高考录取机制的博弈分析

本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果，均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是，真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略，达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制，真实偏好是学生的优势策略，结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制，对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。     

高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析

当前的高考录取机制是用考生的分数和对学校的志愿来分配入学机会的机制,分数是一个公平的指标,分数的高低决定了考生录取时的优先顺序。本文研究了当前高考的录取程序,分析了分数录取机制下的公平和效率问题。由于目前的招生录取机制并不是分数公平的机制,使得录取结果可能是没有效率的。如果使用分数公平的录取机制,考生真实申报对学校的偏好就是他的优势策略,录取结果可以同时达到帕累托最优和分数公平。     

中国高考录取与博士生录取的机制设计

学校录取机制问题是一个教育界广泛讨论的话题。本文探讨了目前高考录取平行志愿制度的优点和缺陷,提出降低投档比例、打通不同院校之间的专业志愿和增加志愿个数可以改进学生的效用损失。而博士生录取是另外一种类型的非统一录取学校录取机制问题,本文设计了一种偏好顺序机制,并证明了这种机制是满足公平、无浪费、个人理性、抗策略且帕累托最优的,最后提出在现实中运用该机制的具体措施。     

中国高考录取与博士生录取的机制设计

学校录取机制问题是一个教育界广泛讨论的话题。本文探讨了目前高考录取平行志愿制度的优点和缺陷,提出降低投档比例、打通不同院校之间的专业志愿和增加志愿个数可以改进学生的效用损失。而博士生录取是另外一种类型的非统一录取学校录取机制问题,本文设计了一种偏好顺序机制,并证明了这种机制是满足公平、无浪费、个人理性、抗策略且帕累托最优的,最后提出在现实中运用该机制的具体措施。     

就业选择机制的博弈分析

就业问题是经济领域的中心问题。在现实社会中，我国的就业选择机制存在着很大的缺陷。本文通过就业选择机制的博弈模型的建立，证明在完全信息时，显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果，并且其均衡结果是帕累托有效和公平的。最后针对当前全球性金融危机为背景的经济形势和中国所面临的就业问题压力，对中国的现状进行了分析，并根据模型对就业选择机制的应用，以及如何有效解决中国的就业问题提出了一些建议。     

成本分担博弈与维克里拍卖机制研究

成本分担博弈中的平均分担机制往往导致参与人低报自己的收益率,从而导致博弈结果的无效率。笔者通过在成本分担博弈中引入维克里机制,利用参与人的占优策略——说真话,使成本分担博弈的结果实现了帕累托最优配置。     

产学研协同创新成本分摊机制研究

产学研协同创新是推动技术创新的一条重要路径,但创新成本分摊机制是影响产学研协同合作的一个重要问题。通过构建充分竞争市场下的多阶段博弈模型,从成本分摊机制角度探究了如何有效推进产学研协同创新。通过模型扩展与求解,获得成本分摊后的帕累托改善以及产学研协同创新的可行路径。结果表明：企业和学研方基于自身收益最大化而进行的成本分摊协商无法实现帕累托最优,而轮流出价博弈模型下的成本分摊形成机制能够有效改善各方收益,并使整体收益达到帕累托最优,因此是一条现实可行的帕累托改善路径,其中,各方获得的收益增量与耐心程度的对比有关。     

医联体背景下的医院合作机制研究

目的是深入研究三级医院对基层医院的合作机制,即三级医院与基层医院间的演化博弈如何实现均衡。方法为运用演化博弈理论构建三级医院的合作机制,分析影响三级医院与基层医院博弈策略选择合作的因素,通过建立复制动态方程,寻求演化稳定策略。结果:基层医院对三级医院所采取的回报措施是三级医院是否选择合作的关键。结论:三级医院的决策行为一方面是根据基层医院回报的附加值大小而决定的,另一方面其决策也反作用于基层医院的决策行为;假使基层医院的决策适当,基于此构建的三级医院合作机制即可充分发挥作用,实现博弈双方各主体的帕累托最优均衡也是可能的。     

论劳资合作博弈中利益的帕累托改进——基于“和谐劳动关系”的分析视角

利益协调是社会主义市场经济条件下劳动关系的本质要求。文章从构建和谐劳动关系的角度出发,阐释了和谐劳动关系的判断标准,认为劳动关系和谐只能是劳资合作所产生的一种可能性结果,而劳资双方利益的帕累托改进则是双方能够产生合作的基本动因;在分析劳资双方的行为偏好基础上,对劳资合作博弈过程中双方利益的帕累托改进及其合作边界展开探讨,并据此提出了相应的政策建议。     

