rates implies an increasing premium for risk over time but that the increasing premium is due to the net impact of the uncertainty in the cash flow; uncertainty in future market expectations of the cash flow; and changes in the market price of risk. The risk of the cash flow itself need not be increasing over time.     

Single vs. Multiple Discount Rates: How to Limit “Influence Costs” in the Capital Allocation Process*

Most finance textbooks suggest that companies evaluate investment projects using discount rates that reflect both the debt capacity and the unique risks of the project. In practice, however, companies often use their company‐wide WACC to evaluate such investments because of the difficulty of (and subjectivity involved in) estimating the risk of individual projects, and the potential for managerial bias and influence to distort the estimates. This article proposes a practicable method for calculating the cost of capital that produces different discount rates for investment projects with different risks while minimizing the “influence costs” that arise when managers have discretion in the choice of discount rates. The proposed approach makes use of market information (in the form of the firm‐wide costs of debt and equity), thereby limiting managerial discretion, while typically still providing a good approximation of theoretically correct, project‐specific discount rates. The key to the method's effectiveness is its use of a project's debt capacity to define the capital structure weights, where debt capacity is defined by the amount of debt financing the project will support without lowering the firm's credit rating.     

The Equity Premium

We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951 to 2000, 2.55 percent and 4.32 percent, are much lower than the equity premium produced by the average stock return, 7.43 percent. Our evidence suggests that the high average return for 1951 to 2000 is due to a decline in discount rates that produces a large unexpected capital gain. Our main conclusion is that the average stock return of the last half-century is a lot higher than expected.