共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Preston SH 《Medical economics》1997,74(20):69-70, 72, 75
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Guillory GL 《Medical economics》1992,69(3):75, 78-75, 80
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Ling Shen 《Economic Theory》2007,31(2):343-366
Dictatorship is the predominant political system in many developing countries. However, different dictators act quite differently:
a good dictator implements growth-enhancing economic policies, e.g., investment in public education and infrastructure, whereas
a bad dictator taxes her citizens for her own consumption. The present paper provides a theoretical model by deriving underlying
determinants of dictatorial behavior. We assume that the engine of economic growth is private investment. It can increase
the productivity of individuals who invest, as well as the aggregate technological level. A good dictator encourages this
investment in order to tax more. However, the cost of this encouragement is that the ensuing higher growth rate will induce
earlier democratization. In this paper we will illustrate the risk of choosing a growth-enhancing policy, while leading to
additional tax revenues in the short-run will also increase the likelihood of a revolution resulting in the eventual overthrow
of the dictator. Furthermore, we will find that the higher the return from private investments the less likely the dictator
will be a good one. Contrary to McGuire and Olson (J Econ Lit 34:72–96, 1996) we find that a long life-time does not always
induce positive incentives among dictators.
I wish to thank Monika Merz, who carefully read the earlier version of this paper and provided many valuable suggestions.
I also would like to thank the editor, the anonymous referee, Uwe Sunde, Philipp Kircher and participants at the 4th international
annual conference of JEPA for helpful comments. I am grateful to Stephan Heim for his assistance. All possible errors are,
of course, mine. 相似文献
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Terry K 《Medical economics》1996,73(9):114-5, 118-22, 128-31
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Stevens C 《Medical economics》1992,69(1):29-32, 35-6, 38 passim
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Abereniye Atemie-Obuoforibo 《Applied economics》2013,45(11):1443-1453
This study contradicts the view that policy cannot be effective if the welfare variable is a random-walk. Also, the study disagrees with the methodology employed by some proponents of this view, and goes on to show that the conclusion of policy ineffectiveness was only due to a wrong inference procedure. Furthermore, it points out that the notion of policy effectiveness suggests the examination of the relationship between policy and welfare; hence, what to look for is not a trend in the individual time series, but a common trend which relates the policy instrument and the welfare-variable in the policy environment under consideration. 相似文献