走出经济效率的误区

经济效率即帕累托效率，是根据帕累托标准来衡量所能够达到的最好的状态。达到经济效率要满足交换条件、生产条件、定点条件三个条件。帕累托效率概念本身有很大的局限性，即达到帕累托效率并不能保证实现其他的目标例如公平、自由等等。而且帕累托效率很可能会与公平、自由主义等相冲突；帕累托效率具有与福利主义同样的缺陷。     

On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

This study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly, and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We demonstrate the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game through a simple algorithm that finds it. Specifically, (i) the equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm and (ii) in a one-to-one matching market, it coincides with the student-optimal von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable matching. We also show that (i) when a strict core allocation in a housing market derived from a college admission market exists, it can be supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, and (ii) there exists a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the college-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the student-optimal stable matching is Pareto-efficient for students.     

Early decision and financial aid competition among need-blind colleges and universities

This paper presents a stylized theoretical model of competition among need-blind colleges and universities that implement early decision admissions. Under need-blind admissions, an applicant's financial aid status cannot affect their likelihood of admission. In the model, a need-blind school can use early decision admissions as a screening mechanism to indirectly identify a student's ability-to-pay, while superficially maintaining a need-blind policy. As a result, in equilibrium, non-financial aid students are more likely to be admitted than financial aid students of comparable quality.     

Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism

This paper considers a model of centralized college admission under the Boston mechanism where students may have uncertainty about their priorities. Students have homogeneous ordinal preferences over colleges, but their preference intensities vary, and the exam scores determine their priorities. In equilibrium, student application strategies take a cutoff form. The strategies depend on their exam scores under post-score submissions, on preference intensities under pre-exam submissions, and on both preference intensities and signals about their exam scores under pre-score submissions. Given these equilibrium strategies, students are better off under pre-exam and pre-score submissions than post-score submissions. When students with the same preference intensities and exam scores receive signals of different qualities, those with bad signals could be hurt by those with good signals.     

Competition Among Universities and the Emergence of the Élite Institution

We consider an environment where two education institutions compete by selecting the proportion of their funding devoted to teaching and research and the criteria for admission for their students, and where students choose whether and where to attend university. We study the relationship between the cost incurred by students for attending a university located away from their home town and the equilibrium configuration that emerges in the game played by the universities. Symmetric equilibria, where universities choose the same admission standard, only exist when the mobility cost is high; when the mobility cost is very low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. For intermediate values of the mobility cost, only asymmetric equilibria may exist; the final section of the paper provides an example where asymmetric equilibria do indeed exist for a plausible and robust set of parameters.     

The Scholarship Assignment Problem

There are n graduate students and n faculty members. Each student will be assigned a scholarship by the joint faculty. The socially optimal outcome is that the best student should get the most prestigious scholarship, the second-best student should get the second most prestigious scholarship, and so on. The socially optimal outcome is common knowledge among all faculty members. Each professor wants one particular student to get the most prestigious scholarship and wants the remaining scholarships to be assigned according to the socially optimal outcome. We consider the problem of finding a mechanism such that in equilibrium, all scholarships are assigned according to the socially optimal outcome. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D78.     

Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated Types

In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using sequential mechanisms, i.e., we show that it is possible to obtain the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44; D70.     

Abreu–Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence

Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome. We conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games. In these games one pure-strategy equilibrium is “focal”; we assess the efficacy of Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms for implementing the other pure-strategy equilibrium outcome. Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms induce some choices consistent with the desired outcome, but more choices reflect the focal outcome. Moreover, “strengthening” the mechanism has a perverse effect when the desired outcome is a Pareto-dominated risk-dominated equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C7.     

GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM

A university uses both early-stage selection outcome (high-school affiliation) and late-stage admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to study policies that have been proposed to combat inefficient gaming in college admissions. Increasing university enrollment size can exacerbate gaming and worsen the selection outcome. Abolishing standardized tests for university admissions increases gaming targeting high-school admissions and worsens the selection outcome, whereas eliminating high-school ability sorting may improve the university selection outcome under some cost conditions of gaming. Committing to a lower-powered selection scheme can improve the selection outcome by reducing gaming behaviors.