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CFO如何推动、捍卫和创造公司价值?中国CFO制度该如何演进?CFO的角色该如何扮演?CFO的管理模式该如何构建?价值管理系统的基本框架该如何设计?对企业的CFO们来说,这些在教科书中找不到现成的答案。显然,向业界成功的顶级CFO们学习是一条非常重要的途径。4月28日晚,本刊邀请到三位来自不同所有制企业的CFO:德国汉高集团大中华区首席财务官王亦东、北京探路者户外用品股份有限 相似文献
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初见陈关中,惊讶于他的年轻.1990年毕业于武汉大学经济管理专业的他,今年不过40出头,却已在中国电力工程顾问集团公司(以下简称中电工程)担任总会计师长达六年. 相似文献
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Ariela Caglio Andrea Dossi Wim A. Van der Stede 《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2018,37(4):265-281
Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005–2009). First, we focus on the CFO role as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs. 相似文献